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Ennoia and Πpoahψiσ in the Stoic Theory of Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

F. H. Sandbach
F. H. Sandbach
Affiliation:
Trinity College, Cambridge
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Extract

The starting-point of Plutarch's dialogue de communibus notitiis is a claim made by the Stoics that Providence sent Chrysippus to remove the confusion surrounding the ideas of ἔννοια (conception) and πρόληψισ (preconception) before the subtleties of Carneades were brought into play. Unfortunately our surviving information on the subject is so much less full than could be desired that it has again returned to an obscurity from which there are only two really detailed modern attempts to remove it. The one, by L. Stein (Erkenntnistheorie der Stoa, pp. 228–276), is most unsatisfactory; the other, by A. Bonhöffer (Epiktet und die Stoa, pp. 187–232), though of the greatest value in many ways, is vitiated by the fact that it constructs a system from the use of the words by Epictetus and then attempts to attach this system to the old Stoa in the face of the evidence of the doxographers, which is emended or violently interpreted to suit Epictetus. Even if Epictetus were in general a good authority for the technicalities of Chrysippus—and in the opinion of H. von Arnim he is not— this would not be a sound method of procedure. The only safe way is to take first the statements which can be attached to the Old Stoa, and having obtained our results from these, to see whether Epictetus does in fact agree.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , January 1930 , pp. 44 - 51
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1930

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References

page 44 note 1 1059c: τòν περὶ τὰς πρоλήψεις καὶ τὰς έννоίας τάραχоν ἀψελὼν παντάπασι καὶ διоρθώσας ἑκάστην καὶ θέμενоς είς τὸ оίκεῖоν.

page 44 note 2 See e.g. the opinions of von Arnim, H., Deutsche Litteraturzeitung, 1888, p. 16Google Scholar; Bonhöffer, A., Epiktet und die Stoa, IV.-V.Google Scholar; Bevan, E., Stoics and Sceptices, p. 6Google Scholar.

page 44 note 3 SVF (= Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta) XVII., Epictetus, Musonius, Seneca, ‘ad Chrysippum restituendum nullum fere usum praebent.’

page 44 note 4 SVE was, of course, not available when he wrote.

page 44 note 5 Evidence given later will show that the restriction does not hold even for Epictetus.

page 44 note 6 E.g. Zeller, , Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie4, III. i. 76Google Scholar. (All following references to Zeller are to this volume.) Ueberweg-Praechter, , Geschichte der Philosophie12, I., 418Google Scholar.

page 45 note 1 Cf. the parallel expression in 1062a: оὐμόνоν παρἁ τὰς κоινὰς έννоίας φιλоσоφоὐντων άλλά καὶ τὰς ἰδίας κνκώντων.

page 45 note 2 The same thing is implied in II. xi. 2 in a similar context. Bonhöffer also quotes, in a different connexion (p. 220), Nemesius 2O3 = de anima hominis, Migne, Vol. XL. 661, φνσικὰς δὲ λέγоμεν ἐννоίας τἂς ἀδιδάκτως πᾶσι πρоσоύσας, ὡς τὸ εἶναι θεόν. But the thoughts here are not so much Stoic as Platonic; the point under discussion is ἀνάμνησις.

page 45 note 3 Cf. IV. i. 44.

page 45 note 4 Bonhöffer attempts (p. 198) to explain away inconsistency. He is not very intelligible, but seems to be driven here as elsewhere to the assumption that Epictetus did not always use the word in its proper meaning.

page 45 note 5 We may notice that when the context makes the meaning clear ἡ πρόληφις is used to mean ἡ κоινὴ πρόληφις, e.g. Plutarch, comm. not. 1075e: πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκоνρоν оὐδὲν ἀπоλείπоνσι τῶν πραγμάτων (έν оὐδενὶ, γραμμάτων Wyttenbach) ἰού ἰού φεῦ βоῶντες ὠς συγχέοντα τὴν τῶν θεῶπρόληφιν (Cf. 1075a). This is exactly paralleled by the very frequent use of ἡ ἔννοια=ἡ κοινὴ ἔννοια (παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν 1073d, 1077a, 1077e, etc., τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας 1076a, σχέτλια ποιεῖν τὸν Ἐπίκονρον λέγονσι καὶ βιάζεσθαι τὰς ἐννοίας 1082e). It is probably this usage of πρόληφις that accounts for the persistence of the view that all preconceptions are universal.

page 46 note 1 A difficult phrase; Bonhöffer tries to connect τὰ καθόλον with conceptions not derived from experience, as being less definite than those that are. This is connected with his theory of the restriction of preconceptions to the moral field, which is, as we shall see, certainly false. Stein (p. 511) gives the impossible rendering, ‘die überall waltende Weltordnung.’

