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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2022
This article focusses on a hitherto underappreciated distinction between immortality and everlastingness in a Greek commentary of disputed authorship on Aristotle's De anima Book 3. This article argues that this distinction calls into question the attribution of the commentary to Philoponus.
I am most grateful to John Dillon for valuable suggestions; and to CQ's Editor and the anonymous reader for their helpful comments. This paper was supported by the Zhishan Young Scholars Programme of Southeast University.
1 E.g. Charlton, W., Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Intellect (de Anima 3.4–8) (London, 1991), 1–12Google Scholar; Charlton, W., ‘Philoponus’: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1–8 (London, 2000), 1–12Google Scholar; Lautner, P., ‘Philoponus, in De anima 3: quest for an author’, CQ 42 (1992), 510–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar. D. Searby, ‘Stéphanos d'Alexandrie’, in R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques VI (Paris, 2016), 439–55, at 442–5 and Kakavelaki, A., ‘The authorship of Philoponus’ Commentary On the Soul iii’, AncPhil 42 (2022), 291–301Google Scholar, at 291–6 review earlier literature.
2 Fragments from the lost Greek model have been discovered by Steel, C., ‘Newly discovered scholia from Philoponus’ lost commentary on De anima III’, RecTh 84 (2017), 223–43Google Scholar; cf. C. Steel and B. Strobel, Ioannes Philoponos, Kommentar zu Aristoteles, “De anima” III: Quellen zur Rekonstruktion des verlorenen griechischen Textes (Berlin, 2022).
3 This fact, unfortunately, was often neglected until Golitsis and Sorabji made it explicit, together with the new proposal: P. Golitsis, ‘John Philoponus’ commentary on the third book of Aristotle's De anima, wrongly attributed to Stephanus’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Re-Interpreted: New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators (London, 2016), 393–412; P. Golitsis, ‘Μετά τινων ἰδίων ἐπιστάσεων: John Philoponus as an editor of Ammonius’ lectures’, in P. Golitsis and K. Ierodiakonou (edd.), Aristotle and his Commentators (Berlin and Boston, 2019), 167–93; R. Sorabji, ‘Dating of Philoponus’ commentaries on Aristotle and of his divergence from his teacher Ammonius’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Re-Interpreted: New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators (London, 2016), 367–92. As a result, most earlier scholars think that the De intellectu simply reflects Philoponus’ own position; the same holds true for the commentator of the Greek commentary on De anima Books 1 and 2 printed in CAG vol. 15.
4 Golitsis (n. 3 [2016]); Sorabji (n. 3). Although the attribution to Philoponus has been defended (e.g. by Lautner [n. 1]), most people still ascribe this commentary to Stephanus. See also Kakavelaki (n. 1) for a defence of Philoponus’ authorship.
5 Cf. Sorabji (n. 3), 367; R. Sorabji, ‘Introduction to the second edition: new findings on Philoponus’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London, 20102), 1–40, at 15.
6 Elias, David and Stephanus might have been Christians while also holding pagan philosophical views in their commentaries on Aristotle. But this does not imply that these Neoplatonic commentators merely pay lip service to pagan doctrines in their philosophical exegeses, since one's religious beliefs need not always interfere with their philosophical ideas. See L.G. Westerink, Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon (Paris, 1990), xxxvi, xxxviii; also Elias, in Cat. 122.28–32.
7 See P. Golitsis, ‘Simplicius and Philoponus on the authority of Aristotle’, in A. Falcon (ed.), Brill's Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity (Leiden, 2016), 419–38, at 434–5. Similar claims can be found in other ancient commentaries on the Categories: e.g. Ammon. in Cat. 8.11–19; Simpl. in Cat. 7.23–32; Elias, in Cat. 122.25–123.11.
8 Golitsis (n. 3 [2016]), 406, 411; cf. in De an. 464.13–14, 466.27–35.
9 The four views are attributed to Alexander, Marinus, Plotinus and Plutarch of Athens. For this doxography, see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic elements in the De anima commentaries’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence (Ithaca, NY, 1990), 305–24, at 311–20.
