Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T20:19:53.029Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Kant's conception of the Noumenon*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2010

Sadik J. Al-Azm
Affiliation:
American University of Beirut

Extract

In treating of our subject three notions stand out prominently: the noumenon, the thing-in-itself and the transcendental object = X. In his commentary on The Transcendental Analytic, Robert P. Wolff has studied very carefully the question of the relationship between the notion of a transcendental object and that of the thing-in-itself. He noted and explained the passages of The Critique in which Kant means by the transcendental object simply the thing-in-itself and the passages in which he means by it something different such as “the concept of the ground of the unity of a manifold of representations in one consciousness.” There is little to be added, at this time, to Wolff's thorough investigations of this aspect of the problem.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1968

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Wolff, R. P., Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 135150, 313–316.Google Scholar

2 Ibid., p. 314.

3 Ibid., p. 95.

4 Wolff stresses this point heavily, p. 312.