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The Soldier and the State in China: The Political Work System in the People' Liberation Army*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

David Shambaugh
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The military is a key actor in the political life of many nations. Across the developing and socialist worlds, the armed forces have served as far more than guarantors of national security as they sustain civilian elites in power or often seize it themselves. In China there has been a long tradition of military rule during much of the modern era–one need think only of Li Hongzhang and the Beiyang Army, the Republic's first president General Yuan Shikai, the warlords of the 1920s, or Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Guominjun (the twin sibling of the ruling Guomindang). In post-1949 China former and active-duty military officers (as well as the military as an institution) have been central actors in the political life of the nation, effectively administering the country from 1949–52 and 1967–73. However, this article is not so much about the militarization of politics in China as about the politicization of the military.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 127 , September 1991 , pp. 527 - 568
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1991

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References

1. See, for example, Deng Xiaoping's speech to martial law troops on 9 June: “Deng Xiaoping tongzhi zai jiejian shoudu jieyan buduijun yishangganbu shide jianghua,” in xuanchuanbu, Zhong-gong zhongyang (ed.), Xuanchuan dongtai: 1989 xuanbianben (Beijing: Renmin ribao chubanshe, 1991), pp. 109–115Google Scholar.

2. One could view the 4 June PLA intervention as “professional” in that the army acted at the behest of the highest organs of state and the military (the State Council and Central Military Commission), and–as the Chinese authorities have argued–the survival of the Chinese state was at stake. What could be more professional than to ensure national security as directed by the commander-in-chief and other members of the CMC? An alternative interpretation would have it that the Party/state and military were controlled by individuals who constituted a factional grouping, and the PLA intervened in order to sustain this group–rather than the institutions–in power.

3. The political campaigns in the PLA have been paralleled by efforts to increase the stature of the PLA in civilian society via the “national defence education movement” (guofang jiaoyu yundong). Similar to the “Learn from the PLA” campaign of 1964, this movement propagates martial values in society, patriotism, reminiscences of past wars, and military readiness.

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7. “The skill of the officer is the management of violence; his responsibility is the military security of his client, society… His behavior in relation to society is guided by: an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state.” Huntington, , The Soldier and the State, pp. 15–16Google Scholar.

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25. Ibid.; Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo, pp. 22–23; and Kai, Xu, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zongzhengzhibu yan'ge, p. 51Google Scholar.

26. Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun lishi zidian, p. 22.

27. Interview with Li Yunzhi, deputy secretary-general of the PLA General Political Department, 21 June 1991, Beijing.

28. Much of the historical data in this section draws upon the very informative volume, Guofang daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuoshi (shehuizhuyi shiqi) (Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1989)Google Scholar.

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30. On this point see George, Alexander, The Chinese Communist Army in Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967)Google Scholar. The GPD's activities during the Korean War are also documented in several recent military histories of the war. See, for example, Dangdai Zhongguo bianjibu, congshu (ed.), Kang-Mei yuan-Chao zhanzheng (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexueyuan chubanshe, 1990)Google Scholar; yanjiubu, Junshikexueyuan junshi lishi (ed.), Kang-Mei yuan-Chao zhanshi (Beijing: Junshikexueyuan chubanshe, 1988)Google Scholar;Chengwen, Chai and Yongtian, Zhao, Kang-Mei yuan-Chao jishi (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, 1987)Google Scholar; yanjiubu, Junshikexueyuan junshi lishi, Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kang-Mei yuan-Chao zhanshi (Beijing: Junshikexueyuan chubanshe, 1988)Google Scholar; Yan, Xu, Diyici jiaoliang: kang-Mei yuan-Chao zhanzheng de lishi huigu yufansi (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1990)Google Scholar.

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32. Hsiao-shih, Cheng, Party–Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan, pp. 96–97Google Scholar.

33. Interview with GPD, 21 June 1991.

34. See Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuoshi, ch. 1.

35. Kai, Xu, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zongzhengzhibu yan'ge,” p. 51Google Scholar.

36. This was evidenced, for example, at the expanded (and extended) Military Commission meeting of May–July 1958 when the themes of “regularization” (zhengguihua) and modernization (xiandaihua) of the armed forces were dominant. For a report of this meeting see Weiben, Sun (ed.), Zhongguo gongchangdang dangwu gongzuo da zidian (Beijing: Zhongguo zhanlan chubanshe, 1989), p. 355Google Scholar.

37. Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuoshi, p. 121.

38. Their rightist labels were not removed until the GPD promulgated Order No. 55 of 1978 exonerating a total of 11,039 persecuted individuals. Ibid. p. 125.

39. See ibid. p. 137.

40. See MacFarquhar, Roderick, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution 2: The Great Leap Forward, 1958–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), especially ch. 10Google Scholar; and Bachman, David, Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China: The Institutional Origins of the Great Leap Forward (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Among the Chinese accounts of Lushan, perhaps the most notable is that of Rui, Li (Mao's former secretary), Lushan huiyi shilu (Beijing Chunqiu chubanshe and Henan Jiaoyu chubanshe, 1989)Google Scholar.

41. This process began immediately following Lushan and Peng's rebuke by Mao. In late August an expanded CMC meeting was convened to denounce the “anti-Party crimes” and “bourgeois military line” of the Peng Dehuai clique (this “verdict” was reversed by the Third Plenum of the 11 th Central Committee in 1978). See Weiben, Sun (ed.), Zhongguo gongchangdang dangwu gongzuo da zidian, p. 355Google Scholar; and Guanyu xin shiqi jundui zhengzhi gongzuo dejueding, p. 103.

42. Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuoshi, pp. 164–65.

43. Ibid.; Kai, Xu, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zongzhengzhibu yan'ge,” p. 51Google Scholar; and interviews with knowledgeable members of the PLA General Staff Department, 23 May 1991, and GPD, 21 June 1991.

44. Ibid. p. 180. A neibu history of the PLA indicates that this conference and the emerging document were under the “pernicious leftist influence” of Lin Biao. The decisions of the conference, including the purge of Tan Zheng, were officially repudiated by the GPD on 24 April 1978. See Guanyu xin shiqi jundui zhengzhi gongzuo de jueding, pp. 108–113 for this repudiation. Also see junshikexueyuan, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun (ed.), Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun dashiji (Beijing: Junshi kexueyuan chubanshe, 1983), p. 365Google Scholar.

45. See Nelsen, Harvey W., The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the People's Liberation Army (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 102–103Google Scholar. For more on the GPD during the Cultural Revolution see Dick, Glenn, “The General Political Department,” in Whitson, William W. (ed.), The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 176–77Google Scholar; and Hsiao-shih, Cheng, Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan, pp. 100–109Google Scholar.

46. Interview at the Central Committee Party History Research Office, 28 May 1991.

47. Ibid.

48. Nelsen, , The Chinese Military System, p. 104Google Scholar. This point is also noted in Chancai, He and Wangchun, Gao (eds.), Xin Zhongguo dashidian (Beijing: Kexue jixue wenzhai chubanshe, 1990), pp. 80, 82Google Scholar.

49. Interview at Central Committee Party History Research Office, 28 May 1991. There is apparently a misunderstanding in the western literature on this point as it is generally thought that veteran Marshall He Long was appointed to head the PLACRG. This was refuted in interviews by scholars in the Party History Research Office as well as the deputy secretary-general of the GPD, who pointed out that He Long had been imprisoned (rangjin) since October 1966.

50. Kai, Xu, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zongzhengzhibu yan'ge,” p. 51Google Scholar.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. According to the current deputy secretary-general of the GPD, the purges in the PLA after Lin's death were limited in number and generally restricted to high levels. Interview, 21 June 1991.

54. Ibid.

55. Kai, Xu, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zongzhengzhibu yan'ge,” p. 51Google Scholar.

56. See Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuoshi, pp. 372–77; and Guanyu xin shiqijundui zhengzhi gongzuo de jueding, pp. 122–27.

57. Guanyu xin shiqi jundui zhengzhi gongzuo de jueding, p. 158.

58. The text of the document can be found in Wenbin, Feng et al. (eds.), Zhongguo gongchangdang jianshe quanshu, 1921–1991, Vol. 7 (Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1991), pp. 473–482Google Scholar.

59. It is widely rumoured inside the PLA that Yang Baibing will soon succeed Yang Shangkun as first vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, effectively becoming the most powerful military figure in China. Personal communication, Beijing Military Region officer, 23 June 1991.

60. “Yang Baibing tongzhi jianli,” Renmin ribao, 10 November 1989, p. 1.