10 I render ἀίδιος ‘everlasting’, αἰώνιος ‘eternal’: M. Share, Philoponus: Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World 1–5 (London, 2004), 7; I.L.E. Ramelli and D. Konstan, Terms for Eternity: Aiônios and Aïdios in Classical and Christian Texts (Piscataway, 2013), especially 14–28.
11 One may wonder whether ‘even if’ (κἄν) at in De an. 541.9 indicates that PhiloponusG was only making a concession here, and did not actually accept this distinction. However, the first passage and the overall context of this passage go against this interpretation: PhiloponusG believed that one thing can be regarded as immortal while also being destructible.
12 Theoretically, ‘what is indestructible (ἀνώλεθρος or ἄφθαρτος)’ does not necessarily amount to ‘what is everlasting’. See Ramelli and Konstan (n. 10), 14–17 for further discussions. However, the ancient Platonists deny this possibility and simply regard ‘being indestructible’ as having the same connotation as ‘being everlasting’ (cf. e.g. Pl. Resp. 546a1–4, Phdr. 245c6–246a2; also Arist. Cael. 282a30–283b22).
13 I borrow the formulation from S. Menn, ‘Self-motion and reflection: Hermias and Proclus on the harmony of Plato and Aristotle on the soul’, in J. Wilberding and C. Horn (edd.), Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature (New York, 2012), 44–67, at 62.
14 See O'Brien, D., ‘“Immortel” et “impérissable” dans le Phédon de Platon’, IJPT 1 (2007), 109–262Google Scholar. For later debates in antiquity, see e.g. G. Karamanolis, ‘Porphyry's notion of empsychia’, in G. Karamanolis and A. Sheppard (edd.), Studies on Porphyry (London, 2007), 91–109; S. Gertz, Death and Immortality in Late Neoplatonism (Leiden, 2011), 143–70; F. Trabattoni, ‘Boéthos de Sidon et l'immortalité de l’âme dans le Phédon’, in R. Chiaradonna and M. Rashed (edd.), Boéthos de Sidon – Exégète d'Aristote et philosophe (Berlin and Boston, 2020), 337–59, at 346–59.
15 Procl. in Ti. 3.64.8–65.7; D. Baltzly, Proclus. Commentary on Plato's Timaeus: Volume 5, Book 4: Proclus on Time and the Stars (Cambridge, 2013), 129 n. 245. If so, then Porphyry may have already established Proclus’ idea that everything immortal must also be everlasting, but not vice versa. Cf. J.M. Dillon, ‘The early history of the noetic triad’, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes, Volume 3: On Causes and the Noetic Triad (Leiden, 2022), 391–405.
16 1.235.17–19, 2.99.29–30, 2.125.8–9, 2.148.30, 3.59.12–13. See D. Baltzly, Proclus. Commentary on Plato's Timaeus: Volume 3, Book 3: Proclus on the World's Body (Cambridge, 2007), 162 n. 320.
17 One may propose that, unlike the Athenian Neoplatonists, some late Alexandrian Neoplatonists forget or even abandon Proclus’ metaphysical system. It is possible that these Alexandrian Neoplatonists did not adopt all the complexities of Proclus’ metaphysical system, but it is unlikely that they would also leave behind the basic triad ‘Being—Life—Intellect’.
18 Although there always exist dissenters, I assume that this commentary is not composed by Simplicius.
19 The early Stoics hold a similar position, contending that the intra-cosmic gods, such as the sun and the moon, are both immortal (do not admit death) and perishable (will be destroyed at a conflagration): A.G. Long, ‘The immortal and the imperishable in Aristotle, early Stoicism, and Epicureanism’, in A.G. Long (ed.), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (New York, 2021), 118–42, at 134–40.
