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Habsburg Policy and the Austrian War of 1809

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

James Allen Vann
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Extract

In April 1809—less than four years after Austerlitz—Austria declared war on France and entered the field as the champion of a vanquished German Empire. In their analyses of the Habsburg bid to restore the old order in the Germanies, historians have stressed certain internal developments within the Austrian Empire that made war possible: a revitalized army, a strong feeling of German nationalism, an embittered émigré lobby, and a powerful war party. This article explores the importance of the factions within the imperial family in relation to these events and points up an irony in the Austrian decision. For while the emperor Francis viewed the war as a final effort to save the dynasty, Count Philipp Stadion, his chief minister and leader of the war party, capitalized on the divergent points of view within the family to attain his own ends. His principal concern was to restore the old political order, to reverse the terms of the Treaty of Pressburg (1805), and to reconstruct the Holy Roman Empire in Germany. By skillful manipulation of ideology and dynastic ambition, he won most of the imperial princes to his side. They, in turn, persuaded the emperor to commit himself to a foreign policy that jeopardized his monarchy for the sake of a war whose diplomatic goals interested him scarcely at all.

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Articles
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Central European History , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , December 1974 , pp. 291 - 310
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Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1974

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References

I am grateful to Michael Cieply for his assistance in the final stages of this manuscript.

1. von Aretin, K. O. Freiherr, Heiliges Römisches Reich 1776–1806, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1967)Google Scholar, and two works by von Oer, R. Freiin, Der Friede von Pressburg (Münster, 1965)Google Scholar, and Die Säkularisation 1803 (Göttingen, 1970)Google Scholar, provide indispensable background material for this period. On the war itself, Kraehe, E., Metternich's German Policy, I: The Contest with Napoleon, 1799–1814 (Princeton, 1963), pp. 42–118;Google Scholar and Botzenhart, M., Metternichs Pariser Botschafterziet (Münster, 1967), pp. 270–95, offer excellent analyses of Habsburg policy.Google Scholar Volume one of Rössler's, H.Graf Johann Philipp Stadion (Vienna, 1966), pp. 225–325Google Scholar, is also helpful. Rössler's, earlier work, Österreichs Kampf um Deutschlands Befreiung, II (Hamburg, 1940), 7–88Google Scholar, remains an informative study, though the argument is weakened considerably by the author's obvious Nazi bias and by his excessive stress on German nationalism. Ernstberger's, A. two works, Eine deutsche Untergrundbewegung gegen Napolean 1806–1807 (Munich, 1955)Google Scholar and Die Deutschen Freikorps 1809 in Böhmen (Berlin, 1942)Google Scholar, likewise focus excessively on emerging German national sentiment, often to the exclusion of other influences. Criste, O., “Politische Vorgeschichte des Krieges,” in volume one of von Vedropolje, E. Mayerhoffer, Krieg 1809 (Vienna, 1907), pp. 1–66, offers a perceptive analysis of the political conditions leading to the declaration of war;Google ScholarBeer, A., Zehn Jahre Österreichischer Politik, 1801–1810 (Leipzig, 1877), is a similarly informative older study.Google ScholarBibl, V., Der Zerfall Österreichs (Vienna, 1922), contains useful material, but in that the scholarship is spotty, it should be treated cautiously.Google Scholar

2. See Epstein, K., The Genesis of German Conservativism (Princeton, 1966), pp. 428–32.Google ScholarRauchensteiner, M., Kaiser Franz und Erzherzog Carl (Munich, 1972), reenforces Epstein's analysis, though Rauchensteiner's primary attention is on Charles and his principal military administrators.Google Scholar There is no adequate biography of Francis. Wolfsgruber, C., Franz I, Kaiser von Österreich, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1899)Google Scholar, and Langsam, W. C., Francis the Good (New York, 1949), treat only his earlier years.Google ScholarMeynert, H., Kaiser Franz I (Vienna, 1872)Google Scholar, offers a curious collection of disconnected studies on various aspects of the emperor's personality and activity. Tritsch, W., Metternich und sein Monarch (Darmstadt, 1952), is a strained apology;Google Scholar while Bibl, V., Kaiser Franz (Vienna, 1938), presents a shrill, unevenly documented attack.Google Scholar

