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The Attempted Coup in Indonesia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Arthur J. Dommen
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Extract

For years, observers have been able to fit developments in Indonesia into the neat framework of a balance of forces between the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the army. The coup attempt of October 1, 1965, which came within a hair's breadth of effecting an irrevocable shift in this balance of forces in favour of the PKI, compels us to re-examine the validity of this frame of reference. The facts of the abortive conspiracy lead me to believe that the Sukarno-PKI relationship under-went a gradual qualitative change and, at some point prior to the illuminating flash of October, became the core of a political dynamo that was propelling the Indonesian revolution forward at an accelerating rate.

Type
Recent Developments
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 25 , January 1966 , pp. 144 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1966

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References

1 “Gerakan 30 September” (“September 30 Movement”), Harian Rakjat, October 2, 1965.

2 This is a reference to Moslem dress. Later, after the army's crackdown on the PKI and Aidit's flight into hiding, a slogan scrawled on many Jakarta walls read, “Aidit, where is your sarong?”

3 Sudisman, Sahinnan, Njono and Adjitorop. Adjitorop is believed to be still in China, where he was reported to have gone last year.

4 Sahirman and Mardjono were reported killed in an action with government troops on December 15. New York Times, December 16.

Reports of Aidit's death began to circulate in Jakarta towards the middle of November. According to usually reliable sources, basing themselves on second-hand evidence, Aidit was found hiding in a cubbyhole in a house near Surakarta by an Army patrol. He identified himself to his captors as a Cabinet minister and asked to be taken to his President, who had issued blanket orders to the Army to bring Aidit to Jakarta if he fell into their hands. The local Army authorities, apparently afraid that Aidit would manage to exculpate himself if he were allowed to contact Sukarno, executed him in Central Java. Aidit's body was positively identified by General Suharto, according to these sources; it is established that Suharto did make a trip to Central Java in late November or December, which would coincide with these reported events there. As of this writing, no conclusive evidence of Aidit's death has turned up. The Army has made no announcement concerning his fate, and Sukarno has avoided the issue. What seems fairly certain on the basis of available evidence is that Aidit's death did occur at the hands of the Army, who had cut off his lines of escape and were searching for him in a systematic manner.

Aidit is reported to have given the Army a lengthy signed confession in which he assumed primary responsibility for the coup, acknowledged joint planning with Colonel Untung, and described how he tried unsuccessful to get Sukarno to sign a bill establishing the Revolutionary Council during the day of October 1 when the two men were at Halim Air Base together. Aidit also described planning for the abortive uprising in Central Java on October 23. The confession states that Aidit was arrested on November 22 in a village west of Surakarta. (See document at end of this article.)

An example of Sukarno's vagueness on the whole question of the whereabouts of the PKI leaders was afforded by his remark at a plenary Cabinet meeting at Bogor on January 2, 1966. Looking over a list of ministers absent from the meeting of the 97-member Cabinet, Sukarno asked: “Where are Lukman and Njoto?” When no one answered, he continued: “Ah! well, perhaps they are still asleep. It's hard to get up in the morning.”

5 AP dispatch, Bogor, October 7, 1965.

6 See page 26.

7 New China News Agency (NCNA), October 19, 1965.

8 At the entry to Klaten the principal item of decoration for Armed Forces Day was a giant kris(Javanese dagger) made of wood and painted bright red—a sinister touch.

9 See page 16.

10 “Necolim” is Sukarno's abbreviation for neocolonialist-colonialist-imperialist agents. Specifically, the RPKAD troops were portrayed in PKI propaganda as Malaysian invaders.