20 See e.g. Karamanolis (n. 14) for a discussion of this passage. If we follow his interpretation, then the distinction between the soul and the empsychia characterized here is similar to the distinction between ‘by virtue of being soul’ (καθὸ ψυχή) and ‘by virtue of being in a body’ (καθὸ ἐν σώματι) proposed by PhiloponusG at in De an. 541.10. Cf. also H.B. Gottschalk, ‘Boethus’ psychology and the Neoplatonists’, Phronesis 31 (1986), 243–57, at 245–6, 248–9; Trabattoni (n. 14), 349–54 on Boethus’ position.
21 One might think that Porphyry (Ps.-Simplicius’ source here) and Boethus could agree that something can be immortal (in an attenuated sense) without being indestructible, but Porphyry criticizes Boethus as equating the soul with the empsychia; cf. Karamanolis (n. 14), 96. However, Porphyry finds fault with Boethus on both points: Boethus is not only wrong in equating the soul with the empsychia, because only the former is immortal while the latter is mortal and destructible, he is also wrong in thinking that one thing can be called immortal without being indestructible.
22 The report from Proclus on Porphyry's view on the immortality of the soul at in Ti. 3.234.18–32 (cf. also Iambl. De an. §37; Dam. in Phd. I.177) does not imply such a distinction: see J.M. Dillon, Iamblichi Chalcidensis In Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta (Leiden, 1973), 272–3 on this testimony.
23 If PhiloponusG did intend the different senses of immortality, his otherwise clear line of reasoning would be muddled or even in danger of equivocation.
24 There is no need to worry about the distinction between ‘indissolubility’ (τὸ ἄλυτον) and ‘indestructibility’ or ‘imperishability’ (τὸ ἀνώλεθρον or τὸ ἄφθαρτον), as it will not affect the point made by these commentators.
25 Golitsis (n. 3 [2016]), 409–10; Golitsis (n. 3 [2019]), 182.
26 Golitsis (n. 3 [2019]), 184–9, a view shared by Sorabji (n. 3), 391.
27 See Osborne, C., Philoponus: On Aristotle Physics 1.1–3 (London, 2006), 13–16Google Scholar; Sorabji (n. 3), 379; Golitsis (n. 3 [2019]), 187, 188 n. 80.
28 Cf. Golitsis (n. 3 [2019]), 187–9; but he may not think that Philoponus’ ἐπιστάσεις were added at a later time. K. Verrycken, ‘The development of Philoponus’ thought and its chronology’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence (Ithaca, NY, 1990), 233–74 proposes that Philoponus later revised his commentary in the light of his Christian beliefs, but Verrycken does not associate the notion of ἐπιστάσεις to his revision thesis particularly.
29 As is put by Golitsis (n. 3 [2016]), 411.
30 Osborne (n. 27), 8.
31 Golitsis (n. 3 [2016]), 406, 411.
32 Both Sorabji (n. 3), 391 and Golitsis (n. 3 [2019]), 193 put the commentary on De anima Book 3 later than almost all other commentaries. Apart from Philoponus’ commentary on the Meteorology, generally treated as the latest, Sorabji puts the commentary on De anima Book 3 just before the commentary on Physics Book 4 (including the Corollaries), where Philoponus expressed his disagreement with Aristotle strongly and ‘truculently’ (Sorabji [n. 3], 378); Golitsis, however, puts the commentary on De anima Book 3 only before the Meteorology commentary.
33 According to Verrycken (n. 28), 252–4, a second revision after Philoponus finished his De aeternitate mundi could explain the back-reference at in Phys. 55.24–6, where Philoponus announces that he has already discussed the topic of the non-generation of being (τὸ μὴ γεγονέναι τὸ ὄν) elsewhere. If so, these ἐπιστάσεις on the generation of matter in the commentary on Physics Books 1 and 2 will indeed be added after the Greek commentary on De anima Book 3, since the commentary on De anima Book 3 is regarded as earlier than the De aeternitate mundi (Golitsis [n. 3 (2016)], 412). However, this back-reference does not necessarily refer to the De aeternitate mundi: Sorabji (n. 3), 379.
