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The State and the Individual: An Overview Interpretation*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Lucian W. Pye
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Extract

It could be that no people have ever outdone the Chinese in ascribing moral virtues to the state or in deprecating the worth of the individual. First Confucianism and then the Chinese version of Leninism went all out in extolling the importance of rulers and society and in minimizing the rights of individuals. The gap between the moral worth and the recognized rights of state and citizen in China was and remains huge both because of the way the Chinese have consistently given paramountcy to the state and the ways in which they have subordinated the individual to the group. The extraordinary imbalance in the relations of the state and individuals provides both the structural and the cultural bases for the human rights practices which are now the most contentious issues between China and the west, especially the United States. What is outrageous to Americans can be for most Chinese normal expectations – although since Tiananmen a majority may feel that the state has gone too far.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 127 , September 1991 , pp. 443 - 466
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1991

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References

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