61. Bo, Jin, “All PLA commanders-in-chief were political commissars: Enigma of Yang Baibing's experience revealed,” Guangjiaojing, No. 204 (16 09 1989)Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 22 January 1990, pp. 82–84.

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63. Guofang daxue xuebao is now available for foreign subscription.

64. For a summary of the “Decision” see, “‘Quanjun zhengzhi gongzuo huiyi jiyao’ zhushi tiaomu,” Jiefangjunbao (29 May 1990), p. 2 (point 5).

65. See Johnston, Alastair I., “Party rectification in the People's Liberation Army, 1983–1987,” The China Quarterly, No. 112 (1987), pp. 591–630CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

66. Interview with Beijing Military Region Officer, 23 June 1991.

67. Kai, Xu, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zong zhengzhibu yan'ge,” p. 52Google Scholar.

68. The following descriptions of functions is based on an interview with the GPD deputy secretary-general, 21 June 1991, and yanjiubu, Junshikexueyuan junshi lishi, Zhongguo dabaike quanshu: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuo fence (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1987), pp. 64–69, 72–78, 80–81, 84–98, 122–24Google Scholar.

69. Document classification and dissemination procedures are set out in the Chinese People's Liberation Army Secrecy Regulations (Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun baomi tiaoli). For a brief description of these regulations see ibid. pp. 83–84.

70. For a description of the functioning of these systems see Xingzu, Pu et al. , Dangdai Zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu, pp. 323–331Google Scholar; and Yingyi, Deng et al. , Jundui dang de jilu jiancha gongzuo gailun (Beijing: Chang zheng chubanshe, 1988)Google Scholar.

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72. See Xingzu, Pu et al. , Dangdai Zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu, p. 329Google Scholar; and Weiben, Sun (ed.), Zhongguo gongchangdang dangwu gongzuo da zidian, p. 342Google Scholar.

73. Sun Weiben (ed.), ibid. p. 328. Also see Shuitao, Zhang (ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu (Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1990), p. 215Google Scholar; and Guang, Yun (ed.), Shehuizhuyi zhengzhixue (Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1985), pp. 315–328Google Scholar.

74. Sun Weiben (ed.), ibid. p. 342.

75. Interview with GPD, 21 June 1991.

76. Ibid.

77. Shuitao, Zhang (ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu, pp. 213–14Google Scholar. Also see Zhongguo dabaike quanshu: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuo fence, pp. 46–49.

78. Deng Yingyi et al., Jundui dang de jilu jiancha gongzuo gailun, especially ch. 2.

79. Zhongguo dabaike quanshu: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuo fence, p. 63.

80. Ibid. p. 37. The order was known as Guanyu tuan yishang geji dangwei chengli jilu jianchayuanhui zhidao.

81. Ibid., and see fn. 57.

82. Johnston, “Party rectification in the People's Liberation Army, 1983–87.” For a daily record of how this rectification campaign unfolded in Party ranks, including in the armed forces, see Jin, Xiao, Zhengdang Dashiji (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1985)Google Scholar.

83. Zhongguo dabaike quanshu: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuo fence, p. 63.

84. GPD interview, 21 June 1991.

85. Ibid. GPD deputy secretary-general Li Yunzhi was reluctant to give an absolute figure of Party membership in the PLA, but indicated that it was between 50–60% - the vast majority of which was constituted by the officer corps. If one assumes that the PLA currently stands at approximately 2.5 million (following the 1986–89 demobilization of one million service personnel), then CCP membership in the PLA today falls in the 1.2–1.5 million range (not including those in the People's Armed Police and paramilitary organs). This still constitutes a small fraction of the now 50 million-strong CCP.

86. For a fuller exposition of these trends see Joffee, Ellis, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987)Google Scholar; and Johnston, Alastair I., “Changing army–Party relations in China, 1979–84,” Asian Survey (10 1984), pp. 1012–1039Google Scholar. As Joffee's and Johnston's analyses cover the early Deng era, for discussion of the developments in the PLA in the late 1980s see Yulin, Yu, “The PLA's political role since 1987: Continuity and change,” in Chang, King-yuh, Mainland China after the Thirteenth Party Congress (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 114–137Google Scholar; and June Teufel Dreyer, “The PLA after the Thirteenth Party Congress,” ibid. pp. 99–113.

