When Joseph Partsch wrote ‘Flavii Cresconii Corippi de vita paucissima comperta habemus’ in the preface (p. xliii) to his long-standard edition (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 1879), he was not exaggerating. Yet this has not prevented scholars (including Partsch himself!) from equipping the poet with a career, largely in Constantinople. Most recently, some of the details have been revived (albeit with decent caution) in the admirable edition of the In laudem Justini Augusti minoris by Averil Cameron. But almost every item is based solely on guesswork; the supposed career may seem to melt away under a fresh and dispassionate look at what has passed for evidence.

Arrian was better qualified to understand the nature and significance of ‘the pursuit’ in Macedonian warfare than any modern scholar. He had himself fought and commanded in a very similar kind of warfare, and he was keenly interested in the study of military tactics. He was also better informed about the pursuits which Alexander had conducted, because he was able to use the accounts of Alexander's contemporaries, Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Anyone today who wishes to question the veracity of Arrian's reports of these pursuits cannot do so of his own experience. He should therefore turn to comparable pursuits of recent times which have been reported accurately beyond any shadow of doubt.

We know of the Atinian plebiscite only from a tantalizing reference of Gellius, apparently citing Ateius Capito: ‘nam et tribunis, inquit plebis senatus habendi ius erat, quamquam senatores non essent ante Atinium plebiscitum.’ Willems was able to note two interpretations, one of which held that the plebiscite required that all tribunes be senators already, the other that it allowed tribunes the enjoyment of senatorial rights. The first was rightly rejected; since all we know disallows the notion that an aedileship would precede the tribunate, senatorial status could only come after the quaestorship and while there were only eight or less quaestors, clearly ten tribunes could hardly all be ex-quaestors. Consequently Willems adopted the second alternative: acquisition of the tribunate entailed the ius sententiae dicendae in the senate.

Among the most prominent supporters of Perdikkas, son of Orontes, were his brother Alketas and Attalos, son of Andromenes, their brother-in-law. That the latter was an unwavering supporter of Perdikkas has not been challenged, nor that his career was advanced by the prestige of the ‘chiliarchos’ at the time of Alexander's death. Crucial to the discussion of the career of Attalos, therefore, is the date of his marriage to Atalante, for which we have only the ambiguous testimony of Diodoros (above). And, while modern scholars claim that the marriage cannot be dated, they have had a tendency to assume that it was contracted during Alexander's lifetime. There is, however, a case to be made for a later date, one that will give us cause to reconsider Attalos' role in the last years of Alexander's reign and in the struggle for power that followed the King's death.

The degrees of formality into which speech can be graded are in no sphere more obvious than in expressions of address and third-person reference. Methods of naming vary according to many factors: the formality of the circumstances in which naming takes place, the nature of the subject under discussion, and the ages, sex, and relative status of the speaker and addressee. Conventions of naming sometimes reflect the rigidity or otherwise of social divisions. In some societies or circles address between superior and subordinate is non-reciprocal: the speaker with the greater prestige will adopt one form of address, the subordinate another. In other societies when unequals address each other both may use the same formal method of address: the difference of prestige is not explicitly acknowledged.

Dikaiopolis, having borrowed a beggar's disguise from Euripides, is about to return to the place where he has set the butcher's block over which he will make his defence of his private peace-treaty. He finds, however, that his (or ) is reluctant to take the plunge. ‘Forward now, my soul,’ he says to it, ‘here's [or ‘there's’] the . What does mean here? Plainly we are meant to think of a foot-race; but is the ‘line’ in question the starting line or the finishing line? The question has implications for production. If it is the starting line, Dikaiopolis must point to an imaginary line on the ground just in front of him; if the finishing line, he must point to the block. The scholia take ypanfiri to mean ‘starting line’ here; but this sense has no fifth-century support. At this date ypanfiri in connection with races meant always ‘finishing line’ (Pind. Pytb. 9.

In the opening verses of P.Oxy. 2370 (= 655 PMG) Corinna declares that she is about to sing lovely to the white-robed ladies of Tanagra. These lines come from the same poem or collection of poems cited by Hephaestion (Encb. 16.3 p.56 Cons.) and Antoninus Liberalis (25) as which must be a corruption of the original at the hands of a copyist who read the unfamiliar as .

