In 2002, the Chinese leadership announced a change in national welfare policy: Voluntary medical schemes at county level, called the “New Rural Co-operative Medical System” should cover all counties by 2010. This article addresses the main characteristics of this system, analyses the introduction of local schemes based on our own field studies in one Kazak county of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region since 2006, and argues that the fast progressing of the local scheme and the flexibility shown by local administrators in considering structural and procedural adjustments are not the result of central directives but of local initiatives. Recentralization from the township governments to functional departments in the provincial and the central state administration is only one aspect of current rural governance. Complementary forms of locally embedded responsiveness to the needs of health care recipients are crucial in restructuring the administration and discharge of health care. These new modes of governance are different from the hierarchical control and institutionalized representation of interests of the local population.

The People's Republic of China has come under strong international criticism recently over its use of the death penalty. Capital punishment had a long history in China as a permanent fixture of the criminal justice system well before the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. Today the death penalty is an integral part of the legal system and is meted out for a wide range of offences.

Village cadres are important agents for the state yet disciplining them has been difficult. There are few disciplinary tools that can easily hold them to account. Prior to 2018, Party discipline did not apply to non-Party cadres. Legislation was ambiguous in relation to these grassroots agents and had to rely heavily on legal interpretation. The impact of the cadre evaluation system on village cadres, who are not considered to be public servants on the state payroll, was limited. This situation has changed since 2018. The party-state has consolidated and institutionalized ways in which grassroots cadres are checked and disciplined. Instead of relying on policy regulation, which had been the dominant disciplinary method since 1949, village cadres are now fully subject to Party rules and state laws. These changes have been accomplished through the application of three measures. First, village Party secretaries are to serve concurrently as village heads, and members of village and Party committees are to overlap, thereby making them subject to Party discipline. Second, village cadres are now considered to be “public agents” and are on an equal legal footing with other state agents. Finally, a campaign waged by the criminal justice apparatus cleaned up village administration and prepared it for upcoming village elections in a new era.

Through two rounds of land contracting, rural households have been allocated a bundle of rights in land. We observe significant differences across villages in the amount of land to which villagers retain a claim and the institutional mechanisms governing the exchange of land rights. This study reveals the perpetuation and expansion of non-market mechanisms accruing to the benefit of village cadres and state officials and only limited emergence of market mechanisms in which households are primary beneficiaries. It identifies factors in economic, political and legal domains that incentivize and enable state officials and local cadres to capture returns from use of land. Relatedly, the study finds differences in conflict over property-rights regimes. Drawing on a pilot survey carried out by the authors in November of 2011 in Shaanxi and Jiangsu provinces (192 households in 24 villages), this paper seeks to explain heterogeneity and change in property-rights regimes over time and across space.

This essay attempts to describe and contrast the social and political norms which the governments of China and Taiwan encourage their respective citizens to adopt. It endeavours to highlight contrasts in the goals of socialization in the two societies, so different in their vision of the ideal Chinese polity, by examining the norms presented to children through elementary school textbooks.

Japanese rule transformed Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, laying the foundations for the post-1950 “economic miracle,” but there is little consensus about the impact on the welfare of Taiwan's ethnic Chinese. A difficulty with past studies is the adequacy of economic indicators to measure the standard of living. Instead of conventional economic data, we use average adult height, an indicator of nutritional status. The rise in the average height of the Chinese indicates welfare improved under colonialism, but the static average height from 1930 highlights the negative effect of the shift in economic policy during the late colonial period.

The relationship of the intellectual in China to society and state has been a complex problem throughout this century. An individual's relationship to the state in China is influenced by separate – and often contradictory – sources from within their individual social context, and from traditional political culture. Not the least of these influences was the ancient moral responsibility of the literati to critically advise the emperor on the rule of the country. During the unrelenting crises of the 1940s, people had heightened political concern, and many became politically active. Even those formerly aloof from politics became involved for the first time.

