This article discusses the ‘Mediterranean model’ of household formation proposed by Laslett and others in the early 1980s and argues that the notion of a Mediterranean culture area has been used in significantly different ways by family historians and social anthropologists. Drawing its materials mainly from research conducted on Italy, it examines the changing relationships through time between nuptiality and household composition, the extent and structural characteristics of servanthood, and the functions of the family as a welfare agency. It is suggested that some concepts that recent generations of Mediterraneanist anthropologists have tended to question or utterly reject (including female honour) might still prove useful to shed light on a number of perplexing features of family life in Italy and the rest of southern Europe.

Robert Putnam's influential article ‘Bowling alone: America's declining social capital’ puts forward a number of possible factors to explain the decline of civil society in the USA. Many of these same forces are also at work in America's erstwhile colony in Asia, the Philippines, where almost the opposite outcome is true if one can measure such things as social capital by the activity of formal and informal associations and networks devoted to mutual assistance. Unlike Americans, however, Filipinos are exposed to a much higher degree of everyday risk. This article traces the evolution of mutual benefit associations and networks and suggests that it is in precisely those geographical regions most exposed to personal misfortune and community danger that they proliferate most readily.

Revisionist historians maintain that the aged in nineteenth-century America and north-western Europe usually preferred to reside alone or with only their spouse. According to this interpretation, the aged ordinarily resided with their adult children only out of necessity, especially in cases of poverty or infirmity. This article challenges that position, arguing that in mid-nineteenth-century America coresidence of the aged with their children was almost universal, and that the poor and sick aged were the group most likely to live alone. The article suggests that the decline of the multigenerational family in the twentieth century is connected to the rise of wage labour and the diminishing importance of agricultural and occupational inheritance.

This article addresses the subject of the first well-attested outbreak of bubonic plague in the history of the Mediterranean world – the so-called ‘Justinianic Plague’ of the sixth century. The African origin of the disease is examined and contextualized, whilst recent revisionist arguments in relation to the scale of the depopulation caused by the plague are responded to with reference to the numismatic, legal, and papyrological sources. The numismatic evidence in particular points to a major crisis in imperial finances for which large-scale depopulation would be the most likely cause. The legal and papyrological sources record how both landowners and the imperial authorities responded to this situation.

The evidence of criminal court records suggests that almost all London wives were engaged in gainful occupations in the eighteenth century. The records of the City livery companies and of Christ's Hospital show that the wives of craft masters and professional men worked, as well as those in poorer families where their income was essential. At lower socio-economic levels it was unusual for couples to work in the same trade. At middling levels it was more common, especially in textiles and retail, but no more than half of couples worked together or in related occupations.

Mortality change has traditionally been considered a necessary prerequisite to any long-term reduction in fertility. In Frank Notestein's original statement of the demographic transition theory, societies went from high to low levels of fertility and mortality by means of a path in which mortality declined first and was followed at a shorter or longer lag by fertility. Subsequently Abdel Omran outlined a number of scenarios of demographic transition, all of which reflected simultaneous or prior declines of mortality as a major factor stimulating fertility reduction. While Omran's view of the epidemiological transition goes on to emphasize many other aspects of mortality decline, his view of it as an agent for fertility decline is similar to Notestein's.

This understanding of the mortality–fertility synergy is based on two very general conceptions of historical reality which both Omran and Notestein share with many people working in the field of historical demography. For one, there has never been a society known to historians in which fertility was high and mortality low, or mortality high and fertility low, except in moments of epidemic or economic or political stress, for relatively brief periods of time, or among very specific historic sub-populations. Normally mortality and fertility have ended up adjusting to each other more or less efficiently so as to ensure moderate rates of population growth. Moreover, high levels of fertility and mortality invariably were replaced by moderate ones during the demographic transition. Secondly, one of the reasons that the demographic transition holds such an allure for most historians is that it was a period of history in which societal traditions appear to have succumbed to the weight of rational choices made by families in order to ensure their best welfare in the face of changing circumstances. The initial instigator of the change, one would reasonably suspect, had to have been a decline in mortality with increasing numbers of children surviving beyond infancy. Faced with this reality, families made the decision to give individual choice priority over social norms and ended up curtailing their fertility. The entire context of social, economic and cultural modernization contributed to people's willingness to adopt new strategies when faced with new realities, but intuitively the point of departure would seem to have been incipient mortality transformation.

This article examines the impact of landholding and differences in local economies on age at marriage, on frequency of service and on household size and structure in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Particular stress is placed on the role of economic rather than cultural factors as determinants of regional variations in marriage age and household structures. Households were more complex whenever land, the accumulation of capital and multiple occupations were required for economic activity. Conversely, wage work – whether in fishing or agriculture and regardless of geographical location (for example in eastern as well as western Finland) – favoured the formation of small nuclear households. Some aspects of the family system (servanthood and a late age at marriage) fit the characteristics of the north-west European household system as delineated by John Hajnal and Peter Laslett better than others (frequency of complex households). It is concluded that there is no inevitable correlation between geographic location and the characteristics of a society's family system and that the model of the north-west European household system does not accommodate those societies where people were in a position to build strategies based on the continuous possession of land.