3. Rainer's papers are preserved at Vienna in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv: Erzherzog Rainer Akten. Joseph's career is covered in detail by Domanousky, S., Jósef Nádor (Budapest, 1945)Google Scholar, Excerpts from his diary are published by Lanyi, L., “Napoléon et les Hongrois,” Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française, XXVII (1955), 360–69.Google Scholar

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5. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna: Kaiser Franz Archiv, Fasz. 78c, contains memoranda outlining the archduke's concept of the state.

6. Wertheimer, E., Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns im Ersten Jahrzehnte des XIX Jahrhunderts, II (Leipzig, 1890), 8–20.Google Scholar

7. Criste, O., “Politische Vorgeschichte des Krieges,” p. 3;Google Scholarvon Oer, R., Der Friede von Pressburg, p. 171.Google Scholar

8. Rainer's memorial of April 1808 is quoted in Wertheimer, E., Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns, II, 21ff.Google ScholarRauchensteiner, M., Kaiser Franz und Erzherzog Carl, pp. 78–79Google Scholar, cites a correspondence between Archdukes Joseph and Charles indicating that these princes shared Rainer's fears of an administrative collapse.

9. Chorinsky's essay is quoted in Rössler's, H.Österreichs Kampf, I, 335Google Scholar, and Rössler is inclined to give full credence to these lofty outpourings. My own feeling is that such speeches represent more theoretical sentiment than literal practice. The archdukes and their colleagues belonged to an Austrian school of political thought similar to that of Humboldt and the German classicists. Both groups had their ideological origins in the writings of Kant. See Winter, E., Frühliberalismus in der Donaumonarchie (Berlin, 1968), pp. 12–18Google Scholar, and Aris, R., History of Political Thought in Germany, 1789–1815 (London, 1965), pp. 65–104, 136–202.Google Scholar

10. Beer, A., Die Finanzen Österreichs im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Prague, 1877), remains the classic study on Austrian finance in this period.Google Scholar See also Helleiner, H. F., The Imperial Loans (Oxford, 1965), pp. 57–131Google Scholar, and Mayr, J. K., Wien im Zeitalter Napoleons. Staatsfinanzen, Lebensverhältnisse, Beamte und Militär (Vienna, 1940).Google Scholar

11. Count O'Donnell himself had declared that the army could not be financed for more than six months; see Rauchensteiner, M., Kaiser Franz und Erzherzog Carl, p. 88.Google Scholar

12. The letter to Francis, written on May 25, 1808, is found in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna: Kaiser Franz Akten, Fasz. 78c.

13. Rössler, H., Österreichs Kampf, I, 332–37.Google Scholar

14. The most recent biography of John is a disappointingly superficial study by Theiss, V., Erzherzog Johann (Graz, 1950).Google Scholar An older study, interesting for its focus on the cultural life of the Steiermark, is Schlosser, A., Erzherzog Johann von Österreich (Vienna, 1878).Google Scholar John's military correspondence appears in two editions: Veltze, A., ed., Erzherzog Johanns Feldzugerzählung 1809 (Vienna, 1909)Google Scholar, and von Zwiedeneck-Südenhorst, H., ed., Erzherzog Johann von Österreich im Feldzuge von 1809 (Graz, 1892).Google Scholar

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16. See Winter, E., Frühliberalismus in der Donaumonarchie, pp. 30–49.Google Scholar

17. Müller always exalted the Holy Roman Empire as the ideal political form and as the custodian of the German culture. A succinct statement of this philosophy is found in Book Three, “Vom Reich der Teutschen,” of his Darstellung des Fürstenbundes (1787), reprinted as vol. IX of von Müller, Johannes, Sämmtliche Werke (Tübingen, 1811).Google Scholar

