This article reviews the history of factor markets in pre-colonial West Africa, both during and after the Atlantic slave trade. The forms and volume of these markets strongly reflected the natural and technological environment, and a horizontally and vertically uneven distribution of coercive and purchasing power. The general abundance of land and absence of economies of scale in production militated against contracting for land and free labour. Hence the most widespread and large-scale factor market was in slaves. Capital and credit were transacted mostly within networks of trust and/or on the security of human pawns. With considerable social costs, variously reinforced and restricted by states, pawning and (especially) the intra-West-African slave trade channelled labour into the production of commodities for sale, contributing to the nineteenth-century growth of certain coastal and interior economies. It was only in the latter era that land rights began to be commercialized. This was not a response to a general shift in factor ratios, but rather to demand for specific kinds of land in specific places, stimulated by the growth of export markets for agricultural commodities.

Factor markets of sorts did exist in the more highly developed areas of early modern Southeast Asia, and they became more efficient in the course of time (although not in a linear process). However, in other more remote areas land was hardly ever sold, labour could not be hired and money was rare. Neither was the institutional framework conducive to economic growth, mainly because the rule of law did not apply where the ruler was concerned. This state of affairs goes a long way to explain why levels of economic growth were lower in Southeast Asia than they were in Western Europe at the same time.

Modern English factor markets originated during the two centuries of active commercialization that preceded the Black Death. An active labour market was established by the late twelfth century. Evolution of a land market followed the legal reforms of the 1170s and 1180s, which created legally secure and defensible property rights in land. These rights stimulated growth of a capital market, since land became a security against which credit could be obtained. Nevertheless, none of these nascent factor markets functioned unconstrained and each became embedded in legal, tenurial, and institutional complexities and rigidities which it took later generations centuries to reform.

The most important determinant of Ottoman economic institutions and their evolution in the early modern era needs to be sought in the Empire's social structure and political economy. Merchants and producers were never in a position to influence the state elites and to push for institutional changes that would favour the growth of the private sector. As a result, many of the key institutions of the Ottoman order, including the state ownership of land and the urban guilds, remained intact until the nineteenth century. In contrast, institutions related to state borrowing changed significantly. This difference in the political power of different groups explains – better than geography or resource endowments, Islam or culture – the striking divergence in the trajectory of different factor markets.

This article revisits an argument that land, labour and credit market transactions in India were restructured by colonialism and globalization, in a manner that left peasants and labourers worse off than before. It shows that the process of change was more diverse than this approach considers, and that it was shaped also by social institutions. I argue further that growth and welfare outcomes of the process cannot be fully understood in terms of market imperfection and state policy. For that purpose, it is necessary to pay more attention to environmental factors and local society.

This article examines the markets for land and labour in traditional Japan, where peasant families accounted for 80 per cent of the population; it focuses on the extent of these markets and how they operated. The survey of evidence, both literary and statistical, indicates that, while the size of the factor markets was small and limited, lease arrangements for farmland and the markets for seasonal labour and the rural–urban transfer of manpower functioned rather well. It is therefore suggested that market forces must have played an indispensable part in the process of Tokugawa Japan's proto-industrialization and Smithian growth.