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From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

JULIEN A. DEONNA  and
FABRICE TERONI
JULIEN A. DEONNA
Affiliation:
University of Geneva
FABRICE TERONI
Affiliation:
University of Bern
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the roles of motivational bases. Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for justified evaluative judgements.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 55 - 77
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2012

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Footnotes

*

We are grateful to Anja Berninger, Roger Crisp, Sabine Döring, Eva Düringer, Julien Dutant, Peter Goldie, Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Federico Lauria, Anika Lutz, Adam Morton, Kevin Mulligan, Bence Nanay, Raffaele Rodogno, Sabine Roeser and Mikko Salmela for their very helpful comments on a previous version of this paper.

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