18. For a specific analysis of John's attitude toward the mountain folk, see Perthes, C. T., Politische Zustände und Personen in Deutschland zur Zeit der Französischen Herrschaft, XI (Gotha, 1869), 352ff.Google Scholar

19. See Hirn, J., “Literarische Vorläufer des Tyroler Aufstandes 1809,” Beiträge zur Neueren Geschichte Österreichs, IV (1908), 197–214.Google Scholar

20. Langsam, W. C., The Napoleonic Wars and German Nationalism in Austria, pp. 119–26.Google Scholar See also von Hormayr zu Hortenburg, J. Freiherr, Lebensbilder aus dem Befreiungskriege, 3 vols. (Jena, 1841–1844);Google ScholarPaulin, K., Leben Andreas Hofers (Innsbruck, 1953);Google Scholar and André, R., L'Idée nationale autrichienne et les Guerres de Napoléon (Paris, 1933).Google Scholar

21. A lucid treatment of Francis's attitude toward the nationalities in his empire is found in Macartney, C. A., The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918 (New York, 1969), pp. 147–98.Google Scholar See Langsam, W. C., pp. 28–55, for a discussion of German nationalism in Austrian governmental circles.Google Scholar

22. Charles's relationships with the emperor and his role in the formation of imperial policy are specifically treated in Rauchensteiner's, M.Kaiser Franz und Erzherzog Carl, pp. 75–110.Google Scholar Three biographies of varying usefulness are Zeissberg, H., Erzherzog Carl (Vienna, 1895), concerned primarily with the archduke's early military career in the Austrian Netherlands;Google Scholarvon Angeli, M., Erzherzog Carl von Österreich, 5 vols. (Vienna, 1897);Google Scholar and Criste, O., Erzherzog Carl, 3 vols. (Vienna, 1912).Google Scholar

23. See von Habsburg-Lothringen, Carl, Ausgewälte Schriften, VI, ed. von Malcher, F. X. (Vienna, 1894), 300–303—hereafter cited as Ausgewälte Schriften.Google ScholarLangsam, W. C., pp. 41ff.Google Scholar, lumps Charles in with the German nationalists, when prior to the autumn of 1808 he had in fact held himself apart from this group. Even his Armee Befehl (Vienna, 04 6, 1809)Google Scholar shows a restrained ideological commitment to the German national movement, especially when compared to John's speeches.

24. Charles's efforts to complete negotiations at Pressburg and his attitude toward the settlement are documented in von Oer, R., Der Friede von Pressburg, pp. 173–75.Google Scholar

25. Zimmermann, J., Militärverwaltung und Heeresaufbringung in Österreich bis 1806, in Handbuch der deutschen Militärgeschichte (Frankfurt, 1965), offers the best account of the Habsburg army prior to Charles's reforms.Google Scholar

26. Rauchensteiner, M., Kaiser Franz und Erzherzog Carl, pp. 15–22 and 85–88.Google Scholar

27. Rosenberg, G. E., “The Austrian Army in the Age of Metternich,” Journal of Modern History, XL (06 1968), is disappointing.Google Scholar The best analysis in English is an unpublished seminar paper by Sabrosky, A. N., “Austrian Military Reforms 1801–1813,” presented to Professor John Shy, University of Michigan, Apr. 1971.Google Scholar See also Ommen, H., Die Kriegsführung des Erzherzogs Carl (reprinted., Vaduz, 1965);Google ScholarKessel, E., “Die Wandlung der Kriegskunst im Zeitalter der französischen Revolution,” Historische Zeitschrift, CXLVIII (1933);Google Scholar and Nitsche, G., Österreichs Soldatentum in Rahmen deutscher Geschichte (Berlin, 1937).Google Scholar

