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The Attack on Naxos: a ‘Forgotten Cause’ of the Ionian Revolt

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Arthur Keaveney
Arthur Keaveney
Affiliation:
Darwin College, University of Kent
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Extract

Herodotus tells us that some Naxian oligarchic exiles approached Aristagoras who was then ruling Miletus as deputy for his father-in-law Histiaeus, and asked him to help them return to power. Aristagoras, who saw a possible advantage for himself in the request, was willing to oblige but, as the matter lay beyond his competence, he put the project before Artaphernes, who, he said, governed all the peoples of the sea-coast of Asia. Artaphernes, in turn, brought the plan to the attention of Darius, who gave his consent. An army and a fleet of two hundred ships was made ready and placed under the command of Megabates. After a feint in the direction of the Hellespont the fleet put in at Caucasa preparatory to swooping on Naxos. There, however, a quarrel broke out between Aristagoras and Megabates over a disciplinary matter and the Persian, in a fit of pique, sent a message to warn the Naxians. As a result they were ready for the siege which proved to be a miserable failure. Aristagoras feared he would pay dearly for this débâcle and when a message urging revolt arrived from Histiaeus, he immediately acted upon it.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 38 , Issue 1 , January 1988 , pp. 76 - 81
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1988

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References

1 Probably in 500 B.C. – see How and Wells, ii.12.

2 In fact he was most likely supreme in western Asia Minor and the exaggeration here (cf. How and Wells, ii.9 and 11) probably arises from Aristagoras' desire to impress the suppliants. See further n. 28.

3 Hdt. 5.30–6.

4 There would be little point in giving even a selective list. More interesting are the dissenters: Curtius, E., The History of Greece, trans. Ward, A. W. (London, 1869), ii.173–5Google Scholar; Grote, G., History of Greece (London, 1907), iii.493–5Google Scholar; Forrest, W. G., ‘Motivation in Herodotos: The Case of the Ionian Revolt’, IHR, 1 (1979), 319Google Scholar. On the views of Evans, J. A. S., ‘Histaeus and Aristagoras: Notes on the Ionian Revolt’, AJP, 84 (1963), 118Google Scholar, see below.

5 In part, I shall, in this paper, be offering a detailed justification for the picture Grote and Forrest (n. 4) adumbrate.

6 This view is favoured by Burn, A. R., Persia and the Greeks2 (London, 1984), p. 196Google Scholar.

7 How and Wells, ii. 13, believe the feint failed whereas Burn, pp. 195–6, believes it worked.

8 I do not think it necessary to discuss Long's views (Historia, 1968) in detail since, in my opinion, they have been adequately refuted by Waters, (Historia, 1970)Google Scholar and Chapman, (Historia, 1972)Google Scholar.

9 Hdt. 5.30.

10 It should be carefully noted that Megabates was not able to stop him. See further below for the full significance of this.

11 Hdt. 5.33, on Aristagoras' authority. See further below for a detailed treatment.

12 Hdt. 5.32, with How and Wells, i.387–8, ii.13. It might, of course, be argued that it is dangerous to postulate an individual's actions at a specific moment by reference to the attitudes of his peer group. However, I hope to show that Megabates behaved pretty much as one might expect any Persian noble to do.

13 Hdt. 5.23–4.

14 Hdt. 6.30.

15 Hdt. 5.35.

16 This, I think, must call in question Forrest's contention (p. 319) that Darius would be ‘open-minded’ in choosing between Greek and Persian. His indulgence was great but it had limits. See further n. 24.

17 We should also remember that, acting in anger, he would probably disregard any slight risk there was.

18 Hdt. 4.137.

19 See below for justification of this view.

20 Hdt. 5.30.

21 How and Wells, ii.9.

22 Like Forrest, p. 314, 1 adopt Macan's summing up of Histiaeus' position, ‘better to reign in Miletus than serve in Susa’.

