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Thucydides and the Uneasy Peace—A Study in Political Incompetence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

H. D. Westlake
H. D. Westlake
Affiliation:
University of Manchester
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Extract

The narrative of Thucydides on the period from the Peace of Nicias to the Athenian expedition to Sicily (5. 25–116) has been less intensively studied than any other part of the History. It is true that the Melian Dialogue, which contrasts so sharply with the rest of the fifth book, has accumulated a large bibliography. The problems arising from the campaign culminating in the battle of Mantinea have also received a considerable amount of attention. On the other hand, the accounts of negotiations and intrigues, mostly in the Peloponnese, which occupy much of the fifth book, have tended to be ignored, being thought to be obscure, confusing, and tedious. Scholars interested in the history of the period have experienced difficulty in tracing a coherent pattern in its catalogue of diplomatic manœuvres and in establishing the motives which prompted them. Scholars interested in the historical technique of Thucydides have been disappointed, even repelled, because his facility for mastering his material seems to have to a large extent deserted him.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , December 1971 , pp. 315 - 325
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1971

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References

page 315 note 1 It will be convenient, in the interests of brevity, to refer hereafter to this section as ‘the fifth book’.

page 315 note 2 Among the problems of the period is the mixture of forcefulness and hesitancy in the diplomacy of the Corinthians, which I discussed in A.J.P. lxi (1940), 413–21.Google Scholar A more elaborate reconstruction by Kagan, D., A.J.P. lxxxi (1960), 291–310Google Scholar, seems to me to be based on insufficiently secure foundations. Brunt, P. A., Thucydides (1963), 172Google Scholar, admirably defines the chief cause of failure in the negotiations of these years: ‘Corinth and Boeotia were seeking a common front against Athens, while Argos, Elis and Man-tinea had no quarrel with Athens but only with Sparta.’

page 315 note 3 All references are to the fifth book unless otherwise defined.

page 315 note 4 InGomme, A. W., Andrewes, A., and Dover, K. J., Historical Commentary on Thucy-dides, iv (1970)Google Scholar, which has appeared since a first draft of this paper was written, there is not much discussion of the problems to be studied here. Andrewes, in his last note on the fifth book (p. 192), proposes to consider its traces of incompleteness, together with those of the eighth book, in the final volume of the Commentary. de Romilly, J., in the second Notice of the Budé Thucydides, iii (1967), i*–iv*Google Scholar, touches brilliantly but all too briefly upon the general character of the fifth book.

page 316 note 1 Schmid, W., Geschichte der gr. Literatur, i. 5 (1948), 133Google Scholar, ‘sehr kurz und abrupt’, cf. de Romilly, op. cit. ii* with n. 1.

page 316 note 2 Apart from the Melian Dialogue, which could perhaps be more accurately defined as fiction than as fact.

page 316 note 3 One reason why he deals so briefly with the events of these two years is doubtless that the challenge to Spartan authority, which before the battle of Mantinea might have permanently transformed the balance of power in Greece, had now become a lost cause, though fitfully revived by the Argive democrats with some support from Athens. The main issue had been decisively settled (despite the claims of Alcibiades, 6. 16. 6).

page 316 note 4 This calculation is based on the text of the Teubner editio minor, in which the number of lines on each page is almost uniform. Summer 428 occupies rather less than 11 pages (including a speech of considerable length); summer 426, under 9 1/2 pages; summer 421, slightly over 8 1/2 pages; summer 420, 10 pages (including the text of a treaty). I have not taken into account the summer of 422 (a little more than 9 pages), because, although it belongs to the Archidamian war, hostilities were confined to the Thraceward area.

page 316 note 5 There is some disagreement about the end of the fourth book and the beginning of the fifth (1–24). According to Gomme, n. after 47. 12 (p. 62), they are fully revised, but Andrewes, ibid., supports the view that they are not.

page 317 note 1 It is discussed by Fritz, K. von, Die griechische Geschichtsschreibung, i.Anm. (1967), 309–10 n. 22Google Scholar, and by Gomme and Andrewes, n. on 39. 3.

page 317 note 2 Cf. 34. 1, where some explanation of neodamodes is required; 40. 1, where there is a reference to Argive reactions to the demolition of Panactum before its demolition became known (42. 1).

page 317 note 3 Cf. 36. 1;40. 2; 49. 4; 55.4.

page 317 note 4 Cf. de Romilly, op. cit. iii*: ‘l’on comprendra, dans ces conditions, que le récit soit nécessairement obscur, rempli de lacunes, peu cohérent lui mėme.’