28. Criste, O., “Politische Vorgeschichte des Krieges,” p. 6.Google Scholar

29. Ausgewālte Schriften, VI, 280.

30. Criste, O., Erzherzog Carl, II, 494ff.Google Scholar

31. von Aretin, K., Heiliges Römisches Reich 1776–1806, I, 462–69, 504–6.Google Scholar

32. Ibid., II, 318–23; von Treitschke, H., Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert, I (Leipzig, 1879), 233–34;Google Scholarvon Srbik, H. Ritter, Das Österreiche Kaisertum um das Ende des Heiligen Rönmischen Reiches, 1804–1806 (Berlin, 1927), p. 72;Google Scholar and Hantsch, H., Geschichte Österreichs, II (Graz, 1968), 245–62.Google Scholar See also volume one of Bitterauf, T., Die Gründung des Rheinbundes und der Untergang des Alten Reiches (Munich, 1905).Google Scholar

33. The only complete biographical study of Stadion is Rössler, H., Graf Johann Philipp Stadion, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1966), a sympathetic, scholarly work.Google Scholar

34. This commitment was so widely known that in 1800 Thugut had warned the emperor against Stadion, fearful that his loyalty to the Reich might jeopardize the imperial position in negotiations with France: von Oer, R., Der Friede von Pressburg, p. 80.Google Scholar His brother Friedrich was equally outspoken. See Aretin, , Heiliges Römisches Reich 1776–1806, II, 334–44,Google Scholar for Friedrich's memorandum of May 24, 1806, written to Francis in an effort to save the old Reich.

35. von Oer, R., Der Friede von Pressburg, pp. 203–13,Google Scholar offers a succinct analysis of the confusion in relationships within the Reich after Pressburg and of the controversy over the fate of the imperial institutions.

36. The French government suspected Stadion's motives and tried to dissuade Francis from appointing him. Several days after the appointment was announced the Moniteur, the semiofficial organ of Napoleon's administration, carried an editorial informing Vienna that Stadion was in the pay of England and suspect as an enemy of France. To retain him, the newspaper warned, would be to jeopardize relations with France. See Falk, Minna, “Stadion adversaire de Napoléon, 1806–1809,” Annals Historiques de la Révolution Française, XXXIV (1962), 295.Google Scholar

37. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna: Staatskanzlei, Personalia, Fasz. 18, “Französische Aufzeichnungen Stadions über die Gründe seiner Berufung ins Ministerium und dessen Führung.”

38. See Walter, F., Die Zeit Franz II (I) und Ferdinands I (Vienna, 1956)Google Scholar, and his subsequent study, Der Theresianischer Staatsreform von 1749 (Munich, 1958).Google Scholar See also Hantsch, H., Geschichte Österreichs, II, 256–64;Google Scholar and Wertheimer, E., Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns im Ersten Jahrzehnte des XIX Jahrhunderts, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1884–1890).Google ScholarBibl's, V. analysis in Der Zerfall Österreichs, I, 144–48, is exaggerated and less reliable.Google Scholar

39. Hantsch, H., Geschichte Österreichs, II, 279, describes the Stadion ministry in terms of “great reforming activity that reached its climax in 1808.”Google ScholarSchnabel, F., Der Aufstieg der Nationen (Freiburg, Basel, Vienna, 1964), pp. 152–62, is almost as enthusiastic as Hantsch.Google ScholarBrusatti's, A. essay on Stadion's “reforms” in Österreich und Europa (Graz, 1965)Google Scholar suggests a similar interpretation, as does Ford, F. L., Europe 1780–1830 (London, 1970), pp. 216–17.Google Scholar This view, in my opinion, is misleading. Stadion never had a systematic plan for the internal development of Austria. To see him as an industrious civil servant concerned with creating an orderly administration is to miss the point. His “reforms” had only one end, the production of a powerful war effort. For an intriguing comparison between Stadion and Baron Stein, see Haussherr, H., “Deutsche Bewegung und Staatsführung, 1807–1809,” Historische Zeitschrift, CLXVII (1942–1943), 285–309.Google Scholar

