Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-dh8gc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-02T20:40:22.688Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Robbery Paradox

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Mark Vorobej
Affiliation:
University of Toronto

Extract

James E. Tomberlin [6] has recently argued that the logical systems of conditional obligation proposed by Azizah al-Hibri [1] and Peter Mott [5] are incapable of resolving at least one variant of the notorious contrary to duty imperative paradox, formulated originally by Chisholm [2]. Tomberlin concedes that these systems offer the very best of the' “conditional obligation approach” to deontic logic and concludes his critical discussion with the pessimistic remark that “the best of this approach is simply not good enough. Deontic logic … is obliged to turn elsewhere for its proper formulation and resolution of the deontic paradoxes” ([6], 373). Below I argue that Tomberlin's three central arguments against al-Hibri and Mott are fallacious.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1983

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

[1]al-Hibri, A., Deontic Logic (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978).Google Scholar
[2]Chisholm, R., “Contrary to Duty Imperatives and Deontic Logic”, Analysis 24 (1963), 3336.Google Scholar
[3]DeCew, J. W., “Conditional Obligation and Counterfactuals”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (1981), 5572.Google Scholar
[4]Leblanc, H. and Wisdom, W., Deductive Logic (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972).Google Scholar
[5]Mott, P., “On Chisholm's Paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1973), 197211.Google Scholar
[6]Tomberlin, J. E., “Contrary to Duty Imperatives and Conditional Obligation”, Nous 15 (1981), 357375.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[7]van Fraassen, B. C., “The Logic of Conditional Obligation”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1972), 417438.Google Scholar