87. Commentator, “Have better troops and weapons, reinforce our Great Wall,” Jiefangjunbao, 28 September 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 25 October 1989, p. 36.

88. See Chinese People's Liberation Army and People's Armed Police Rank and Insignia: A Reference Aid (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency DDB–2680–338–89, 1989)Google Scholar.

89. See Henley, Lonnie, “Officer education in the PLA,” Problems of Communism (05–06 1987), pp. 55–71Google Scholar.

90. Interview with Beijing Military Region General, 9 May 1990.

91. Personal communication, Beijing, 10 May 1990.

92. Jencks, Harlan, “Party authority and military power,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 26, No. 7 (07 1990), p. 27Google Scholar. Jencks further develops this theme in his “Civil-military relations in China: Tiananmen and after,” Problems of Communism, Vol. XL (05–06 1991), pp. 14–29Google Scholar.

93. See Lam, Willy Wo-lap, “Yang Baibing reveals army defiance in crackdown,” South China Morning Post, 28 12 1989Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI, 28 December 1989, pp. 23–24. For further reports see Bing, Lo, ”’Rebel troops’ inside the army of the CCP,” Zhengming, No.147 (1 01 1990), p. 10Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI, 2 January 1990, pp. 22–23.

94. See Yanjun, Ren, “At an all-army training class on order and regulations, Liu Huaqing, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, delivers a speech, urging serious enforcement of orders and regulations,” Jiefangjunbao, 11 07 1990, p. 1, FBIS–CHI, 24 July 1990, pp. 18–19Google Scholar.

95. See, for example, Wenqing, Zang, “Continue to do ideological, political work well while carrying out the task of enforcing martial law,” Jiefangjunbao, 7 September 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 22 09 1989, p. 29Google Scholar.

96. Yecheng, Guan, “The martial law enforcement troops are attacked every day,” Zhengming, 1 October 1989, in FBIS-CHI, 3 10 1989, pp. 36–37Google Scholar.

97. Yuwen, Luo, “The army investigates high-ranking and middle-ranking leadership groups,” Renmin ribao, 16 September 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 21 09 1989, p. 36Google Scholar.

98. No precise figures for court martials have been released, but the GPD indicated that they were extremely few (jixiao de). Interview, 21 June 1991.

99. Xinhua Domestic Service, 15 November 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 16 November 1989, pp. 29–30.

100. Commentator. “Uphold the Party's absolute leadership, ensure that our army is always politically up to standard,” Jiefangjunbao, 1 October 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 18 October 1989, pp. 36–39.

101. Ibid. p. 37.

102. Commentator, “Take political strengthening as the most important task,” Jiefangjunbao, 27 November 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 22 December 1989, p. 14. For more on the CMC meeting and the preceding Fifth Plenum see Shambaugh, David. “The fourth and fifth plenary sessions of the 13th CCP Central Committee,” The China Quarterly, No. 120 (1989), pp. 852–862CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

103. See Jiangong, Lin, “Refuting the advocacy of separating the army from the Party,” Jiefangjuunbao, 21 November 1989, in FBIS–CHI 22 12 1989, p. 7Google Scholar.

104. The GPD deputy secretary-general denied that Zhao himself had advocated this separation, but said a number of his advisers had. Interview, 21 June 1991.

105. For more on this campaign see Shambaugh, David, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–90 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), ch. 6Google Scholar. Among the many articles on peaceful evolution in the Chinese press see the three-part series in Ban Yue Tan in October 1989, carried in FBIS–CHI, 5 January 1990, pp. 17–21.

106. . See, for example, Yingquan, He, “The Wolf Has Come’ and ‘Where is the Wolf?'–Calling for proper alertness to the presence of the enemy,” Jiefangjunbao, 8 October 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 31 10 1989, p. 28Google Scholar.

107. .See Jun, Yuan, “Military colleges and schools must become powerful positions for adherence to the four cardinal principles and opposition to bourgeois liberalization,” Jiefangjunbao, 19 October 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 7 11 1989 pp. 24–25Google Scholar.

108. Xianyi, Chen, “Initial achievements made in cleansing the cultural environment in army barracks,” Jiefangjunbao, 28 October 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 17 11 1989, pp. 31–32Google Scholar.