40. Saurau's letter is quoted in Bibl, V., Der Zerfall Österreichs, I, 147–50.Google Scholar The diary of Gentz's son-in-law, who served under Stadion, offers interesting insight into the attitude of the lower echelons of the civil service. See volume one of von Kübeck, M. F., Tagebücher des Carl Friedrich Freiherrn Kübeck von Kübau (Vienna, 1909).Google Scholar

41. von Oer, R., Der Friede von Pressburg, pp. 199–203, discusses Austrian efforts at Pressburg to win compensation for the d'Este family.Google Scholar

42. Ernstberger, A., Die Deutschen Freikorps 1809 in Böhmen, pp. 340–44.Google Scholar See also Rössler, H., Graf Johann Philipp Stadion, I, 294–95.Google Scholar

43. Rössler, H., Graf Johann Philipp Stadion, I, esp. pp. 71–84, 181–225, and 300.Google Scholar See also Haussherr, H., “Deutsche Bewegung und Staatsführung,” p. 298;Google Scholar and Langsam, W. C., The Napoleonic Wars and German Nationalism in Austria, pp. 40–41.Google Scholar

44. The text of this speech is found in von Zwiedeneck-Südenhorst, H., Die Zeit des Rheinbundes und die Gründung des Deutschen Bundes, 1806–1815 (Stuttgart, 1897), pp. 142ff.Google Scholar

45. Helleiner, H. F., The Imperial Loans, pp. 132–37;Google ScholarBotzenhart, M., Metternichs Pariser Botschafterzeit, pp. 163–71;Google Scholar and Criste, O., “Politische Vorgeschichte des Krieges,” p. 56.Google Scholar

46. Botzenhart, M., Metternichs Pariser Botschafterzeit, pp. 186–90.Google Scholar

47. Metternich scholars disagree over his precise role in the war preparations. Stearns, J., The Role of Metternich in Undermining Napoleon (Urbana, Ill., 1938), pp. 34ff.Google Scholar, stresses his conscious efforts to fan the ardor of the war party. Bibl and Rössler likewise emphasize his support of Stadion; and Kraehe describes him after spring 1808 as “an intimate of the war party in Vienna.” More recent research points to a different conclusion. Botzenhart, M., Metternichs Pariser Botschafterzeit, pp. 262ff. and 282ff.Google Scholar, argues that until late in the fall of 1808 Metternich remained so convinced of Austria's military weakness that he could never seriously entertain the possibility of an attack on Napoleon and could contemplate defense only in terms of an alliance with Russia.

48. Kraehe, E., Metternich's German Policy, p. 71.Google ScholarCf. Hof- und Staats-Schematismus des Österreichischen Kaiserthums (Vienna, 1808), pp. 160–65.Google Scholar

49. Rauchensteiner, M., Kaiser Franz und Erzherzog Carl, p. 88.Google Scholar

50. Criste, O., “Politische Vorgeschichte des Krieges,” pp. 28 (plan to seize Belgrade) and 46–48 (“Oriental Project”).Google Scholar

51. See Esposito, V. J., A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars (New York, 1964), p. 93, for Charles's goal and the strength of the army at the outbreak of war.Google Scholar

52. Bibl, V., Erzherzog Carl, p. 185.Google Scholar

53. Criste, O., Erzherzog Carl von Österreich, II, 436.Google Scholar

54. Stadion's memorandum is reproduced in Beer, A., Zehn Jahre Östterreichischen Politik, II, 512.Google Scholar

55. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna: Sammelbände, Fasz. 277, letter of Apr. 30, 1808.

