Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T18:09:36.994Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Aitia as generative factor in Aristotle's philosophy*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

J.M. Moravcsik
J.M. Moravcsik
Affiliation:
Stanford University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Today we tend to think that such diverse entities as facts of nature, mathematical propositions, and plans for action call for different kinds of accounts. Facts of nature require explanations, mathematical propositions demand proof, and plans for action call for justification. Though explaining, proving, and justifying all count as intellectual activities, it would be alien to most modern frameworks to envisage a general scheme within which these activities would be interrelated, and common denominators established. Still, such a program is hardly unreasonable since all three activities involve understanding. One wants to understand nature, one wants to understand mathematical propositions, and one wants to understand plans for action.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , December 1975 , pp. 622 - 638
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1975

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See my “Aristotle on Adequate Explanations,” forthcoming in Synthese.

2 See my “Recollecting the Theory of Forms,” forthcoming in an anthology on Plato, published by Florida State University.