In Virgil, as in modern narrative, the act of saying is barely mentioned or left out altogether. At times the transition from indirect to direct speech comes abruptly, without warning (Aen. 2. 657 ff., 675 ff., 10. 825 ff.). On the other hand, the stress falls on the speaker's position within the general narrative. We are thus drawn away from the actuality of speech to a broader frame of reference. The characters seem to be more concerned with the distant implications of the action than with the present moment. Their motivations and fortunes cover the years. They merge, therefore, into legend, history, romance; and the words they speak illustrate their extending roles.

It is generally accepted that the Homeric Hymn to Apollo was not conceived as a single poem but is a combination of two: a Delian hymn, D, performed at Delos and concerned with the god's birth there, and a Pythian hymn, P, concerned with his arrival and establishment at Delphi. What above all compels us to make a dichotomy is not the change of scene in itself, but the way D ends. The poet returns from the past to the present, and takes leave of his audience; farewell, he says, and remember me ever after. He is quite clearly finishing. Whereupon there is an abrupt and unsatisfactory transition to P.

The question of determining the genuine works of Hippocrates, a topic already much discussed by the ancient commentators, still continues to be actively debated, although the disagreements among scholars remain, it seems, almost as wide as ever. In comparatively recent times, Edelstein's IIEPI AEPQN and two subsequent studies of his written in the 1930s (Edelstein (b) and (c) marked a turning-point in that they presented a particularly clear and comprehensive statement of the sceptical view, according to which Hippocrates is, as Wilamowitz put it long ago, ‘ein beriihmter Name ohne den Hintergrund irgend einer Schrift’.

All drama is meant to be heard by an audience, so that there is a sense in which any utterance in a play may be called audience address. It is possible, however, to draw a distinction between on the one hand the kind of drama in which the presence of an audience is acknowledged by the actors—either explicitly by direct address or reference to the audience, or implicitly by reference to the theatrical nature of the action the actors are undertaking, or by a combination of some or all of these elements—and on the other hand the kind of drama in which such a presence is not acknowledged, where the actors maintain the pretence that they are enacting a real as distinct from a theatrical event.

L has …, P … Paley wanted to delete Subsequent editors did not take up the suggestion. J. Diggle on the other hand has proposed that was originally a gloss on ‘It would be no cause for surprise that a scribe who had never seen the like of Homer's (Il. 4. 189) should fuse the two versions by distributing the two in what he thought a fair and impartial manner.’ Diggle arrives at The metre is tidied up, the corruption explained. But would be unique in Euripides. is the Euripidean Greek for ‘O dear one’. For ‘O dear Hector’ he writes (Tro. 673). If he did want to create here by repetition a sense of there is no reason why he should not have written what is in L; compare Tro. 1081 , Su. 278 and Andr. 530

In the opening sentence of 2.6, which is of key significance, the meanings or references of are disputed, rendering the whole passage difficult. In the most widely established version, while —‘Evidence for the statement that Athens grew morethan other places because of migration is provided by the following, viz. that...’ This is consistent with taking either Athens or the other places as the subject of the infinitive, ‘Athens grew more’ or ‘the other places grew less’. If recapitulates the end of 2.2, appears to refer to those migrations; but since it is a rare word, abnormal in that sense, and is obscure, Ullrich (Beitr. z. Erkl. des Th., 169 ff.) proposed , which makes a straight reference to migration, disposes of the obscurity, and provides an explicit subject for the infinitive. Gomme accepts this. I disagree, but yet believe that the established version, though capable of much improvement, is the best to date.

Since other readers of Mr. Creed's recent interesting article may find themselves in a similar puzzlement to my own over certain statements there made, I offer this reply in the hope of providing elucidation. It is clear that someone named Adkins has perpetrated something heinous; but that ‘someone’ manifestly holds views which differ in a number of important respects from my own. The most convenient method of demonstrating this fact would be to juxtapose passages of Creed with passages of my Merit and Responsibility; but since space does not permit the juxtaposition of whole passages, I confine myself in the first part of this article to juxtaposing the references.

