Taiwan entered the international spotlight in 1996. No longer seen as just an economic powerhouse and diplomatic dilemma, the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROCOT) caught international attention in two new dimensions: politics and security. In March the ROCOT's first ever direct presidential election took place against the backdrop of unprecedented military coercion from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The world watched nervously as Taiwan's presidential candidates campaigned while Chinese missiles landed near the island's two major ports and air and naval forces of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) held live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait.

China is credited with having “gat on her feet.” But the metaphors must be mixed—like the feelings of the Chinese themselves. China also leans on Russia, and is “riding a tiger” (or the modern equivalent, a tank or a rocket). In 1949, Chinese Communism was apparently the only decisive component in the “China Problem”; not now. The decade saw swift and brutal intensification of Communist purposes, internally on the mainland and externally in outward thrusts, leading to great stresses, much loss of the initial support and toleration enjoyed by the régime, and increasing opposition.

In China, government at all levels relies on the specially selected graduates (SSG) scheme to recruit elite university students as future political leaders. This article examines the mechanism of the SSG scheme and the relationship between elite university education and political selection in China. We show that elite education is increasingly stratified, such that graduates from top elite universities have significant selection advantages in the SSG competition and are more likely to be offered incentives and preferences. We argue that taking elite university education as a hard eligibility criterion reinforces the homophily effects in selection of future political elites and strengthens the political influence of top elite universities on China's politics. Further, because poor and lower-class students have little chance of entering elite universities, the SSG does not provide an effective route of upward mobility for non-elite classes. Merit-based political recruitment as a channel of upward mobility for non-elite classes is largely an illusion.

Why do policy experimentation regimes breakdown? And, if there are recognizable patterns of experimental failure, what might explain the variation? Focusing on aviation, finance and food safety, this article considers why a policy style that has been credited with China's successes in the past is failing to address governance challenges in these sectors at present. The article moves beyond discussions of policy mis-implementation by reframing experimental failure as a case of policy maladaptation under conditions of complexity and ambiguity. Maladaptation describes how approaches used in previous periods to foster adaptation can inadvertently make a system less resilient in the future. The analysis shows how the degree of consolidation of previously successful experimental regimes lends itself to certain types of maladaptation in the present: consolidated regimes are unable to generate policy alternatives (aviation), moderately consolidated regimes are maladapted for selection (finance), and unconsolidated regimes impede niche creation (food safety).

The following note was originally intended to be part of our Lu Xun symposium (in issue No. 91). Tang Tao, a disciple of Lu Xun in the latter's last years, is now Research Fellow at the Institute of Literature, CASS – Editor.