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Strategic Weapons and Chinese Power: The Formative Years

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

John Wilson Lewis  and
Xue Litai
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Extract

China entered the nuclear and space age as a result of a crusade that began almost as soon as the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had completed the conquest of the mainland. In this article we will comment on some aspects of the entire nuclear programme over the past 30 years as it has affected the strategic role of the PLA.1

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 112 , December 1987 , pp. 541 - 554
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1987

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References

1. A full treatment of this can be found in Lewis, and Xue, , China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming). Our article draws on this book with the permission of the publisher. We are now writing a companion volume on the nation's strategic missile force.Google Scholar

2. Chen, Honggeng, “Xinyuan” (“Aspirations”), in Mimi licheng (A Secret Course) (Beijing: Yuanzineng chubanshe, 1985), p. 163.Google Scholar

3. “The riddle of research and development on China's atomic bomb, hydrogen bomb, and nuclear-powered submarine,” Liaowang (Outlook) (overseas edit.), 15 June 1987, p. 5.

4. Data in support of our estimate may be found in Lewis, and Xue, , China Builds the Bomb.Google Scholar

5. Mao, Zedong, “On the 10 major relationships,” in Selected Works of Mao Tsetung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), Vol. 5, esp. p. 288.Google Scholar

6. Liu, Jingzhi and Li, Peicai, “A description of Deng Jiaxian, a theoretical physicist and a pioneer in our country's atomic and hydrogen bomb effort,” Guangming ribao (Bright Daily), 18 07 1986.Google Scholar

7. Liu, Xiyao, “How China succeeded in making hydrogen bombs with the highest speed,” Guangming ribao, 3 11 1985. Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section is from this article.Google Scholar

8. “The riddle of research and development,” p. 6.

9. Ibid. p. 6.

10. “China's first hydrogen bomb successfully exploded,” Peking Review, No. 26 (23 June 1967), pp. 6–7.

11. “A magnificent victory for Mao Tse-tung's thought,” Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), 18 June 1967, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: People's Republic of China (hereafter FBIS-CHI), 19 June 1967, p. CCC4.

12. “The triumphal song of Mao Tse-tung's thought that rings ever loud across the sky,” Jiefangjun bao, 18 June 1967; in FBIS-CHI, 20 June 1967, p. CCC14.

13. These emphases all come within what political scientist Allen Whiting has termed “the calculus of deterrence” adopted by China in conflicts with India and with the United States in Vietnam. Whiting, Allen S., The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), esp. Chap. 7.Google Scholar

14. Nie, Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu (Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984), p. 787.Google Scholar

15. Du, Yuejin, “A survey of the path to develop simultaneously the construction of national defence and of the national economy,” Liaowang, 22 12 1986, p. 13.Google Scholar

16. Mao, Zedong, “On the 10 major relationships,” esp. pp. 288–89.Google Scholar

17. See, e.g., Wang, Shouyeun, “Defence economics-a realistic question,” Baike zhishi (Encyclopedic Knowledge), No. 10 (1984), pp. 26–27.Google Scholar

18. “On questions of Party history” (27 June 1981), Beijing Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 27 (6 July 1981), p. 31.

19. As each became operational, the west designated these missiles CSS-1 through 4, respectively. Most of the information in the rest of this section is from interviews with Chinese specialists, 1985.

20. Zhang, Jun (chief ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo de hangtian shiye (Modern China's Space Cause) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1986), p. 41.Google Scholar

21. Ibid. pp. 561–62.

22. American Government reports regularly described this medium-range ballistic missile as a “single-stage, liquid propellant, transportable system developed from Soviet models. …It can reach targets in the Eastern U.S.S.R., peripheral nations, and some U.S. bases in the Far East. It is an obsolescent and cumbersome missile system with slow reaction time.” These reports gave an estimated range of about 600 nautical miles or 1,100 km., which the Chinese say slightly underestimates the true maximum range. See Brown, George S., United States Military Posture for FY 1976 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1975), p. 48.Google Scholar

