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Merit, Responsibility, and Thucydides
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
Extract
Since other readers of Mr. Creed's recent interesting article may find themselves in a similar puzzlement to my own over certain statements there made, I offer this reply in the hope of providing elucidation. It is clear that someone named Adkins has perpetrated something heinous; but that ‘someone’ manifestly holds views which differ in a number of important respects from my own. The most convenient method of demonstrating this fact would be to juxtapose passages of Creed with passages of my Merit and Responsibility; but since space does not permit the juxtaposition of whole passages, I confine myself in the first part of this article to juxtaposing the references.
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References
page 209 note 1 ‘Moral Values in the Age of Thucydides’, C.Q. N.S. xxiii (1973), 213 1T., hereafter referred to as ‘Creed’.
page 209 note 2 Merit and Responsibility: a study in Greek values (hereafter referred to as MR) (Oxford, 1960).
page 209 note 3 For funeral speeches see MR 171 n. 3.
page 210 note 1 For Pindar see p. 165 and note b; and for a fuller discussion see now my Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece (Chatto and Windus, 1972), 75–98 (hereafter referred to as MV).
page 210 note 2 And cf. Odyssey 5. 7 ff.
page 210 note 3
page 210 note 4 In the fourth century, one might cite Theodectes frag. 8 (Nauck/Snell); but the sentiment is rare even at this much later date, when the nature of piety has been debated by philosophers (as in Plato, Euthyphro, esP. 14 e 6f.).
page 210 note 5 The dikaiosune demonstrated by Plato to be an arete in the Republic is of course ‘valued for itself alone’ in the sense that it is per se a ‘good thing’ for its possessor and benefits him (see MR 284 ff.). It is not suggested that it would be worth pursuing if it were not good for its possessor; the dikaiosune concerned is a very curious quality; and to prove even so much is evidently a novelty, and requires many pages of elaborate argument.
page 210 note 6 And at greater length MV 48 f.
page 211 note 1 One should not assume the identity of eunomia with justice (see MV 46 ff., 56, 84 f.). It is, however, ‘co-operative’ in implications.
page 211 note 2 Depending upon the reconstruction of the disiecta membra found in Plato's Protagoras. I discuss the poem, MR 165, 196, 355 ff.
page 211 note 3 ‘Blameless’ need have no reference to co-operative excellences. See MR 81 ( II).
page 212 note 1 Since to interpret agathos and kakos ‘co. operatively’, eu prattein and kakōs prattein it success-terms, produces a sense which muse appear implausible to us, and would have appeared even more implausible to the Greeks of this period, who regarded hubris as a likely outcome of good fortune.
page 212 note 2 e.g. 75 f., 238 f., 259.
page 212 note 3 MV 65 ff.
page 213 note 1 MR 201 ff., MV 119 ff.
page 213 note 2 Discussed MR 192 (is), MV 70. I refer my readers to the examples and argument of MV chapter 4 as a whole for further material.
page 213 note 3 The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, 16.
page 214 note 1 Which I discuss, MR 230 ff.
page 215 note 1 Cf. also my remarks on ‘stress’ at MR 38.
page 215 note 2 The phenomenon of ‘cultural time lag’ is prevalent (see MR, e.g. 75 1., 238 f., 259); but the touchstone of these values is reference to the demands of the actual situation and the needs of the community as the community understands them.
page 215 note 3 On this see MR 164 ff., 238 f., and generally chapters vii-xi, MV gg fr.
page 215 note 4 Thucydides' Mytileneans agree, 3. II. 2, even in the case of allies. I shall discuss the passage in a subsequent article.
page 216 note 1 For this see MV chapter 4 and index, s.v. ‘Hubris’. 2 193 nn. 16, 17.
page 216 note 2 193 nn. 16, 17
page 216 note 3 My contention that some values are new, some traditional, rests on different evidence, as I have shown.
page 216 note 4 As is, for example, that of Euripides before a popular audience in Elec. 386 ff, discussed in MR 177, 195 if.
page 217 note 1 D. M. MacDowell, and Generosity', Mnem. 4th ser. xvi (1963), 127 ff.
page 217 note 2 C. Q. ii.s. xiii (1963), 30–45.
page 217 note 3 Though he may have ‘no literary or intellectual axe to grind’ (MacDowell 130), in the situation in which he finds himself, Andocides has a vested interest in the acceptance of this usage: another reaon for suspecting a ‘persuasive definition’.
page 217 note 4 See MR 70, 78 (on Theognis 147 f.), 195, etc.
page 218 note 1 MacDowell, D. M., Andocides on the Mysteries (Oxford, 1962), ad loc.Google Scholar
page 218 note 2 See ‘Friendship’ 36.
page 218 note 3 ‘Friendship’ 39 ff.
page 218 note 4 See C. L. Stevenson in Mind, 1938, 331 ff., where the usage of this phrase is explained at length.
page 219 note 1 For example, the suppliants at Corcyra, 3. 70; 80; 81. Traditionally, to kill a suppliant at an altar or on consecrated ground was a most heinous offence, as in Thucydides I. 126. io (the conspiracy of Cylon).
page 220 note 1 On the whole question of see now Gould, J. P., ‘Hiketeia’, J.H.S. xciii (1973), 74 ff.Google Scholar
page 220 note 2 See MR chapters viii-xvi, ‘Aristotle and the best kind of tragedy’, passim.
page 220 note 3 See 26, 78 ff., 188 ff., 347, 360, etc.
page 220 note 4 See 113, etc. The reluctance of Theseus, 195 ff., later overcome by Aethra, 297 ff., to acknowledge the claims of the suppliant may have contemporary relevance: has less force than was once the case.
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