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The Robbery Paradox
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
Extract
James E. Tomberlin [6] has recently argued that the logical systems of conditional obligation proposed by Azizah al-Hibri [1] and Peter Mott [5] are incapable of resolving at least one variant of the notorious contrary to duty imperative paradox, formulated originally by Chisholm [2]. Tomberlin concedes that these systems offer the very best of the' “conditional obligation approach” to deontic logic and concludes his critical discussion with the pessimistic remark that “the best of this approach is simply not good enough. Deontic logic … is obliged to turn elsewhere for its proper formulation and resolution of the deontic paradoxes” ([6], 373). Below I argue that Tomberlin's three central arguments against al-Hibri and Mott are fallacious.
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- Articles
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , September 1983 , pp. 433 - 440
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1983
References
[2]Chisholm, R., “Contrary to Duty Imperatives and Deontic Logic”, Analysis 24 (1963), 33–36.Google Scholar
[3]DeCew, J. W., “Conditional Obligation and Counterfactuals”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (1981), 55–72.Google Scholar
[5]Mott, P., “On Chisholm's Paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1973), 197–211.Google Scholar
[6]Tomberlin, J. E., “Contrary to Duty Imperatives and Conditional Obligation”, Nous 15 (1981), 357–375.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[7]van Fraassen, B. C., “The Logic of Conditional Obligation”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1972), 417–438.Google Scholar