109. Ibid. p. 32.

110. Ibid.

111. Baibing, Yang, “Basing ourselves on the grass-roots level, performing meritorious deeds, and making contributions to building a modernized, regularized, and revolutionized army,” Jiefangjunbao, 30 September 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 25 10 1989, pp. 37–40Google Scholar.

112. See Commentator, , “Fulfill the demands of being politically qualified down to grass-roots units,” Jiefangjunbao, 23 October 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 9 11 1989, pp. 35–36Google Scholar.

113. See Xinhua Domestic Service, 8 December 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 12 January 1989, pp. 35–36; and Xinhua Domestic Service, 9 December 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 21 12 1989, pp. 30–31Google Scholar.

114. Editorial Department of the Liberation Army Daily (ed.), Jiaqiang rentnin jundui de zhengzhi jianshe: quanjun zhengzhi gongzuohuiyi jiyao he youguan lunwen, zhushi tiaotnu (Beijing: Changzheng chubanshe, 1990), p. 25Google Scholar.

115. The jiyao, Yang's speech, and the annotated summary can be found in ibid. The document itself has not been released publicly, but was transmitted to all Party organs by the CCP Central Committee as Central Document (zhongfa) no. 4 of 1990.

116. Ibid. pp. 3–23.

117. Lam, Willy Wo-lap, “Yang Shangkun ally receives political post,” Hong Kong Standard, 4 01 1990, pp. 1–2Google Scholar.

118. Jiangbo, He and Daiping, Chen, “Concentrating attention–sidelights on the first study class of the CCP Committee Secretaries of the PLA General Staff units,” Renmin ribao, 30 December 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 9 01 1990, pp. 19–20Google Scholar.

119. Chi Haotian, “Strive to raise the leadership level.”

120. Xin, Xu, “Make strenuous efforts to enhance political construction of the General Staff Headquarters and ensure that the army will always be up to standard politically,” Jiefangjunbao, 2 March 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 30 03 1990, pp. 39–41Google Scholar.

121. Anyuan, See Liu, “Seriously implement the ‘summary’ of the all-army meeting on political work, strengthen and improve political work in logistics departments,” Jiefangjunbao, 2 March 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 29 03 1990, pp. 35–36Google Scholar.

122. Xinhua Domestic Service, 6 February 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 7 February 1990, pp. 19–20.

123. Ibid. p. 19.

124. See Beijing Domestic Service, 23 January 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 26 January 1990, p. 30; Xinhua, 24 February 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 26 February 1990, p. 26; and Xinhua Domestic Service, 24 February 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 1 March 1990, pp. 30–31.

125. See Xuge, Li, “Implement the ‘summary’ closely in light of realities, make sure that our troops manage to withstand the ‘three tests',” Jiefangjunbao, 8 March 1990, in FBIS-CHI, 30 03 1990, p. 41Google Scholar.

126. Xinhua Domestic Service, 13 July 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 20 July 1990, p. 29.

127. Ibid. p. 30.

128. Commentator, “Hard and fast measures are necessary for theoretical study among cadres,” Jiefangjunbao, 27 June 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 18 July 1990, p. 23.

129. Yi, Luo, “The gun should be put firmly in the hands of people loyal to the Party,” Jiefangjunbao, 13 February 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 2 03 1990, p. 24Google Scholar.

130. Chenghan, Wang, “Uphold the Party's absolute leadership over the army with great firmness,” Jiefangjunbao, 18 December 1989, in FBIS–CHI, 15 02 1990, p. 38Google Scholar.

131. See Haotian, Chi, “Strive to raise the leadership level”; Gao Aisu, “When meeting with leading comrades of troops in Shanxi, Jiang Zemin stresses absolute Party leadership over the army,” Jiefangjunbao, 27 January 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 13 02 1990, p. 14Google Scholar; Xuan, Bai, “Unwaveringly uphold the Party's leadership of the army,” Jiefangjunbao, 19 December 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 2 02 1990, pp. 17–19Google Scholar; and Lixing, Wan, “The organs which control the army of the CCP,” Dangdai, No. 7 (6 01 1990), in FBIS–CHI, 9 January 1990, pp. 20–22Google Scholar.