The meaning of eluded the first editor, E. Lobel, who describes it as ‘etymologically mysterious’, and has not been investigated by others, yet one does not have to look very far to find it. or better, the singular can be understood as a formation of the same type as and ) In their verbal forms, the stems of these nouns change to e-grade giving from and from .3 If the analogy is correct, we would expect that would be formed from and a verb from

In 50 B.C. Cicero writes to Atticus as follows (Att. 7.2.1): ‘Brundisium uenimus VII Kalend. Decembr. usi tua felicitate nauigandi; ita belle nobis flauit ab Epiro lenissimus Onchesmites. hunc si cui boles pro tuo uendito.’ The antonomasia, the euphonic sibilance, and the mannered rhythm (the five-word line with fourth foot homodyne; the spondaic fifth foot) are all prominent in Cicero's hexameter. The line is a humorously concocted example of affected and Grecizing narrative. But it is also a line which, Atticus is to suppose, would value; presumably therefore it is meant to hit off characteristics of their style. Cicero must in fact be parodying what he regards as a typical ‘neoteric’ line, and the significance of this simple fact has perhaps been underestimated.

The problems connected with the Cornificii of the late Republic are various, and all concerned with identification. I have no major discoveries to present, but various minor rectifications and suggestions to make, which should give the younger Q. Cornificius at least more substance. Where he is concerned, one basic identification has been, rightly, generally accepted: that made by Jerome between the poet of the name and the Cornificius who fell in Africa in the wars of the Triumvirate, abandoned by the soldiers whom he had castigated as ‘hares in helmets’. I do not wish to discuss here in any detail the military career of Cornificius; son of the man, like him Quintus, who stood in vain for the consulship of 63, he fought with success for Caesar as quaestor pro praetore in Illyricum in 48; he was rewarded, probably in 47 when Caesar doled out many priesthoods, with the augurate, and went out to govern Cilicia, only to find himself called on to help in suppressing Caecilius Bassus' revolt in Syria.

Columella in his Res Rustica always speaks of the bailiff (uilicus) as the slave of the owner of the farm, but in his Preface he states that the owner sometimes sent a mercenarius to be bailiff, and this has by some scholars been taken to mean that a freeborn labourer could be appointed. Since such a possibility is not mentioned by Columella elsewhere or by any other Roman writer, it is probable that the term mercenarius in the Preface has been misunderstood. Hired labourers in ancient Rome included slaves as well as freemen.

‘Saving the appearances’, , is a slogan that, in its time, stood or was made to stand for many different methodological positions in many different branches of ancient natural science. It is not my aim, in this paper, to attempt to tackle the subject as a whole. I shall concentrate on just one inquiry, astronomy. Nor, with astronomy, can I do justice to all the complexities of what was certainly one of the central methodological issues, if not the central issue, in the history of ancient theoretical astronomy. I have a quite limited aim, to examine the foundations, and test the applicability, of a widespread and influential line of interpretation of ancient Greek astronomy according to which it was essentially, or at least predominantly, what we may call ‘instrumentalist’ in character—that is, broadly speaking, that Greek astronomical theories were devices or fictions put forward purely for the sake of calculations with no claims to correspond with physical reality.

Both and are guaranteed by the London scholia (Pfeiffer vol. i, p.3), so the gap is reduced to the tantalizingly small one of a monosyllabic feminine noun in the accusative case, most probably of four letters. The number of possibilities cannot be unlimited. My own suggestion must necessarily remain in limbo in the present state of our knowledge concerning the poet or poets whom Callimachus is talking about, but at least it seems to me less bizarre than other restorations currently in the field.

Recent months have brought forth a new edition of Nemesianus and a 294-page study of the textual tradition that he shares with Calpurnius. The edition, prepared by P. Volpilhac for Budé (Paris, 1975), offers nothing new on the tradition beyond reports of a few manuscripts known to previous editors; but Luigi Castagna's book I bucolici latini minori: una ricerca di critica testuale (Florence, 1976) makes an earnest attempt at solving once and for all the problems that survived the last contribution of any weight, Giarratano's edition (Naples, 1910). Though most of what Castagna says is true, however, his readers may be cushioned against the sharper points by an undue amount of padding, which also fails to hide gaps. Before he proceeds to his own edition of Nemesianus, therefore, a few things can usefully be said.