23 Hdt. 1.134, 153. On the relations between Greeks and Persians see Forrest, pp. 317–19.

24 How and Wells, ii.74, note that the Persian nobility distrusted Histiaeus but without bringing out the full significance of this attitude. They also claim Histiaeus was feared by the Persian nobility but this seems unlikely. Forrest indeed suggests (p. 320) that the Ionian revolt arose out of a struggle between Artaphernes on the one hand and Histiaeus and Aristagoras on the other as to who would control Ionia for Darius. I am not sure, however, that it is necessary to go this far. The very fact that a pair like this could achieve any influence with the king would be a sufficient blow to the self-esteem of the Persian nobility to make them want to hate them passionately and as we shall see, work for their destruction. We should perhaps bear in mind in this respect what was said above about how far Darius was prepared to exercise his phil-Hellenic tendencies. Note also the remarks of Evans, p. 117.

25 Hdt. 5.23–4. On the theme of Persian distrust note, for what it is worth, that Herodotus has Megabazus characterise Histiaeus as νδρ Ἕλληνι δεινῷ τε κα σοπῷ.

26 Evans, p. 127 and Forrest, pp. 319–20 incline to the view that he did. The Chians certainly had their suspicions of him (Hdt. 6.2) and it is possible he was simply overtaken by events (Hdt. 6.5). In support of his thesis Forrest draws attention to the use of Histiaeus' name ‘by Artabanos in 480 as an example of loyalty’. But in the passage in question (Hdt. 7.10) Histiaeus is not invoked as an example of loyalty but of what could happen to you if you embarked on military adventures. Your fate could depend on the will of one man. See further next note.

27 Hdt. 5.106–7, 6.1–2, 30. Three further points deserve mention. If, in spite of his complicity in starting the revolt, Histiaeus was willing and able (n. 26) to pacify Ionia, then Artaphernes, in acting as he did, was putting personal animus before the interests of Persia and, it may be added, the policy of the king. The mysterious Persians at Sardis with whom Histiaeus corresponded (Hdt. 6.4) might, one supposes, ‘be Lydians who still nourished national aspirations’ (How and Wells, ii.67) but are more likely, perhaps, to be members of the satrapal court. If that is so, another possibility presents itself. During his time at Susa Histiaeus had become friendly with enemies of Artaphernes which would give the satrap yet another reason for wishing to be rid of him. On all of this see Evans, pp. 123–8. Finally, Darius' willingness to forgive Histiaeus does not necessarily involve the assumption of Forrest, p. 320 that he never directly acted against the interests of the king for another explanation, grounded on what we know of Darius and Persians in general, lies to hand. As a follower of Ahura Mazda Darius was wont to weigh up the good and ill a man had done in order to determine which was the greater (Hdt. 7.194) and it is not unreasonable to suppose he did so in the case of Histiaeus. Bearing in mind what the tyrant had once saved him from, it comes as no surprise to learn he reached the conclusion he did.

28 It is true that Aristagoras boasted of his friendship for Artaphernes (Hdt. 5.30) but this was intended to impress the Naxians. When things went wrong he had no expectations of aid or protection from Artaphernes (Hdt. 5.35). Cf. n. 2.

29 See n. 12.

30 Hdt. 5.32.

31 Hdt. 5.33. The narrative sequence would seem to suggest two separate forces were in question – so Macan, ad loc. (contra Burn, p. 195)Google Scholar. At any rate, Macan is surely right to say the combined forces were under the command of Megabates.

32 Macan says, ‘the exact authority of Megabates in the story is represented as ill-defined – ‘Hinc illae lacrymae’. On the contrary, it seems to me that, in Herodotus, his authority, its relationship to the authority of Aristagoras and the way that relationship might lead to tears are perfectly clear.

33 Of this incident, Evans, p. 118, says, ‘one would like to know why it is inherently incredible’. I hope I have shown why it is ‘by no means as incredible as it has seemed to many’ (Forrest, p. 319). Evans objects to its veracity on the grounds that it is an ‘inside story’ for which Herodotus would probably not have a reliable source. But an incident on board a ship is public and not of a piece with the scene in, say, Hdt. 3.134.

34 Hdt. 5.35.

35 For some pertinent remarks see Forrest, pp. 311–14.

36 For discussions of conditions in Ionia at this time see Tozzi, P., La Rivolta Ionica (Pisa, 1978), pp. 114–33Google Scholar and Forrest, pp. 315–17.