Pindar's Dithyramb 2opens with a reference to the historical development of the genre it exemplifies, the celebrated circular chorus of classical Greece. The first two lines were long known from various citations, notably in Athenaeus, whose sources included the fourth-century authors Heraclides of Pontus and Aristotle's pupil Clearchus of Soli. The third line appears, only partly legible, on a papyrus fragment published in 1919, which preserves some thirty lines of the dithyramb including most of the first antistrophe (thereby guaranteeing the metre for some reconstruction of the first strophe).

ἂναξ and βασιλε⋯ς are the two most important titles applied to the top stratum of Homeric aristocracy., usually translated as ′lord′ or ′master′, and βασιλε⋯ς, usually translated as ′king′, often apply to the same individuals, and can at times appear to be very close in meaning, allowing translators to render ἂναξ as ′king′ and βασιλε⋯ς as ′lord′. There are, however, significant differences between the two. As Lexikon des friihgriechischen Epos (LfrgE) now conveniently summarizes for us, avat; can be divine or human, can be a master of a state, of gods, of men, of animals, or of his household, and can be used as an address in the vocative, whereas fiaoiXevs is only applied to humans in Homer, often in a political context, and is never used in the vocative.

Recognition of the technical complexity and literary sophistication of Homeric oral poetry1 encourages close, detailed examination of Homeric similes in their immediate context and in the larger context of the poem in which they occur. The similes offer direct access to understanding and appreciating Homeric poetic technique. Even so, this approach to Homeric poetics is, for the most part, often only taken seriously in the case of the longer or ‘extended’ similes in the poems. Careful study of even a shorter simile, one all too likely to be dismissed as merely decorative, can be fruitful as well.2 This paper explores the implications of the analogy in Odyssey 21.48–50 between the creaking sound of a pair of heavy doors opening and the bellow of a bull.

This short political pamphlet has survived to our day through the lucky chance of being included in the minor works of Xenophon, and for over 150 years it has been the subject of lively scholarly debate. The unknown author was a confirmed oligarch, but with an insider's insight into Athenian democracy. Though he cannot approve of this form of government, he is astute enough to see that the system works well on its own terms and that it is therefore popular; it will prove very hard to overthrow. The work has proved difficult to tie down to an historical context.

What have the following in common: Epimetheus, Paris, Anchises, and the suitors of Penelope? The ready answer might be that it must have something to do with women, for it requires no great thought to see that the attractions of femininity proved the undoing of three of them, while for Anchises life was never to be the same again after his encounter with Aphrodite. But suppose we add to our first group such figures as Zeus, Priam, Polynices, and Eumaeus? The fates of all these characters as they, appear at certain points in the poetry of Homer, Hesiod, and others give expression i to a network of interrelated sexual and economic anxieties that seem to underlie a { great deal of what the Archaic poets say about the female sex. In this article I 1 propose to explore a particular part of that network, which I have called the ? ‘Pandora complex’, since it is Hesiod′s version of the Pandora myth which provides the classic statement of the male dilemma over women, poised between the conflicting desires for sexual gratification and domestic stability.1

On any view, the Aristotelian account of Athens' constitutional history between victory over the Persian invaders and Ephialtes' reforms of the Areopagus and indeed beyond must be regarded as factually grudging and difficult to follow. Worse, current orthodoxy1 convicts it of a major chronological blunder for assigning a part in those reforms, which it places securely and beyond doubt correctly in the archonship of Konon (462/1), to Themistokles, who had been ostracized from the city perhaps as early as 473/2 and in any case by 467/62.

From the Archaic period to the sixth century A.D., as well as in later Byzantine lexica, we find numerous instances of the word TTTJKTIS as the name of a musical instrument. It occurs in some 78 passages:1 enough, one might suppose, to establish its meaning beyond peradventure. Yet of all ancient instrument names, this one proves to be the most Protean. In the earlier sources it designates a harp. Later it is applied to other types of stringed instrument, both to lyres and to lutes. But it does not remain confined to the chordophone category, for in the Imperial period it frequently signifies a panpipe. As no complete collection and analysis of the evidence has ever been made, I have thought it worth while to undertake one.

It has recently been argued by Gabriel Herman that fourth-century Athenian citizens, or at least the majority of them, believed that even under the impact of serious private aggression a man should not pursue revenge. The general ideal, so it is maintained, was to avoid not only violent revenge but also revenge through prosecution. Herman recognizes that other Athenian texts of the same period take the propriety of exacting revenge for granted, and he explains this in part by reference to a supposed ‘double standard’—a rather strange expression in this context, because it suggests that the propriety of revenge in classical Athens depended on the status of the victim of the revenge—which is not in fact the burden of Herman's doctrine.

It has gradually become accepted among historians of ancient culture that the Greeks and Romans always, or nearly always, read aloud. They did not read to themselves, silently, save in rare and special cases. Either they were not able to read silently, or they felt no need to do so, or they did not enjoy doing it even when they were alone.