56. Tagebücher von Friedrich von Gentz. Aus dem Nachlass Varnhagens von Ense (Leipzig, 1861), pp. 63, 66.Google Scholar For his subsequent efforts see Gentz, F., Schriften und Briefen, I (Munich, 1921), especially his essay of 1808, “On the Liberation of Germany” (175–215), and his “Manifest des Österreichischen Hofes 1809” (215–43).Google Scholar His efforts to urge Austria to war prior to Tilsit are treated in Ernstberger, A., Eine Deutsche Untergrundbewegung, passim.Google Scholar

57. Rössler, H., Graf Johann Philipp Stadion, I, 297–300.Google Scholar

58. Criste, O., “Politische Vorgeschichte des Kriegs,” p. 56.Google Scholar

59. Rainer served from 1808 through the end of the war as Francis's regular deputy on the Staatsrat. Together with Charles, though for less apparent reasons, he fell into disfavor after the war and lost his post as imperial consultant on internal affairs.

60. There is no good scholarly biography of the empress. Guglia, E., Kaiserin Maria Ludovica von Österreich (Vienna, 1898), is obsequious and superficial.Google ScholarWertheimer, E., Die Drei Ersten Frauen des Kaiser Franz (Leipzig, 1893), is little better.Google Scholar A lively, though decidedly popularized sketch is found in McGuigan, D., The Habsburgs (New York, 1966).Google Scholar

61. On the empress's identification with German national movement, see von Oer, R., Der Friede von Pressburg, p. 203;Google ScholarThurheim, Gräfin L., Mein Leben, I (Munich, 1913), 226 and 272–73;Google ScholarMacartney, C. A., The Habsburg Empire, p. 185;Google Scholar and Langsam, W. C., The Napoleonic Wars and German Nationalism in Austria, pp. 32–34.Google Scholar

62. Rössler, H., Graf Johann Philipp Stadion, I, 285–87.Google Scholar

63. The letters between Maria Ludovica and Francis are preserved in Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna: Sammelbände, Fasz.43. See also the letter written to the empress by Archduke John from Villach, May 19, 1809, in Theiss, V., Erzherzog Johann, pp. 101–3.Google ScholarAndré, R., “L'Idée nationale autrichienne et les Guerres de Napoléon,” p. 499,Google Scholar particularly stresses the empress's influence. Cf. Tritsch, W., Metternich und Sein Monarch, p. 217.Google Scholar

64. Wagner, K. analyzes Stadion's propaganda campaign in “Die Wiener Zeitungen und Zeitschriften der Jahre 1808 und 1809,” Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte, CIV(1915), 197–401.Google Scholar See articles in Der Sammler, ein Unterhaltungsblatt, published three times per week from Jan. 1, 1809, through June 30, 1809, and in Vaterländische Blätter für den Österreichischen Kaiserstadt, thrice weekly from May 10, 1808, to Apr. 17, 1809. See also Langsam, W. C., The Napoleonic Wars and German Nationalism in Austria, pp. 28–55.Google Scholar

65. Botzenhart, M., Metternichs Pariser Botschafterzeit, pp. 273–74.Google Scholarde Grunwald, C., “La Fin d'une Ambassade. Metternich à Paris en 1808–1809. Mémoires inédites,” La Revue de Paris, XIX (1937), 481–513 and 819–46.Google Scholar

66. Feldzeugmeister Anton Mayer von Heldensfeld was a leading spokesman for war within Charles's staff. See Mayer's “Geschichte meiner Zeit von Beginn des Jahres 1805,” in the Kriegsarchiv Vienna: Mem. 3/68.

67. Rauchensteiner, M., Kaiser Franz und Erzherzog Carl, p. 88.Google Scholar

68. Ibid., pp. 89ff.

69. The complete texts of these papers are published in Beer, A., Zehn Jahre Österreichischer Politik, II, 516–35.Google Scholar See also Botzenhart, M., Metternichs Pariser Botschafterzeit, pp. 279–84.Google Scholar

70. See Ausgewälte Schriften, VI, 329.

71. Stadion's letter is reprinted in Fournier, A., “Österreichs Kriegsziele im Jahre 1809,” Beiträge zur Neueren Geschichte Österreichs, IV (12 1908), 216–30.Google ScholarCf. Rössler, H., Graf Johann Philipp Stadion, II, 13–23.Google Scholar