11 Nasakom, a term first coined by Sukarno in 1926, means the merging of the nationalist, religious and Communist trends in Indonesian life. See, for example, Sukarno's remarks to Japanese newspaper reporters in Jakarta on October 19. According to one published report of his remarks, Sukarno called the formation of the Revolutionary Council a big mistake, referring to it as an incident of the Indonesian Revolution similar to incidents which had occurred in the French and Russian revolutions. “My task at present is to protect and strengthen the Indonesian revolution.” (Yomiuri, Tokyo, 10 20, 1965.)Google ScholarPubMed

12 The official news agency Antara on October 23 gave the following list of “political parties, political organisations and mass organisations believed to be involved” in the September 30 Movement: PKI, BTI, SOBSI, Sarbupri, SBKA, SB Postel, SBLG, Serbuksi, Sebbetsi, SBKB, Sepda, SBPU, Pemuda Rakjat, IPPI Kommunis, IM, HM, KM, CGMI, HSI, Lekra, Gerwani, Baperki, PPI, Partindo, Pemuda Indonesia, Tani Marhaen, Germindo, Wanita Indonesia, Pertimi, SBRRI, SB Kem. Pertahanan, SS Pendidikan, SB Kesehatan, Ichwannul Muslimin, SB Tekstil Pakaian, Lesbi. It should be noted that Partindo was the only political party besides the PKI whose party newspaper (Bintang Timur) printed Untung's communiques.

13 NCNA, October 4, 1965.

14 NCNA, October 19, 1965. This claim is surprising because the Chinese Embassy employs its own radio transmitter for communications with Peking.

15 NCNA, October 18, 22, 25, November 5, 22, 30, 1965.

16 Contrary to the Chinese allegation of diplomatic immunity, the Chinese commercial counsellor's house and office were not officially listed as embassy property at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.

17 NCNA, October 20, 1965.

18 Angkatan Bersendjata, Jakarta, 10 29, 1965Google Scholar. Gestapu is an abbreviation for the September 30 Movement.

19 Antara news bulletin, 11 13, 1965Google ScholarPubMed.

20 Antara news bulletin, 11 7, 1965Google ScholarPubMed.

21 Pravda, Moscow, 10 26, 1965Google ScholarPubMed.

22 Antara news bulletin, 11 2, 1965Google ScholarPubMed.

23 The four armed services are the army, navy, air force and police.

24 Sukarno, , Reach to the Stars! A Year of Self-Reliance, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 1965, p. 43Google Scholar.

25 Sujono Atmo himself was arrested after October 1. Mochtar, the Governor of Central Java, and his wife were among the guests in Peking on October 1.

26 Private information from a reliable eyewitness source.

27 Sukarno, , “A Year of Living Dangerously,” in Indonesia's Political Manifesto 1959–1964 (Jakarta: Prapantja, no date), p. 300Google Scholar.

28 Information Bulletin: Documents of the Communist and Workers' Parties, Articles and Speeches (Prague: 1965), p. 58Google Scholar. NCNA also published the text of Aidit's speech on May 25.

29 Sukarno, , Reach to the Stars!, p. 25Google Scholar.

30 Information Bulletin, p. 54.

31 Aidit, D. N., Dare, Dare and Dare Again! (“Political Report Presented on February 10, 1963, to the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia”) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 50Google Scholar.

32 Sukarno, , Reach to the Stars!, p. 16Google Scholar.

33 Sukarno, , Reach to the Stars!, p. 38Google Scholar.

34 “Summary of a General Report Made by Chairman Aidit at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Indonesia,” in the Peking People's Daily, May 11, 1962.

35 Sukarno, , Reach for the Stars!, p. 23Google Scholar.

36 Information Bulletin, p. 54.

37 Sukarno, , Reach for the Stars!, pp. 23–24Google Scholar. The text of the mimeographed English translation distributed to press correspondents in advance of Sukarno' speech read, “… will flare up and burn away the luxurious lives.…”

38 Sukarno, , A Year of Living Dangerously, p. 299Google Scholar.

39 Sukarno, , Reach to the Stars!, p. 24 (italics in original)Google Scholar.

40 Information Bulletin, p. 56.

41 Quoted in Brackman, Arnold, Indonesian Communism (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 272Google Scholar.

42 Antara news bulletin, 07 8, 1964Google Scholar.

43 See, for instance, Aidit's remarks about the PKI incorporation of Sukarno's August 17, 1964, guidelines quoted in Information Bulletin, p. 55.

44 Sukarno, , Reach to the Stars!, p. 24Google Scholar.

45 “Five October—A Day of Tears,” article in Angkatan Bersendjata, November 14, 1965.