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Ignorance and Evidence in Hume Scholarship

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

John P. Wright
John P. Wright
Affiliation:
University of Windsor
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Abstract

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Type
Intervention
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , Winter 1987 , pp. 731 - 734
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1987

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References

1 Wilson, Fred, “Wright's Enquiry Concerning Humean Understanding”, Dialogue 25 (1986), 747–752.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, L. A., 2nd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 267.Google Scholar

3 Wright, J. P., The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 132–133.Google Scholar

4 Wilson, , “Wright's Enquiry”, 751.Google Scholar

5 Ibid., note 7.

6 Hume, , Treatise, 267.Google Scholar

7 This has been further developed in my “Hume's Academic Scepticism: A Reinterpretation of his Philosophy of Human Understanding”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (1986), 407–435.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 See Price, H. H., Hume's Theory of the External World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940)Google Scholar. Unlike many of his followers, Price carefully presented his interpretation of Hume's ontology and epistemology as a reconstruction of his philosophy. The obvious problem with this reconstruction is that it leaves no room for any serious scepticism in Hume's philosophy. There is nothing of which we lack knowledge.

9 Cf. Wilson, , “Wright's Enquiry”, 752.Google Scholar