132. See for example, Haotian, Chi, “Learn from and carry forward the Lei Feng spirit, strengthen the building of the people's army,” Renmin ribao, 2 March 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 22 03 1990, pp. 27–30Google Scholar; Desheng, Li, “Learning from Lei Feng's spirit is the need of the times,” Jiefangjunbao, 8 January 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 26 01 1990, pp. 33–34Google Scholar.

133. “PLA general political department issues circular, urging all military units to study and implement the spirit of central leaders’ inscriptions and carry out activities of learning from Lei Feng in a deep-going and down-to-earth manner,” Jiefangjunbao, 6 March 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 29 March 1990, pp. 32–33.

134. See Hao, Fan and Hua, Qin, “Qin Jiwei contributes article to first issue of Guofang, stressing need to strengthen national defence education and promote modernization of national defence,” Jiefangjunbao, 30 December 1990, in FBIS-CHI, 6 02 1990, p. 10Google Scholar.

135. See Boliang, Gu, “Document issued a few days ago by PLA General Staff Headquarters outlines guidelines and tasks for military training in 1990,” Jiefangjunbao, 9 January 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 30 01 1990, p. 18Google Scholar; Jinyou, Li, “Correct understanding of the professional value of servicemen,” Jiefangjunbao, 8 February 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 2 03 1990, pp. 23–24Google Scholar.

136. Henggao, Ding, “Earnestly strengthen and improve ideological and political work; ensure that the armed forces will always remain politically qualified,” Jiefangjunbao, 3 March 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 30 03 1990, p. 13Google Scholar.

137. For detailed discussions of this process see Organizational Department of the Political Department of the PLA General Staff Department (ed.), Dangwei jianshe tanyao (Beijing: Changzheng chubanshe, 1990Google Scholar; and Organizational Department of the Political Department of the PLA General Staff Department (ed.), Xin shiqi dang zhibu shuji “liu hui” gaiyao (Beijing: Changzheng chubanshe, 1991)Google Scholar.

138. See “PLA General Political Department promulgates ‘programme on strengthening and improving ideological and political education for soldiers’,” Jiefangjunbao, 12 March 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 11 April 1990, pp. 31–33.

139. Ibid. p. 32.

140. See Aisu, Gao, “At discussion with comrades attending enlarged meeting of Beijing military regional Party committee, Yang Baibing urges leaders at all levels to work harder and do an even better job in army-building,” Jiefangjunbao, 22 June 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 9 07 1990, pp. 36–38Google Scholar; Xinhua Domestic Service, 31 July 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 1 August 1990, p. 24.

141. Xinhua Domestic Service, 21 November 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 27 November 1990, pp. 39–40.

142. Ibid.; and Commentator, “Adhere to the principle of'building Party branches at the company level'-on strengthening grass-roots Party branch-building,” Jiefangjunbao, 8 November 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 27 November 1990, pp. 40–41.

143. PLA General Political Department and Nanjing Military Region Political Department's Joint Investigation Group, “Display Wang Keqin's spirit of fraternal love and mutual help; preserve and develop good relations between officers and men,” Jiefangjunbao, 25 July 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 22 August 1990, pp. 22–28.

144. See, for example, Xinhua Domestic Service, 18 May 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 21 May 1990, pp. 40–41; Commentator, “Unwaveringly put moral education in first place,” Jiefangjunbao, 27 July 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 16 August 1990, pp. 29–30; Zhou Chuantong, “The requirement of being politically qualified should be carried out to the letter,” Jiefangjunbao, 20 September 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 11 October 1990, pp. 26–27.

145. Min, Zhou and Bo, Ru, “First all-army forum on theory concerning psychological warfare against hostile forces,” Jiefangjunbao, 12 July 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 2 08 1990, p. 23–24Google Scholar.

146. Ibid. p. 23.

147. “Ba baozheng zhengzhishang yongyuan hege zuowei yixiang genben renwu; yitan jiaqiang wojun zhengzhi jianshe,” Jiefangjunbao, 10 April 1990, p. 1.

148. “Xuyu buke fangsong ‘shengmingxian',” Jiefangjunbao, 13 April 1990, pp. 1,4.

149. “Yongyuan ba wojun zhiyu dang de juidui lingdao zhixia,” Jiefangjunbao, 18 April 1990, pp. 1, 4.

150. “Shanghao zhengzhi jiaoyu de zhuke,” Jiefangjunbao, 22 April 1990, pp. 1, 3.