Recent years have brought to light much new evidence which has sometimes compelled considerable revision of the consular fasti of the early Empire. Of especial importance have been the large number of tabulae ceratae forthcoming from the area around the Bay of Naples and the new fragments or reinterpretations of known fragments of municipal fasti The aim of the present paper is to examine the effect which recent discoveries have had on knowledge of the fasti for the reign of Claudius and in the light of the interpretation of this new evidence to produce a revised list of consuls for the period 41–54.

The argument attributed to the Laws of Athens at Crito 50 a ff. relies on three main propositions, firstly that disobedience to law harms persons, secondly that the relationship between citizen and state is analogous to that between child and parent, and thirdly that the citizen makes a tacit compact to obey the laws. The connection between these three is not entirely clear and I shall consider how the first proposition is related to the second, and then how the second is related to the third. Both these problems, which are important for the assessment of Plato's conclusions, appear in obscurities in the structure of the speech of the Laws.

The awkwardness of the word in 997 has called forth various transpositions and excisions, but none so far suggested seems to put the passage right. Thus Fraenkel excised 991—6 and 1005 f. Professor H. Lloyd-Jones very rightly defends the passage against this, advocating the placing of 991—6 between 1005 and 1006. But although the verses do indeed fit here, is still slightly odd, since a few lines come between Orestes' first talking of the robe (980 ff.) and his next mention of it (997), and in these lines both Clytemnestra and Aegisthus are mentioned.

In the Republic, Socrates undertakes to defend justice as being in itself a benefit to its possessor. Does he do this, or does he change the subject? In a well-known article, David Sachs pointed out that there seems to be a shift in what Plato is defending. The challenge to Socrates is put by Thrasymachus, who admires the successful unjust man, and by Glaucon and Adeimantus, who do not, but are worried that justice has no adequate defence against Thrasymachus. In all these passages justice is discussed in terms of the non-performance of actions which are regarded as unjust according to common morality; Sachs calls this common concept of ordinary justice ‘vulgar justice’.

For E. Badian the story of Pompeius Strabo's desire for a second consulship in 88, though implausible, was too well documented to require citation of sources. In fact it is not well documented and seems to depend solely on one disputed passage: Veil. Pat. 2.21.2. Others, far less cautious than Badian, have not scrupled, however, to accept it as uncontested fact and on it to build unlikely hypotheses, despite the long scholarly controversy as to whether it refers to 88 or 86. It is my belief that it can be shown that the passage almost unquestionably refers to the ambitions Pompeius Strabo entertained in 87 with regard to the consulship of 86.

Altum gurgitem Tigris premens: what is Tigris doing? Gronovius has no remark to the point. The context however points the way to interpretation. For in the list of four rivers, two others are given some word or phrase to characterize them: Hydaspes is gemmifer and Baetis is said to give his name to nearby lands. Thus altum gurgitem premens should refer to some characteristic act or condition of Tigris, not to a unique or casual occurrence. H. M. Kingery (1908, reprinted 1966) cannot be right in saying that ‘the Tigris, noted for its swift current, is pictured here as checking its deep torrent, so as to water the plants that grow in or near its bed’;

In the third book of Cicero's De re publica L. Furius Philus, one of the protagonists, is assigned the task of putting the case against justice. Among his arguments he makes the familiar claim that justice is a product of society, not of nature (3.13: ‘ius… civile est aliquod, naturale nullum’). If, he explains, justice and injustice were natural phenomena, they would be the same for all men, but in fact people hold very diverse views on what is just. This argument is supported by a motley collection of exempla: the Egyptians worship Apis, a bull; while the Greeks and the Romans fill their temples with statues in human form, the Persians consider such practices to be sacrilege; various nations indulge in human sacrifice; the Cretans and Aetolians hold the view that brigandage is perfectly respectable; the Spartans used to claim as their own all the territory which their spears might touch; the Athenians used to take public oaths that all land which produced olives and grain belonged to them; the Gauls despised corn-growing and raided the fields of others instead. All these instances would be familiar to Cicero's audience.