Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-tf8b9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T20:37:12.396Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Piaget's Genetic Epistemology and the Problem of Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Gary F. Greif
Gary F. Greif
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Green Bay
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Piaget's work represents, f?om his own point of view, not only a study of intelligence, but a remedy for philosophical studies of the same subject matter. Philosophy in general, according to Piaget, “does not give us knowledge, as it lacks methods of verification”, that is, it does not give knowledge of anything except the personality of the philosopher “sim-ply meditating in his study by the light of his own reason”. Philosophical reflection can serve a heuristic function, but cannot yield objective knowledge, of truth. Piaget succinctly states this crucial methodologicalposition as follows:

Although speculative reflection is a fertile and even necessary heuristic introduction to all inquiry, it can only lead to the elaboration of hypotheses, as sweeping as you like, to be sure, but as long as one does not seek verification by a group of facts established experimentally or by a deduction conforming to an exact algorithm (as in logic), the criterion of truth can only remain subjective, in the manner of an intuitive satisfaction, of “self-evidence,” etc.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , Autumn 1987 , pp. 501 - 512
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1987

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Piaget, Jean, insights and Illusions of Philosophy, trans. Mays, Wolfe (New York, NY and Cleveland, OH: World Pubishing, 1971), 11–12.Google Scholar For the previous quotations, cf. ibid., 216 and 217.

2 Piaget, of course, has given attention in his works to logic as well as to experimentation. When the issue is philosophy's ability to attain truth, however, he stresses conformity to facts. Cf. for example his Introduction à L'Épistémologie Génétique, Tome 1, La Pensée Mathematique (Päris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), 27: “Le développement mental de l'individu et le développement historique des sciences constituent en effet, des données réelles dont chacun des grandes solutions de I'épistémologie philosophique est bien obligée de s'accommoder et qu'elte ne saurait par conséquent considérer D'avance comme contradictoires avec elles. Or, la méthode génétique se borne àétudier ces données de fait, en tant que processus d'accroissement des connaissances.”Google Scholar

3 Piaget, Jean, The Principles of Genetic Epistemology, trans. Mays, Wolfe (New York: Basic Books, 1972), 90–91.Google Scholar The same position concerning intellectual adaptation to an independentreality canbe found throughout his works. Cf., for example, Introduction à LÉpistémologie Génétique, Tome 3, La Pensée Biologique, La Pensée Psycholo-gique, et La Pensée Sociologique, 307–308; ibid., Tome 2, La Pensée Physique, 345; Insights and Illusions of Philosophy, 10; Biology andKnowledge, trans. Walsh, Beatrix (Chicago, IL and London: Univeisity of Chicago press, 1971), 361 and 362;Google ScholarStructuralism, trans. Maschler, Chaninah (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 112;Google ScholarThe Mechanisms of Perception, trans. Seagrim, G. N. (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 357–358;Google ScholarAdaptation and Intelligence: Organic Selection and Phenocopy, trans. Eames, Stewart (Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 79Google Scholar.

4 Piaget, Jean, The Development of Thought, Equilibration ofCognitive Structures, trans. Rosin, Arnold (New York: Viking Press, 1977), 39–40. Cf. Adaptation and intelligence, 79; Biology and Knowledge, 8–9, n. 3.Google Scholar

5 Piaget, Jean, The Origins of Intelligence in Children (New York: Norton, 1952), 418–419.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Cf. Piaget, Jean, “The Myth of the Sensorial Origin of Scientific Knowledge”, Psychology and Epistemology (New York: Penguin, 1977), chap. 4, 63–88. Cf. as well The Mechanisms of Perception, 364CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Piaget, , The Mechanisms of Perception, 366.Google Scholar

8 Piaget, Jean, Psychology of Intelligence (Patterson, NJ: Littlefield, 1963), 124.Google Scholar

9 Piaget, , The Origins of Intelligence in Children, 49–55.Google Scholar

10 Piaget, , The Mechanisms of Perception, 364.Google Scholar

11 Piaget, , The Principles of Genetic Epistemology, 80. Cf. also the references above in n. 4.Google Scholar

12 Piaget, , The Mechanisms of Perception, 357–358.Google Scholar

13 Cf. Piaget, , Psychology of Intelligence, 76Google Scholar.

14 Piaget, , Introductlon à L'Épistémologie Génétique, Tome 2, 345.Google Scholar

15 Piaget, , The Origins of Intelligence in Children, 46.Google Scholar

16 Cf., for example, Piaget, , “The Circle of Science”, Psychology and Epistemology, chap. 5, §6, 116–120Google Scholar.

17 Cf. the quotation in the text above, 502, and the references in n. 4.

18 Piaget, , Biology and Knowledge, 361.Google Scholar

19 Piaget, , The Mechanisms of Perception, 359.Google Scholar

20 Ibid., 357–358.