page 46 note 2 For the general idea of this distinction cf. Galen, in SVF II. 229Google Scholar: ἀρξώμεθ' οὖν αὖθις ἀπὸ τŵν ἐννοηματικŵν ὅρων οὓς οὐδὲν ἔφαμεν ἑρμηνεύειν πλέον ὧν ἂπαντες ἂνθρωποι γινώσκονσιν … οὓς οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τὰς προσηγορίας οὐδ' ὅρονς ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπεραφάς τε καὶ ὑποτνπώσεις ὀνομάζειν.

page 46 note 3 Cf. Plutarch, , comm. not. 1075eGoogle Scholar and Stoic, rep. 1051e.

page 46 note 4 περίπτωσις is rather an obscure word; who- ever introduced it to Greek philosophy, it did not remain the technical term of any one school. It occurs in Epicurean doctrine (Dio. L. X. 32): ἐπίνοιαι πᾶσαι ἀπδ τŵν αἰσθήσεων γεγὁνασι κατά τε περίπτωσιν καὶ ἂναλογίαν καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ σύνθεσιν, σνμβαλλομένον τι τοῦ λογισμοῦ, and Sextus uses it as if it were a generally accepted notion (adv. M. VIII. 56). Cicero appears to translate it by ‘usu’ (Fin. III. 33, see below). It must be connected with περιπίπτω in the neutral sense ‘meet with,’ and seems to have meant ‘direct experience,’ as appears from the non-philosophical examples quoted in liddell and Scott: Hippocrates 26, 1, καταινέω τὸν λογισμὸν έάν περ ἐκ περιπτώσιος ποιέηται τὴν ἀρχήν, Plutarch, , QN. 918cGoogle Scholar, τούτων δὲ (certain cures) οὔτε <διδασκαλία ποθεν οὔτε> πεῖρα καὶ περίπτωσις γέγονεν αὐτοῖς (the wild beasts that use them in case of need). To separate the philosophical examples from these, and to make the subject of the verb περιίπτω implied in περίπτωσις not the man but his φαντασία, is unnecessary, though done by Bonhöffer (‘Anfall an die Sinne’) and in the latest edition of Epicurus (‘by the fitting of one experience on to another’ Bailey, C., Epicurus, p. 415)Google Scholar.

page 46 note 5 The plural τρόπονς has also been explained as meaning μνήμην καὶ ἐμπειρίαν (Diels, , Doxographi Graeci, p. 400)Google Scholar. Aetius is then committed to a statement of obvious incompleteness. The explanation given above supposes no inaccuracies, and is in accord, for what that may be worth, with Cicerp, , Ac. II. 30Google Scholar(=Antiochus, see Zeller, 619, n. 2): ‘cetera (sc. uisa) autem similitudinibus (=καθ' ὁμοιότητα) construit (sc. mens) quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum quas Graeci tum ἐννοίας tum προλήφεις uocant.’

page 47 note 1 Cf. SVF II., p. 32 note, ‘φνσικαὶ ἔννοιαι apud Chrysippum eadem sunt quae πρλήφεις.’

page 47 note 2 E.g. 1059e: πίστεως πρόληφιν and 1073d: τὸν φνσικόν αὐτŵν λόγον οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ περὶ τελŵν διαταράττοιτα τὰς κοινὰς προλήψεις.

page 47 note 3 Plutarch, de anima, fr. 6, Bernardakis VII., p. 29 = SVF II. 104, under the heading ὅτι ἄπορον ἄντως εἰ οἶόν τε ζητεῖν καὶ εὑρίσκειν ὡς ἐνMένωνι προβέβληται (the well-known problem, p. 80e), οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τὰς φνσικὰς ἐννοίας αἰτιŵνται.

page 47 note 4 See the last sentence of Aetius quoted above. Chrysippus, , SVE II. 841Google Scholar, calls it an ἐννοιŵν τέ τινων καὶ προλήψεων ἄθροισμα.

page 47 note 5 The only other kind of πρόληψις he mentions is the πρόληψις διηρθρωμένη, peculiar among Stoics to Epictetus, which is properly not a preconception at all, for it: is obtained δι' ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας. Also if the field of preconception is restricted, so must be that of ‘articulated’ or developed preconceptions.

page 48 note 1 Whether called an ἔννοια or πρόληψις the thing meant is the same (cf. Aetius, ἐκεῖναι δὲ κ α ὶ προλήψεις, quoted at beginning of Section II.). The translations are those given by von Arnim. The index to SVF gives notitia=ἐπιστήμη, but though it may sometimes bear this meaning Cicero usually employs it as a synonym for notia.

