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China's America Watchers: Changing Attitudes Towards the United States*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Phillip C. Saunders
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The People's Republic of China (PRC) has hundreds of analysts who interpret American policy for a Chinese audience. Some hold positions in government ministries, but many are in semi-official research institutes. These “America watchers” advise Chinese policy-makers and write internal papers which circulate among the top leadership. By influencing how China's leaders view the United States, they indirectly help shape policy. This article describes the community of America watchers and examines the theoretical orientations they use to understand international relations and to think about the United States. By surveying Chinese interpretations of Sino-U.S. relations during the 1990s, it seeks to evaluate how well China's America watchers understand the United States and assess their influence on Chinese foreign policy.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 161 , March 2000 , pp. 41 - 65
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2000

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