page 317 note 5 My Individuals in Thucydides (1968), 290–307.Google Scholar

page 317 note 6 Thucydides may be creating a slightly misleading impression because of his preoccupation with what, as will be suggested below (323–4), he seems to have considered to be the basic general lesson of the period.

page 317 note 7 Individuals in Thucydides, 212–19.

page 317 note 8 Schwartz, E., Geschichtswerk des Thuky-dides (1929), 58.Google Scholar The Peace of Nicias seemed likely to restore Athenian control of the Thraceward area, and he may have felt, as an exile, that his life might be in danger if he lived there (ibid., n. 2).

page 318 note 1 A.J.P. lxi (1940), 413 n. 3.Google Scholar

page 318 note 2 Cf. Schwartz, op. cit. 62.

page 318 note 3 See above, p. 316 n. 3.

page 318 note 4 I have discussed the development of this nterest in Rylands Bulletin,liii (1970), 227–46.Google Scholar

page 319 note 1 40. 3 ; cf. Andrewes, n. ad loc, on the forcefulness of this phrase.

page 319 note 2 44. i ἠμ⋯λουν, cf. the neat translation of de Romilly, ‘ils ne s'occupèrent plus de leurs ambassadeurs’.

page 320 note 1 On two occasions in 419 the Spartan army was mobilized but at once disbanded (54. 1–2; 55. 3).

page 320 note 2 See above, p. 319.

page 320 note 3 A.J.P. lxi (1940), 413–21.Google Scholar

page 321 note 1 I have discussed this episode more fully in Rylands Bulletin, liii (1970), 235–7.Google Scholar

page 321 note 2 See above, p. 318.

page 321 note 3 Individuals in Thucydides, 218.

page 321 note 4 One reason is that it was difficult for him to obtain information from Athens while he was in exile (see above, p. 318); another reason will be suggested below (p. 323).

page 322 note 1

page 322 note 2 An earthquake terminated these negotiations, but it was a very convenient earthquake, which ‘may only have served as an excuse for ending a seemingly endless conference’ (Gomme, n. ad loc.).

page 322 note 3 In this instance, as Gomme and An-drewes, n. ad loc., point out, Thucydides gives hardly any information about the discussions of the envoys, but his reticence is exceptional in his narrative of the period.

page 322 note 4 The full text of the treaty between Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis follows (47).

page 322 note 5 Gomme, n. ad loc., notes that the ξυμ–μαχία between Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, to which Thucydides refers here, has not been expressly mentioned before, though it is implied in 44. 2 and 46. 5. This omission may be a mere oversight, as Gomme believes. It may, however, reflect a tendency on the part of Thucydides to pay more attention to disagreement than to agreement, because the former seemed to him to be a more significant feature of the period than the latter.

page 322 note 6 Cf. 50. 4 on the widespread fear felt by the Greeks assembled at Olympia.

page 322 note 7 25. 2 and 26. 2 have been excluded, because Thucydides is here summarizing in general terms the features of the period with which he is about to deal.

page 322 note 8 Comparison with the account of Dio-dorus (12. 75–78. 2) is not at all fruitful, since it is extremely brief and seems to be founded very largely upon information derived originally from Thucydides. Diodorus lays somewhat less emphasis on diplomacy, but he uses a phrase to describe the situation in the Peloponnese (77. 3, which is wholly consistent with the impression which Thucydides creates.

page 323 note 1 Individuals in Thucydides, 122 and 136.

page 324 note 1 His use of these and other terms denoting intellectual qualities has been exhaustively examined by Huart, P., Le Vocabulaire de l’analyse psychologique dans l’œuvre de Thucydide (1968)Google Scholar; cf. 502–7 for a summary of conclusions.

page 324 note 2 Alcibiades was perhaps superior in intelligence to any of the leaders in this second group, but Thucydides pays tribute only to his achievements (6. 15. 4; 8. 86. 4).

page 324 note 3 It is noteworthy, though it could be fortuitous, that neither any of the terms denoting prediction (Huart, op. cit. 352) nor (sound judgement) occurs in 5. 25–56.

page 324 note 4 See above, p. 321.

page 325 note 1 Andrewes, n. on 66. i.

page 325 note 2 In 72. 2, although is the subject, the ⋯μπειρία in which they were worsted is clearly that of their High Command. The previous sentence is concerned with orders issued by Agis.