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Does Performance Competition Impact China's Leadership Behaviour? Re-examining the Promotion Tournament Hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2023

Baoqing Pang ,
Shu Keng  and
Siyi Zhang
Baoqing Pang
Affiliation:
School of Sociology and Political Science, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China
Shu Keng*
Affiliation:
School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China.
Siyi Zhang
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China.
*
Corresponding author: Shu Keng, email: [email protected]
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Abstract

How can China develop so quickly and yet maintain stability? Most scholars pinpoint the efforts of China's local government leaders as a primary factor. Regarding what motivates these leaders, however, scholars display wide disagreement. The widely accepted “promotion tournament” hypothesis stresses competition among local leaders as the driving force, but empirical test results vary considerably and create controversy. We argue that tests of promotion competition should target leadership behaviour rather than institutional inducements; the latter are, at best, a necessary condition of the former. Informed by extensive fieldwork, this study proposes an alternative and more direct approach to verifying the promotion tournament hypothesis by examining the impacts of promotion competition on leaders’ performance efforts. Our test results show, however, that competition for promotion has no significant impact on local leaders’ behaviour, thereby indicating that the promotion tournament hypothesis cannot be the primary explanation for China's economic achievements and regime resilience. In so doing, our study illuminates the oversimplified assumptions behind a prevailing proposition in Chinese politics and offers empirically informed insights into the tensions between political institutions and leadership behaviour.

摘要

摘要

中国官员为何如此拼搏政绩，是否为职务晋升所调动？受李宏斌与周黎安先行研究的影响，相关研究多聚焦 “官员绩效能否影响职务晋升”？这涉及中国政府的人事制度，但制度未必决定行为。由于学界关注焦点在如何激励地方官员，因此作者主张直接考察官员行为，即 “晋升竞争形势能否影响官员投入？” 本文乃通过中国地级市政府在 2000–2015 的政府预算支出与融资平台借贷数据，检测中国官员的晋升竞争形势—包括 “整体晋升名额” 与 “个人竞争优势”—对其政绩投入努力的影响。结果发现无论哪个层面均不存在晋升锦标解释预期的显著影响。换言之，晋升激励至多只是中国官员努力的必要条件之一，并不具有决定性影响。本文除考察流行的晋升锦标解释外，还能对政治 “制度” 与 “行为” 的关系有所启发。

Keywords

Chinese politicslocal governmentsgovernment personnel systempromotion competitionpromotion tournament hypothesis中国政治地方政府政府人事制度晋升竞争晋升锦标假说
Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 255 , September 2023 , pp. 716 - 733
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London

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