The work transmitted to us as the fourth speech in the manuscripts of Andocides is an invective against Alcibiades on the occasion of the last ostracism to occur in Athens, the ostracism of Hyper bolus. Despite a challenging article by Raubitschek1 pointing to certain authentic-looking details in the speech, most scholars would probably now agree that [And.] 4 is neither by Andocides, nor a genuine speech delivered on the occasion of the last ostracism, but is most likely to be a product of the fourth century. But if this general feeling is correct, why and in what context was the speech written? When in the fourth century did rhetoricians spend their time composing works like [And.] 4?

Among the late fifth-century regulations governing the wine-trade in Thasos is a ban on κοτυλιζεῖν (‘selling wine in half-pint measures’, or more generally ‘breaking bulk’). It is normally characterized as a law of rather narrow relevance, something to do with maintaining the quality of Thasian wines and guarding against false measures. Here I want to examine the possibility that it is in fact a highly political measure on the part of a government hostile to the demos, an attempt to ban an institution identified with democracy–the public bar.

A recent article on ‘The Number of Speaking Actors in Old Comedy’ by D. M. MacDowell has argued that to perform the plays of Aristophanes required the use of four, but never five, speaking actors.1 Systematically argued, MacDowell presents a cogent case against Henderson (xli–xliv), who has suggested that at times five actors were permitted. MacDowell also presents some very sensible observations on the nature of any prescription which might limit the number of actors. The final paragraphs, however, express considerable discomfort at the earliest work in the extant corpus: 'Akharnians, however, remains problematic, since it has two scenes which may be thought to require five actors' (MacDowell, 335). A tentative solution is offered by MacDowell, which is that 'these scenes were actually performed without a fifth actor, by making very quick changes in the scene with Amphitheos and the Envoy, and by using dolls for the Megarian's Daughters' (MacDowell, 335). Unspeaking performers for the Megarian's Daughters are more likely than dolls, since they must follow orders for movement (Akh. 732, 740–5). Apart from this, I have no doubt that this is indeed how Akharnians was performed, and an examination of the specific comic techniques employed by Aristophanes in the two problematic scenes in Akharnians demonstrates not only the comic desirability of their use, but their applicability to other plays by Aristophanes.

This essay has two aims: to affirm the significance of private banking in fourthcentury B.C. Athens, and to propose a model of its role in the economy. Such a project is desirable because there has been a tendency since the publication of Finley's The Ancient Economy to minimalize the significance of banking in ancient Greece. Banking is seen as a ‘fringe activity’ largely carried out by such ‘outsiders’ as metics and ex-slaves.Consequently historians have frequently overlooked the value of banking as a tool for understanding the Greek economy.

The history of scholarship, philosophical or otherwise, about Plato and his writings reveals a quandary pertaining to the interpretation of the contents of Plato's dialogues. To understand Plato one must come to terms with this problem: how ought Plato's writings to be interpreted?

Lines 25–30 of the hypothesis to Euripides′ Hippolytus read as follows:

Socrates' account of recollection in the Phaedo has been the subject of much study, but little attention has been paid to the questions whether and how far his arguments address Simmias' claim that he needs to recollect and be reminded that learning is recollection (73b6–10). I shall argue that Socrates reminds Simmias by appealing to Simmias' experience of question-and-answer discussion in order to show him how in these discussions they are regaining forgotten knowledge, but have not yet completed this process.

This is Snell's text:

The dossier of decrees concerning the Deceleans and the Demotionidae of Athens (IG ii 1237) presents fascinating problems and has attracted plentiful discussion. For a long time there has been a division between the view of Wilamowitz and his followers, that the Demotionidae were a phratry and the Deceleans a privileged genos within it, and that of Wade–Gery refined by Andrewes, that the Deceleans were a phratry and the Demotionidae a privileged genos within it.3 Each of these interpretations gave rise to problems; and since the work of Bourriot and Roussel on the gene there has been a reluctance to believe in gene as aristocratic clans able to control their phratries. Recently Hedrick has argued that the Demotionidae were the phratry and the Deceleans the members of the deme of Decelea; and Lambert has argued that the Demotionidae were the phratry and the Deceleans a genos–like body (but not a genos, and not controlling the phratry) which formed a semi–independent group within the phratry and which in these decrees was extending its independence further. These interpretations also give rise to problems: in this paper I attempt to continue the debate and to show that an interpretation on Wade–Gery′s lines is after all the most likely to be right.

In his Rhetoric Aristotle gives six definitions of emotions in approximately the following form, with the word (Rhetoric ii.2.137830–1). Does he mean ‘Let anger be a reaching-out, accompanied by pain, for conspicuous revenge for some conspicuous slight to oneself or one's own, the slight not having been deserved’, or should ϕαινομένηςίην be taken to mean ‘manifest, plain’, or (a third possibility) should it be translated ‘perceived, apparent’? Since this is his fullest definition of anger, the question deserves discussion, even though a number of scholars, including such an expert on Aristotle's philosophy of the emotions as W. W. Fortenbaugh, have previously answered the question in what I think is the right way.