34 For the Christian elements of the commentary of PhiloponusG on De anima Book 3, see Westerink (n. 6), xxxix; Charlton (n. 1 [2000]), 11–12; Golitsis (n. 3 [2016]), 407; Kakavelaki (n. 1), 298–9.
35 R. Sorabji, ‘Introduction: seven hundred years of commentary and the sixth century diffusion to other cultures’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Re-Interpreted: New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators (London, 2016), 1–80, at 72–3, 78; M. Roueché, ‘A philosophical portrait of Stephanus the philosopher’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Re-Interpreted: New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators (London, 2016), 541–64.
36 Arguably, the dividing line between an ἀπὸ φωνῆς commentary and a commentary in propria persona is often obscure in Late Antiquity. In my view, since the difference between ‘what is immortal’ and ‘what is everlasting’ proposed by PhiloponusG constitutes a whole section of exegesis of a particular lemma (PhiloponusG, in De an. 541.5–13), PhiloponusG should not be regarded as the reportator of an ἀπὸ φωνῆς commentary. Cf. P. Golitsis, ‘Who were the real authors of the Metaphysics commentary ascribed to Alexander and Ps.-Alexander?’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Re-Interpreted: New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators (London, 2016), 565–87, at 567–77.
37 See e.g. Golitsis (n. 3 [2016]), 394 and Lautner (n. 1), 511–13 for doubts about these traditional grounds.
38 It contrasts particularly with the view presented in the De intellectu and in the Greek commentary on De anima Books 1 and 2 transmitted under the name of Philoponus and ascribed to Philoponus (or Ammonius). According to the commentator, the non-rational soul and the vegetative soul are mortal (e.g. in De an. 11.29–31, 12.10–12, 193.8–10; De intell. 60.60–5). Therefore, it is not an argument ex silentio, to the effect that neither Philoponus, in his other undisputed commentaries, nor other Neoplatonists have proposed such a distinction. Rather, they adopt views hardly compatible with this distinction and its implications.
39 Cf. Urmson, J.O., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1–2.4 (London, 1995), 177Google Scholar n. 296.
40 See Menn (n. 13), 56–7.
41 The reference should be Phd. 106d2–4, rather than a commentary on the Phaedo: O'Brien (n. 14), 252–5.
42 See also Damascius, in Phd. 1.256.1; Olympiodorus, in Phd. 11.3.6–11.4.1. But their formulation is briefer, and proposed in a different context: Westerink, L.G., The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo. Volume II: Damascius (Amsterdam, 1977), 154Google Scholar.
43 See Aristotle's wording at Cael. 286b9, κινεῖσθαί ἀεί, on which Simplicius is commenting. Cf. PhiloponusG and Proclus’ formulation of ‘being everlasting’: τὸ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχειν (PhiloponusG, in De an. 537.5); ἀεὶ ἔστιν/ὄν/ὄντα (Procl. ET 105.3, 105.5, 105.7).
44 We do not know whether Simplicius relies on some earlier sources in making the distinction at in Cael. 369.4–6. Although we have seen that Damascius (in Phd. 1.256.1), Olympiodorus (in Phd. 11.3.6–11.4.1) and Proclus (see e.g. ET §105) expressed a similar position, they mentioned it in different contexts, and did not focus on the exposition of the expression ‘immortal and everlasting’ at De an. 430a23. If it is Simplicius’ own idea, then we have more reason not to identify PhiloponusG as Philoponus himself. The reason is that Simplicius’ commentary on the De caelo was composed later than Philoponus’ De aeternitate mundi (Hankinson, R.J., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.1–4 [London, 2003], 1–2Google Scholar), and the Greek commentary on De anima Book 3—if by Philoponus—should be written before the De aeternitate mundi. It is more reasonable to suppose that Simplicius’ distinction inspired the distinction made by PhiloponusG, rather than the reverse.
45 See Roueché (n. 35), 557–8, 560.