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The PLA and China′s Threat Perceptions*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Allen S. Whiting
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Extract

Because this volume focuses on the People′s Liberation Army (PLA), only those threat perceptions directly relevant to the presence of Chinese military force are addressed in this article. The problems of ideological unity, legitimacy of the regime, and other political or economic threats to the People′s Republic are excluded insofar as they do not call on the PLA. Nor are general foreign policy stratagems for dealing with Moscow, Tokyo, New Delhi and Washington under review, let alone regions beyond China′s capacity to project military power.

Type
The External Environment
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 146 , June 1996 , pp. 596 - 615
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1996

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References

1. For a recent approach to the broader subjects see Hu, Weixing, ”China′s security agenda after the Cold War,” Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1995), pp. 117–136.Google Scholar

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3. On PLA factionalism, see Swaine, Michael D., The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions and Belief (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), p. 270Google Scholar; reviewed critically by You Ji, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 32 (July 1994), pp. 175–78. For the impact of these factors on the Chinese Air Force see Allen, Kenneth W., Krumel, Glenn and Pollack, Jonathan D., China′s Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995).Google Scholar

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19. ”The blue water is close to us: the law of the sea and the navy′s function, record of an interview and discussion,” Renmin ribao, 8 January 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 6 April 1995, pp. 14–17.

20. For fuller treatment of this theme see Allen S. Whiting, ”Chinese nationalism and foreign policy after Deng,” The China Quarterly, No. 142 (June 1995), pp. 295–316.

21. Mao Zhenfa and Lin Zhipei, ”The strategic status of modern border defence,” Guofang (National Defence), No. 7 (15 July 1995), in FBIS-CHI, 3 October 1995, pp. 25–28.

22. For comprehensive background see Choon-ho Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983); Eric Hyer, ”Dangerous shoals: an introduction to the South China Sea dispute,” American Asian Review, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 1001–16.Google Scholar

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27. Lin Mu, ”The aviation dream of the Chinese people,” Shidian, No. 7 (8 July 1994), in FBIS-CHI, 24 August 1994, pp. 35–38. In 1995 one article claimed ”drilling for oil and gas on more than 220 points in the South China Sea, most of which are distributed in the waters of the Nanshas ]Spratlys^.” Zheng Hongfan and Yin Pinduan, ”I love you, Nansha,” Renmin ribao, 3 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 24 July 1995, pp. 37–38.

28. Antara in Indonesian, 21 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 24 July 1995, p. 75.

29. Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 August 1995, p. 16.

30. Xinhua Domestic Service, 14 February 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 28 February 1994, p. 43.

31. Zheng Hongfan and Yin Pinduan, ”I love you, Nansha.”

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34. For reported naval views see Eastern Express, 20 April 1995 coverage of Wide Angle, 20 April 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 20 April 1995, pp. 99–100. Argument by naval officers that an aircraft carrier is necessary to take the Spratlys appeared in Lin Mu, ”The aviation dream”; also in Xiandai jianchuan (Modern Ships) as reported by Kyodo in English, 27 January 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 27 January 1995, pp. 24–25. For a critical assessment of PLA power projection weaknesses see Michael G. Gallagher, ”China′s illusory threat to the South China Sea,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169–194.

35. Zhen Hongfan and Yin Pinduan, ”I love you, Nansha.”

36. Cao Baojian and Ding Feng, ”Years of efforts by a South Sea fleet naval base result in integrating the procurement, supply and transportation of materials to Nansha into a system,” Jiefangjun bao, 17 March 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 23 March 1995, pp. 33–34.

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46. Whiting, Calculus, pp. 240–41.

47. Interviews by American scholars in Beijing during July 1995 experienced unusually hard-line attacks on U.S. policy, as reported by John W. Lewis and David Shambaugh, The New York Times, 1 August 1995, p. 2; the author′s interviews were similar.

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50. Xinhua in English, 18 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 18 July 1995, p. 28; also Xinhua in English, 26 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 27 July 1995, p. 18.

51. Ming bao, 27 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 27 July 1995, p. 18; also South China Morning Post, 1 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 7 July 1995, p. 26.

52. Lianhe bao, 19 July 1995 and 20 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 20 July 1995, pp. 16–18; South China Morning Post, 7 July 1995 and 17 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 7 July 1995,26–27 and 17 July 1995, pp. 43–44.

53. Fan, Yi, ”Chinese Communists prepare public opinion for attacking Taiwan with force,” Zhengming, No. 208 (1 February 1995), in FBIS-CHI, 14 April 1995, pp. 220–24. Papers included ”Military means, choice to achieve cross-straits reunification,” and ”Military means, only way to resolve reunification issue.”Google Scholar

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56. McNamara et al., Sino-American Military Relations, pp. 20–21.

57. Based on comparison of American interviews in 1994–95.

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73. Xinhua in English, 4 July 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 5 July 1995, p. 17, summarizes ”the first… systematic collection of documentary materials” on Japanese atrocities, including ”bombing of Tianjin and massacres in Baoding and Shijiazhuang” published in August 1995.

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80. Tsung Lan-hai, ”CPC decides on its international archenemy.”

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100. In addition to the relevant papers in this volume, for analysis of the PLA in Chinese politics see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping: The Power Struggle Since Tiananmen (Hong Kong: PA Professional Consultants, 1995), ch. 4.

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