23. Zhang, Jun, Modern China's Space Cause, p. 565.Google Scholar

24. According to Zhang Jun (ibid. p. 567), the DF–3 (zhongcheng huojiari) and the DF–4 (zhongyuancheng huojiari) were first successfully flight-tested in December 1966 and January 1970, respectively. We should note that the terms zhongjincheng (mediumshort-range, a classification for the DF–2), zhongcheng (medium-range) and zhongyuancheng (intermediate-range) imply ranges that do not precisely coincide with the terms medium-range, intermediate-range, and limited-range intercontinental as used in the west. The U.S. Department of Defense categorized the DF–2 as “medium-range,” the DF–3 as “intermediate-range,” and the DF–4 as “limited-range intercontinental” missiles. See George, Brown, United States Military Postures for FY 1976, pp. 48–49. In this discussion, we have chosen to follow the western usage.Google Scholar

25. Jones, David C., United States Military Posture for FY 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 76.Google Scholar

26. Some American sources have stated that the DF–4 (CSS–3) had a maximum range of 4,350 miles (about 7,000 km.), but Chinese specialists state this is incorrect. See “Chinese develop series of missile, satellite launchers,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 25 August 1980, p. 16.

27. This is based on Du, Hua et al., “The ‘vanguard’ of the missile troops,” Guangming ribao, 6 08 1986;Google Scholar and “The outstanding achievements in scientific research on our strategic missiles,” Renmin ribao (People's Daily) (overseas edit.), 28 December 1986.

28. United States, Department of the Air Force, Guided Missiles Fundamentals, AFM 52–31 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 3–10 to 3–14.

29. The DF–5 used UDMH and an oxidizer of one-hundred percent nitrogen tetroxide.

30. Zhang, Jun, Modern China's Space Cause, p. 182.Google Scholar On the development of graphite control vanes, see Willy, Ley, Rockets, Missiles, and Men in Space (New York: Viking, 1968), Chap. 8.Google Scholar A picture of graphite vanes on the German V–2 (A–4) is on p. 195.

31. On these control systems, see Guided Missiles Fundamentals, pp. 7–11 to 7–18. Even though China did not test the DF–5 over the full Pacific range until 1980, the missile had been tested over shorter ranges in the 1970s and was initially deployed late in the decade, probably starting in 1979. Information from a Chinese specialist, 1986; and Du, Hua et al., “The ‘vanguard’ of the missile troops.”Google Scholar

32. Information from a Chinese specialist, 1986.

33. Zhang, Jiajun, “The birth of China's strategic missile troops,” Renmin ribao (overseas edit.), 7 05 1987.Google Scholar

34. Guo, Qingsheng, “China has a nuclear counterattack capability-a visit to China's strategic missile units,” Liaowang, 22 04 1985, pp. 23–24.Google Scholar

35. Du, Hua et al., “The ‘vanguard’ of the missile troops.”Google Scholar

36. Unless otherwise cited, the information in this section is based on Zhang Jun, Modern China's Space Cause, pp. 140–42, 146, and 148–50.

37. Gu, Mainan, “The course of his life from a little 8th route armyman to a scientist,” Liaowang, 5 01 1987, p. 16.Google Scholar Originally “JL” stood for the characters julong (gigantic dragon) but the second character was later changed to lang (wave).

38. According to Jane's Fighting Ships 1985–86 (London: Jane's Publishing Co., 1985), p. 95, the range of the JL–1 is 1,800 nautical miles. Chinese specialists interviewed, however, state that the true maximum range is 1,800 kilometres. The official U.S. designation for the JL–1 is CSS-NX–3.

39. This information is based on interviews with a Chinese specialist, 1986. The Chinese system of firing SLBMs differs from that of the United States. In the American system the missile is ejected from the launch tube and ignited after clearing the surface. While the American navy has experimented with underwater ignition of its missiles, the Soviet navy actually developed and deployed such missiles in the early stages of its SLBM programme.

40. The number of launch tubes is based on a picture published by Renmin ribao (overseas edit.), 1 January 1987. Sources such as Jane's Fighting Ships 1985–86, p. 95, give the number of launch tubes as 14.

41. Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen, p. 810.

42. See, e.g.,Zhang, Jianzhi, “Views on medium-sized nuclear powers’ nuclear strategy,” Jiefangjun bao, 20 03 1987. Zhang is a specialist in the Second Artillery Corps.Google Scholar