The entrepreneurial “second generation” of Chinese policy research institutes (often called think tanks) that emerged during the 1980s played a pivotal role in the policy process of reform. Since Tiananmen, China's growing commercialization is spawning a “third generation” of think tanks characterized by even more ambiguous links to sponsoring leaders and institutions, greatly expanded commercial links, greater exposure to Western theories and techniques, and the gradual emergence of wide-ranging “policy communities.” The extent of this change varies greatly across policy sectors, however. Generational change is evident in China's previously unstudied network of public security (police) think tanks. Though clearly still of the “second generation” variety, these institutes have been in the forefront of importing and incorporating more sophisticated crime-fighting techniques and less class-based and conspiratorial theories of crime and social unrest.

Not until the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 did the Chinese mass media openly refer to the “Lin Piao affair.” Yet, almost all Chinese - including Kwangtung commune members - had been given an explanation for his demise sometime previously, so the revelations of the Tenth Congress came as no surprise. Without help from the mass media, but with guidance from the network of political study groups, the Chinese had been taught how to decode such esoteric phrases as “Liu Shao-ch'i type swindlers” which appeared in the media. The dissemination of information about Lin Piao was the most dramatic but not the first indication of China's dual communication network: the open, mass media and the closed system contained within the bureaucracy (except for the final link to the populace). To cite other prominent examples, a recorded tape of Mao's important 27 February 1957 speech “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People” was played for select audiences long before the revised version was published in June 1957. The series of edicts on agriculture and the socialist education campaign in the early 1960s were widely disseminated; yet the open press only reflected the spirit of the documents. Mao's interview with Edgar Snow that explained and sanctified Nixon's visit went unrecorded in the open media, but circulated widely among cadres.

With the proclamation of Document 1, 1983, reform of marketing became one of the major targets of agricultural policy in China. This official emphasis on the need to liberalize the marketing system was, however, little more than a confirmation of a process which was already taking place. The initial reforms of labour management and prices in 1978 had led to a decentralization of economic authority to the household level. The commune system was in decline and the number of small-scale free markets was increasing rapidly as peasants took advantage of their new-found freedom to trade their surplus production as they wished. Responding to the economic stimulus offered by the new structure of prices and to the organizational flexibility offered by the decentralization of management, some households began to plan at least part of their production for sale on the market, there by initiating a process of specialization and commercialization. Once begun, this process fed backwards into production by encouraging further specialization and diversification and forwards into marketing by stimulating the emergence of longdistance trade carried out by specialist merchants and traders. In effect, the free market began to act as an engine of economic change, shaping both the structure of agricultural production and employment and the network of new economic linkages through the emerging hierarchy of market centres.

This article examines how Chinese reformers have used a set of “fatality indicators” to deal with the serious work safety situation in the past two decades. It argues that the system of fatality indicators is a prudent strategy to tackle the responsibility deficiencies in the previous work safety regulatory system and strengthen the central government's supervision over local safety management. The primary purpose of implementing the fatality indicators is to shift local officials' focus from a GDP-centred growth mode to a new mindset of achieving a balance between economic development and social stability in local governance. The article also indicates that the decline in work-related fatalities in recent years is evidence of the effectiveness of the fatality indicators. These achievements aside, however, the introduction of fatality indicators is closely associated with an increase in local officials' dishonest reporting of real death tolls and the fluctuation in very serious accidents.

Since 2015 rights-based NGOs, lawyers, feminists and journalists have endured the most stringent crackdown since 1989. Simultaneously the Xi Li administration has pushed forward a series of laws, policies and regulatory changes to enable service-oriented NGOs to apply for government contracts to provide welfare services. This seemingly Janus-like policy of welfarist incorporation can be traced back to the Hu–Wen period, often described as a lacklustre period, despite significant efforts to tackle issues of poverty and inequality. This article argues for a more balanced appraisal of this period by exploring in depth the complex politics underpinning efforts to pluralize welfare provision by involving service-oriented NGOs. It explores three sets of politics influencing this policy process: inter-institutional politics; state/non-state actor politics; and domestic/external politics. Furthermore, it considers processes of gradual institutional change adopted by key political actors to achieve these ends.

As the one and a half centuries of British colonial rule draw to a close on 30 June 1997, it is timely to review the true legacy of British administration in Hong Kong. It would be naive to resort to any simplistic blanket judgment or to issue any sweeping endorsement or condemnation on the mixed record of the British administration. It would also be dangerous to look only at the attainments in the final days of the British regime and use them to reconstruct, or even to substitute for, the full span of British rule. Even given a charitable view of this sunset era of the British regime as its finest hour in Hong Kong, a more informed and balanced assessment of its past deeds must be appreciated in the fuller context of the actual inputs and outputs of British officialdom in shaping developments in the territory and the life of Hong Kong people during the entire course of British rule.