Since the appearance of Dodds's edition of Gorgias a number of the dialogues in tetr. I-VII have benefited from a re-examination of the evidence for the Platonic text—most notably Meno, tetr. IV, Parmenides, and Phaedrus. Recently the textual tradition of Phaedo has been studied by A. Carlini in a useful book which traces the fortunes of the text from antiquity until the time of the major manuscripts. The evidence thus accumulated goes some way to lessening a problem which has long been obvious—the difficulty of studying the tradition of any single dialogue in isolation from the rest of the Platonic corpus. I propose to argue, however, that the bulk of evidence now available for several dialogues should not blind us to another hazard—that of attempting to fit dialogues showing different textual features into what is basically a single stemmatic pattern

It is now generally agreed that in Aristotle's Poetics, ch. 13 means ‘mistake of fact’. The moralizing interpretation favoured by our Victorian forebears and their continental counterparts was one of the many misunderstandings fostered by their moralistic society, and in our own enlightened erais revealed as an aberration. In challenging this orthodoxy I am not moved by any particular enthusiasm for Victoriana, nor do I want to revive the view that means simply ‘moral flaw’ or ‘morally wrong action’. I shall try to show that the word has a range of applications, from ‘ignorance of fact’ at one end to ‘moral defect’, ‘moral error’, at the other, and that the modern orthodoxy, though not as clearly wrong as the moralizing interpretation it displaced, restricts Aristotle's meaning in a way he did not intend, and does lessthan justice to his analysis of classical drama.

According to two recent books, there is no evidence that political pay was given by any Greek city other than Athens; and one of them goes further and asserts positively that, ‘lacking imperial resources, no other city imitated the Athenian pattern.’ Since the book from which the quotation has been made is likely to become a ‘standard work’, it is desirable to make two points clear. First, there is explicit evidence for political pay elsewhere than at Athens: at Rhodes, in the fourth century B.C. and perhaps for some centuries thereafter, and at Iasus in Caria in at any rate the third century B.C. And secondly, no careful reader of Aristotle's Politics can doubt that by at least the 330s B.C. political pay, for attending the courts or the Assembly or both, had been introduced in quite a number of Greek democracies, even if Aristotle mentions specifically only Athens and Rhodes.

In 1824 Eduard Gans, in the course of a study of inheritance law, had occasion to deal with the class of women known in Athens as epikleroi—daughters of a deceased man who, in the absence of sons, were married to their nearest relative, with the estate of the deceased passing to the son or sons of the new union. ‘For these,’ he wrote, ‘… the basic concept throughout is not that, in the absence of descendants, they themselves appear as inheritors, but rather that they are inherited along with the property by the collaterals.’

I Should have known better than to revive Carcopino's heresy on the Lex Bembina Repetundarum. My attempt to rob C. Gracchus of this important measure and restore it to Glaucia met with universal disbelief. Soon a powerful counter-attack followed in learned publications. There may seem little left to say. Certainly it would be pointless to go over the old arguments yet again. My only excuse for perseverance is that I have new material. For my readers' convenience I group it under five main heads.

Ancient Rhodes reached a pinnacle of power in the early second century B.C. For twenty years—from Apamea to Pydna—her fleet was unrivalled in the Aegean and her mainland possessions encompassed most of Lycia and Caria. Ally and helpmate of Rome in the war on Antiochus III, Rhodes gained much profit from the association, in prestige and territorial acquisitions. But her heyday was brief, her fall swift and calamitous. After Pydna, Rhodes felt the heavy hand of Rome: she forfeited most of her mainland holdings; her economy suffered ruinous setback; the island republic was humbled and humiliated. So dramatic a reversal of fortune demands explanation.