In the eighteenth century, the condition of English wives under ‘coverture’ was both defended as one of privilege and attacked as worse than slavery. This article suggests that married women were not in reality confined within coverture's regulations on credit and property ownership. Their economic activities were fairly broad and flexible and they had an instinctive sense of possession over some goods during wedlock, perceiving their contributions to marriage as a pooling of resources for familial benefit. It will be suggested that wives did not necessarily think that their conduct in acting as if some marital property was legally theirs was illegitimate, because it was facilitated by coverture and the legal devices that allowed it to function.

Attempts to account for the pattern and progress of mortality decline in England and Wales in the nineteenth century have produced a literature in which something of a general accord exists over key factors involved. Historians acknowledge the influence of two broad trends of change: environmental improvements as a result of sanitary reform initiatives and nutritional improvements as a consequence of a rise in the general standard of living. Where discord has arisen is in the degree of attachment of individual historians to one or other of these trends as primary contributor. The study of mortality decline, which was the product of a complex amalgam of factors, has proved a complicated task. It is one whose outcome ultimately depends upon efforts to disaggregate and measure the influences of different factors involved. To date, attempts at the systematic measurement of certain key factors associated with mortality decline have lagged considerably behind acceptance of the importance of their measurement. An important omission has been a measure of the timing and dimensions of sanitary reform programmes which, via infrastructure development and environmental controls, had the potential to decrease the rate at which infectious diseases were transmitted. This article examines the trends which emerge from a quantification of local government expenditures on sanitary infrastructure and from attention to its phasing over time. We are concerned with two main issues: to what extent do public health expenditure data describe the public health effort, and how do trends in public health expenditure relate to the decline of mortality? Our subject is local authority sanitary reform as a factor in mortality decline and our focus is on the impact of the timing of public health expenditure rather than the reasons for that timing. We do not examine inter-relationships between sanitary reform and other factors contributing to mortality decline such as income levels and density factors. A call for a more comprehensive study of the sanitary undertakings of local government has been common amongst historians of nineteenth-century mortality decline. It has been acknowledged on both sides of the ‘nutrition versus sanitation’ debate that a probable causal relationship exists between sanitary reforms and declining mortality levels. What has been lacking is a study of sufficient scale and detail to enable comprehensive evaluation.

The realization that European family forms are failing to converge as predicted by modernization theory has led many scholars to suspect that the broad regional differences detected by historians persist in the present and are likely to influence future developments. This article outlines some relevant hypotheses prompted by historical studies about the role of family and kinship as sources of social security and analyses the results of comparative work on contemporary Europe, paying special attention to the relative weight of cultural and structural factors. Although differences still appear to predominate over commonalities, it is not inconceivable that in certain important respects European countries might paradoxically converge, owing to the generalized decline of the welfare state, towards forms of welfare provision that are closer to the ‘familialistic’ models of southern and eastern Europe than to the ‘modern’ models of Scandinavia and north-western Europe.

This article summarizes aspects of the decline in infant mortality in the five Nordic countries. During the nineteenth century, both the levels of infant mortality and its development differed among the Nordic countries. At an early date, Denmark, Norway and Sweden stood out as the countries with the lowest levels in Europe whereas levels of infant mortality in Iceland and Finland were comparatively high. Within the countries there were large regional differences that often crossed national borders. Artificial feeding characterized most of the areas with the highest infant mortality. Within the different countries the high infant mortality came to be seen as a problem during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The spread of information, midwives as agents of change and high literacy are factors that have been proven important in explaining the subsequent decline.

English population history from family reconstitution 1580–1837 (Cambridge, 1997) is an impressive volume. This ambitious study represents the culmination of a quarter-century of laborious research by four of the most accomplished practitioners of English historical demography, E. A. Wrigley, R. S. Davies, J. E. Oeppen, and R. S. Schofield. The sheer volume of information is overwhelming; the book contains 121 tables and 73 graphs, and it weighs in at almost 2½ pounds. The study is a landmark in the field of pre-industrial population history. It contributes important new evidence on long-run trends in fertility, mortality, and marriage behaviour. Even more exciting than the refinement of the aggregate results contained in previous work by the Cambridge Group, however, is the new kinds of analyses made possible by the existence of microdata. The book marshals an array of innovative methods to address a remarkable assortment of demographic issues. The authors address dozens of topics previously hidden from view, ranging from an ingenious analysis of the relative mortality of monozygotic and dyzygotic twins, to an important investigation of lifetime fecundity, to an exhaustive analysis of the seasonality of mortality.