The three articles which follow provide a review of the development of the study of domestic Chinese politics over the last decade. The first, by Elizabeth Perry of the University of California at Berkeley, is on state-society relations. The second, by Avery Goldstein of the University of Pennsylvania, deals with political elites and institutions. The third, by Peter Moody of the University of Notre Dame, addresses the study of political culture. Although the three essays do not claim to provide an exhaustive survey of the analysis of Chinese politics, they do offer a reasonably comprehensive overview of the field in the early 1990s.

In 1996, the Sino-Japanese conflict over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands intensified to the point where the American mass circulation periodical Time asked: “Will the next Asian war be fought over a few tiny islands?” That such a question could be asked seems incredible given that the Diaoyu Islands, which lie north-east of Taiwan and west of Okinawa, consist of only five small islands and three rocky outcroppings with a total landmass of no more than 7 square kilometres or 3 square miles. Apart from their miniscule size, the islands are uninhabited, are incapable of supporting human habitation for an extended period of time and are unlikely to support any economic life of their own from indigenous resources.

Has survey nonresponse caused scholars to overestimate political trust in China? We analyse item nonresponse for sensitive questions on trust in government from our original survey of villagers conducted in China in 2012. We also analyse nonresponse in four other comparable surveys conducted in China between 1993 and 2014. We examine the association between nonresponse to politically sensitive questions and individual characteristics such as sex, level of education, Party membership and cosmopolitanism. We find that less privileged groups may be underrepresented in survey data generally. We find mixed results regarding the association between cosmopolitanism and nonresponse. We conclude that our understanding of political trust in China has been compromised by high rates of item nonresponse, leading to artificially high estimates of trust in the centre and exaggerated accounts of the gap between trust in central and local leaders.

This study explains the institutional structure and mechanism of economic regulation in China's telecommunications basic service industry. The case of telecoms basic service provides an excellent window to explore how Chinese leadership governs strategic state sectors whose assets and profits are central to the national economy. Challenging the ideational model of independent regulator, this study argues that the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) explains much of the telecoms business regulation, as the authority of the Ministry of Information Industry has been circumscribed by other party-state institutions. The SASAC's regulatory power suggests that the primary goal of the Chinese industrial economy is the best protection of state assets through the creation of large and strong state firms, not the protection of consumers' interests by breaking up the monopoly in markets.

In recent decades, China has transformed from a relatively egalitarian society to a highly unequal one. What are the implications of high levels of inequality for the lives of children? Drawing on two nationally representative datasets, the China Family Panel Studies and the China Education Panel Survey, we develop a comprehensive portrait of childhood inequality in post-reform China. Analyses reveal stark disparities between children from different socio-economic backgrounds in family environments and in welfare outcomes, including physical health, psychosocial health and educational performance. We argue that childhood inequality in China is driven not only by the deprivations of poverty but also by the advantages of affluence, as high socio-economic status children diverge from their middle and low socio-economic status counterparts on various family environment and child welfare measures.

China's long-term history – social, economic, political, and intellectual – has been interwoven from the start with its environment. In counterposed fashion, the history of the Chinese environment has been entwined with that of anthropogenic forces. The Chinese landscape was one of the most transformed in the pre-modern world as the result of its reshaping for cereal cultivation, re-engineering by hydraulic works for drainage, irrigation and flood-defence, and deforestation for the purposes of clearance and the harvesting of wood for fuel and construction.

Have workers of minority status suffered labour market discrimination in China? Do all actors in the state sector discriminate against minority workers? What are the rationales for discrimination? To address these questions, I compare two ethnic groups (Han Chinese and Uyghur) with regard to job attainment in the state sector. Data are from a 2005 survey (N = 2,947) conducted in Ürümchi, China. Data analysis shows that controlling background characteristics does not remove the Uyghur–Han difference in job attainment in state firms. However, there is no ethnic variation in employment in redistributive agencies. This contrast is explained with reference to post-1978 market transition and the resulting differentiation in the institutional tasks between state firms and government agencies.