Although the view dies hard that the poetry which Ovid wrote during his years in exile at Tomi consists largely of the ‘querulous and sycophantic’ complaints of a weak man unable to come to terms with a personal disaster, it has been recognized for many years that the Tristia and the Epistolae ex Ponto are not mere expressions of emotion but are as well thought out and constructed as any other of the doctus poeta's products. Of these poems, Tristia 2 must be placed in a category by itself-if only because of its length (578 lines—four times the length of the next longest of the poems from exile) and because it purports to be a plea by Ovid to Augustus, the man responsible for his exile, on the very practical matter of mitigating the sentence.

There has been no major critical edition of Velleius with commentary since that of Kritz in 1840. Kritz, who took into account Sauppe's long essay on Velleius of three years earlier, was preceded by Ruhnken, whose commentary appeared in 1779. During the century which followed Kritz's work several valuable editions without commentary were produced, the last of which, by Stegmann de Pritzwald (1933), almost coincided with the essay and bibliography devoted to Velleius in Schanz-Hosius (1935). These two contributions of the thirties remain standard to the present day.

In a vigorously argued passage of the oration Pro L. Flacco, Cicero defends his client L. Valerius Flaccus against the charge that he had acted improperly during his governorship of Asia three years previously in claiming as heres legitimus the estate of one Valeria, wife of Sextilius Andro, who had died intestate in the province. This section of the speech involves Cicero in a brief display of his knowledge of the civil law concerning tutela, the forms of acquiring manus in marriage by usus and coemptio and inheritance ah intestate, and it is described by the scholiast as ‘negotialis quaestiuncula’. The passage is regularly cited in the handbooks to illustrate those features of the civil law which Cicero treats, but the Valeria in question is otherwise wholly obscure.

I Want to comment on five passages where I have provoked disagreement by a previous discussion. In the first three, my discussion was in Philologus cx (1966), 152–4, and my critic is Bruno Gentili in Quaderni Urbinati iv (1967), 177–81. I was not the first to make an emendation in any of the three places, so that in defending the transmitted text Gentili is actually not only criticizing me but others such as Hermann, Naeke, O. Müller, Schoemann, Hunt, Murray, and Page.

If one were to find a date for the games put on by Pompey to celebrate the opening of his theatre in 55 B.C., it would be possible to assign a more precise date to the delivery of Cicero's speech in Pisonem than seems to have been done so far. Asconius states quite firmly that the in Pisonem was delivered in the second consulship of Pompey and Crassus, a few days before the lavish games celebrating the opening of Pompey's theatre. Asconius rejects a counter-view that the speech was delivered late in the following year.

A states the phenomenon that requires to be explained. B explains it. C justifies B. D is the furthest reach of the argument and explains C. E. begins the way back, stating the consequence of D and therefore balancing C. F is the inference from E and corresponds to B, and G brings us back to A. The logic is closely knit. And it is pointed by repeats and correspondences. In A the fire is liquidus; in E profundant, in F profundunt. In B the clouds must contain permulta seeds of fire; in D they must conceive multa from the light of the sun, and the repeat of necessest, necessust hammers home the argument.

That both parts of the sentence refer to the same person is now generally agreed; it is not so much that a change of subject would be, as the commentators are wont to say, ‘un-Sophoclean’, but simply that it would be awkward and clumsy. But to whom do the lines refer?

D. B. Gregor (C.R. lxiv [1950], 87–8) argues for Clytaemnestra, but despite the apparent force of some of his arguments (e.g. that the clause refers to Clytaemnestra because it is she who picks up Electra, in 616, picks up Clytaemnestra's of 615; but could still be Electra's) I cannot agree. He adds too that the reference to echoes the motif of Electra's speech, but it is just as much the motif of Clytaemnestra's speech, in fact more so. Finally, the first part of the sentence, it is true, could be asserted by the chorus on the strength of some such gesture as the heaving of the bosom, but I cannot see how they could then deduce that Clytaemnestra ‘no longer cares whether justice is on her side’