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L’individuation des parties temporelles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

MURIEL CAHEN
MURIEL CAHEN*
Affiliation:
Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris (EHESS, ENS, CNRS)
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

All perdurantists claim that objects persist by having different temporal parts at different moments of their existence. Nevertheless, while most of them argue that temporal parts are individuated by their temporal boundaries, a minority claim that they are individuated by a principle of unity. After a critical review of these two options, I will argue in favour of a new version of the second one, by showing that it provides a better defence of perdurantism against other conceptions of persistence.

Tous les perdurantistes soutiennent que les objets persistent dans le temps en ayant différentes parties temporelles à différents moments de leur existence. Cependant, alors que la majorité d’entre eux considère que les parties temporelles sont individuées par leurs limites temporelles, une minorité pense qu’elles sont individuées par un principe d’unité. Après un examen critique de ces deux options, je défendrai une nouvelle version de la seconde, notamment en montrant qu’elle est mieux à même de défendre le perdurantisme face aux les autres conceptions de la persistance.

Keywords

individuationméréologiepartie temporelleperdurancetemps
Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 56 , Issue 4 , December 2017 , pp. 745 - 773
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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