151. “Jianchi gaojun de sixiang, daode fazhan,” Jiefangjunbao, 27 April 1990, pp. 1,

152. “Jianchi decai jianbei, zhuzhong zhengzhi biaojun,” Jiefangjunbao, 12 May 1990, pp. 1, 4.

153. “Renzhen zhuahao fanfushi douzheng,” Jiefangjunbao, 19 May 1990, p. 1.

154. “Baozheng he fazhan lianghao de nei-wai guanxi,” Jiefangjunbao, 22 May 1990, p. 1.

155. “Shiyong biandengfa, tigao xiaolu,” Jiefangjunbao, 24 May 1990, pp. 1, 4.

156. “Zai jiaqiang de qiantixia gaijin zai duancheng de jichushang chuangxin,” Jiefangjunbao, 28 May 1990, p. 1.

157. For further discussion of the changed political climate see Shambaugh, David, “China in 1990: The year of damage control,” Asian Survey (01 1991), pp. 101–114Google Scholar.

158. Bing, Lo, “A heavy storm in the high army hierarchy,” Zhengming, No. 155 (1 09 1990), in FBIS–CHI, 6 September 1990, pp. 39–40Google Scholar.

159. Ibid. p. 40; also see Bing, Luo, “Defence minister has courageously defeated generals of the Yang family,” Kaifang, No. 44 (15 08 1990), in FBIS–CHI, 23 August 1990, pp. 35–37Google Scholar.

160. Da, Qi, “Young military officers boycott Yang Baibing,” Dangdai, 20 October 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 25 10 1990, pp. 30–32Google Scholar. On this point see also Jencks, , “Civil-military relations in China,” especially pp. 24–27Google Scholar.

161. Personal communications with sources in Beijing, summer 1991.

162. This is apparently not only the case among elements of the retired High Command, but particularly among younger officers. Interviews with officers in the Beijing Military Region, 26 May and 23 June 1991.

163. See, for example, Xun, Nan, “Massive military purges after 4 June incident,” MingBao, 22 October 1990, in FBIS–CHI, 22 10 1990, p. 29Google Scholar.

164. Chenghua, Li and Rujin, Xu, “Xin de xingshi-xin de bufa,” Renmin ribao, 3 10 1990, p. 1Google Scholar; also translated in FBIS–CHI, 18 October 1990, pp. 39–42.

165. See “Baozheng dang dui jundui de juedui lingdao: Yang Baibing tan quanjun jicha gongzuo de genben renwu,” Jiefangjunbao, 1 December 1990.

166. See “Quanjun keke yueyue zuohao junshi gongzuo: Jiang Zemin zai zongcan gongzuo huiyi shang yaoqiu,” Jiefangjunbao, 5 December 1990; and “Zhichi zhandou lige zhun, shixian junshi shang guoying,” Jiefangjunbao, 5 December 1990.

167. See “New rules on PLA control,” South China Morning Post, 2 January 1991. 168. They are classified “secret, carefully protect” and are disseminated by the GPD in a pocket-size edition to all officers.

169. Of the many articles in the Liberation Army Daily on this aspect see in particular “Zhichi dang dui jundui juedui lingdao shi wojun de genben yuanze,” Jiefangjunbao, 17 April 1991.

170. See, for example, “Baozheng jiceng dang zhibu zuzhi jianquan,” Jiefangjunbao, 2 February 1991; “Renzhen xuexi he guanche luoshi ‘zhenggong tiaojian',” Jiefangjunbao, 23 February 1991; and Wangwen, Luo, “Quan jun geji dangwei fahui hexin lingdao zuoyong,” Renmin ribao, 24 06 1991, p. 1Google Scholar.

171. Among the numerous leadership speeches, documents and declarations on this score see Baibing, Yang, “Dang de juedui lingdao shi women de jian jun zhihunli jun zhiben,” Renmin ribao, 24 06 1991, p. 5Google Scholar.

172. See “Yang Baibing on importance of ideological work for army facing ‘severe tests',” Summary of World Broadcasts–Far East, FE/1177, B2/1.

173. Ibid.

174. “Jiang Zemin urges army to conscientiously implement Mao Zedong's military thought,” Renmin ribao, 11 September 1991, ibid. B2/2.