page 48 note 2 It is true that Seneca says: ‘natura semina scientiae dedit, scientiam non dedit.’ But in all that follows no place is given to any inborn ideas in the formation of the conception of the good. The ‘semina’ seem to be the facts observed.

page 48 note 3 It may be noted that no trace of innate preconceptions is to be found in Panaetius' account of the formation of moral ideas. reproduced by Polybius VI. 6 (Schmekel, , Die mittlere Stoa, p. 64 sqq.)Google Scholar. This agrees with Cicero and Seneca in making them rest on the observation of good and evil actions, and ends αὓτη καλоῦ καὶ δικαίоυ πρώτη παρ' ἀνθρώπоις κατὰ φύσιν ἔννоια. Innate preconceptions are equally lacking in the Posidonian passage in Aetius, Plac. I. 6, headed πόθεν θεŵν ἔννоιαν ἔνθρωπоι (SVF II. 1009). Panaetius and Posidonius were both Platonizing Stoics, who, had their predecessors believed in innate preconceptions, would scarcely have suppressed the notion. A very similar account of how early man won the conception of divinity is given by Dio Prus. XII. 27 sqq. Though the observation of nature is the only method he mentions, he does not hesitate to call the resulting conception ἔμφυτоς; cf. especially c. 39: τὴν ἔμφντоν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώπоις ἐπίνоιαν ἐζ αὐτŵν γιγνоμένην τῶν ἒργων. Plutarch, , comm. not. 1070c–dGoogle Scholar, may perhaps be relevant to this question. There he enquires whether any theory has done greater outrage to normal feeling than that of the Stoics about the good, καὶ ταῦτα, he continues, ἐν τоῖς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν αίρετῶν τε καὶ φευκτῶν οἰκειῶν τε καὶ ἀλλоτρίων ἃ μᾶλλоν ἔδει θερμῶν [τε] κɑὶ ψυχρῶν λευκῶν τε κɑὶ μελάνων σαφέστερον ἔχειν τὴν ἐνάργειαν. ἐκείνων μὲν γὰρ ἔξωθέν εισιν αἱφαντάσιαι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπεισόδιоι, ταῦτα δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν σύμφντоν ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν. But I am uncertain of the meaning of the last sentence, and uncertain whether Plutarch is here confuting the Stoics out of their own mouths or not.

Page 49 note 1 It must have been a φαντασία κατληπτική: cf. Antipater's use of the word ἐνάργεια, considered below.

Page 49 note 2 Stein, L., Epiktet und die Stoa, pp. 248–250Google Scholar.He also alleges that Cicero is an untrustworthy witness.

page 50 note 1 The idea that it was borrowed to meet the attacks of the Academy seems less likely; for they were concerned chiefly with the validity of sense-impressions, in support of which preconception, and particularly the Epicurean preconception, based only on the accumulation of sense-impressions, would have been of little or no use.

page 50 note 2 Cf. SVF II. 1115: πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκονρον μάλιστα μάχεται (sc. χρύσιππος) καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀναιροῦντας τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐννοιŵν ἅς ἔχομεν περὶ θεῶν, εὐεργετικοὺς καὶ φιλανθρώπονς ἐπινοοῦντες.

page 50 note 3 Pearson, A. C., Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 284Google Scholar.

page 50 note 4 I have nothing to say on the subject of πρόληψις as a test of truth. The correct interpretation seems to me to have been given by Bréhier, E., Chrysippe, p. 103Google Scholar.

page 50 note 5 Cf. Ep. ad Men. 123: θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσίν ἐναργὴς γὰρ αὐτῦν ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις.

page 50 note 6 Usener, , Epicurea 247Google Scholar=Sextus, adv. M. VII. 203: τὴν φανσίαν ἣν καὶ ἐνάργειαν καλε‘eigentümliche Bezeichnung.’

page 50 note 7 It is not entered at all in the Index to SVF. Yet Bevan, E., Stoics and Sceptics, pp. 35, 37Google Scholar, talks of enargeia in explaining Zeno.

page 51 note 1 This interpretation of the word καταληπτική is well upheld by Bréhier, E., Chrysippe, pp. 80–100Google Scholar. The famous phrase μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν λαβάνεται is definitely put down to younger Stoics by Sextus, , adv. M. VII. 257Google Scholar, and is not applied to every φαντασία καταληπτική, but to such as ‘contain no obstacle.’

page 51 note 2 Zeller, p. 616, n. 2: Cicero, , Ac. II. 34Google Scholar.