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“Moro”: The Resupply of German Submarines in Spain, 1939–1942*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Charles B. Burdick
Charles B. Burdick
Affiliation:
San Jose State College
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Extract

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 manifestly occasioned fundamental adjustments in European strategic considerations. While few powers had given serious thought to Spain's diplomatic, military, or even geographical importance, the rising produced numerous useful opportunities for Germany. It created a potential friend on France's southern frontier, drew the senior, more aggressive dictator, Benito Mussolini, closer to the more recently arrived Adolf Hitler, threatened Great Britain's control of the Mediterranean at Gibraltar, and redirected the focus of international diplomacy. In order to obtain a position of greater influence within the unstable vector of forces created by the new situation the two dictators had dispatched socalled volunteer military and air formations in support of the rising. While these troops and their equipment were of fundamental value to the Nationalists, their presence forced the participating military high commands to reevaluate carefully their positions and intentions.

Type
Articles
Information
Central European History , Volume 3 , Issue 3 , September 1970 , pp. 256 - 284
Copyright
Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1970

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References

1. New York Times, Sept. 4, 1950, p. 16. Captain (Ret.) Byron S. Anderson, the United States Naval Attaché, 1941–42, expressed the same opinion in an interview with the writer, September 1969.

2. This cursory introduction is founded upon discussions and correspondence with the late Generalmajor a. D. Walter Bruns, the late Generaladmiral Otto Schniewind, and Generaladmiral a. D. Eric Bohm. For a useful survey of this period see Watt, D. C., “German Strategic Planning and Spain, 1938–1939,” The Army Quarterly, LXXX, No. 2 (07 1960), 220–27.Google Scholar A detailed explanation is Merkes, M., Die deutsche Politik gegenüber dem Spanischen Bürgerkrieg 1936–1939 (Bonn, 1961).Google Scholar

3. United States, Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1916–1945, Series D (1937–1945), III, Germany and the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939 (Washington, 1950), p. 747, Doc. 664.Google Scholar

4. Spanish-German relations at this time were very complex. In the event of a general European war before he could win his own campaign, Franco faced the likelihood that the Iberian Peninsula would become an operational theater. With Italian and German troops in residence the French and possibly the British, via Portugal, might directly intervene in the conflict. Hitler, on the other hand, as an arch-opportunist, probably had no idea about the immediate future but extemporized as he moved forward. Without a detailed operational plan he would not, indeed could not, tell Franco anything. For an excellent consideration of this relationship see Detwiler, Donald S., Hitler, Franco und Gibraltar. Die Frage des spanischen Eintritts in den Zweiten Weltkrieg (Wiesbaden, 1962), pp. 8–14.Google Scholar

5. See, for example, “Vortragsnotiz für Chef I. Skl.,” May 6, 1939. This is a detailed survey of Spain's position in German naval thinking. This document was made available through the kindness of Rear Admiral E. M. Eller, Director of Naval History, United States Navy.

6. Interview with Generalmajor a. D. Walter Bruns, German Military Attaché in Spain, 1939–41, May 1965. See Watt, op. cit., p. 225. An earlier Spanish military mission under General Antonio Aranda Mata had not accomplished any more than a much photographed, inconsequential encounter with Hitler.

7. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 52/39 g. Kdos., July 20, 1939; O.K.M. Skl. AI 1588 geh./Skl. Ic, June 22, 1939. Unless otherwise noted all documents with the heading “Deutsche Botschaft” come from Spain.

8. Leaving Kiel on Apr. 25, 1915, Lieutenant Commander Otto Hersing took his submarine around Scotland and moved south for the Mediterranean. He was to pick up fuel, procured by a secret agent, off Cape Finisterre. On May 3 he took on fuel and provisions from the steamer, Marzela, in the Cape Cee area. When Hersing tested the newly acquired fuel he discovered that it was too heavy and would not burn properly. Hersing continued onward and just made safety in Cattaro Bay. “Kriegstagebuch S. M. Unterseeboote ‘U 21’ für die Zeit vom 16. April bis 15. Mai 1915.” Mr. Harry Rilley in the Naval History Office searched out the relevant entries in this document. A less useful source is Hersing, Otto, U 21 rettet die Dardanellen (Zurich: Amalthen-Verlag, 1932), pp. 43–44.Google Scholar

9. O.K.W./Ausl. IV (L) “Aktenvermerk über die Besprechung beim F.d.U. [Führer der Unterseeboote] in Kiel am II. Aug. 1939,” Geheime Kommandosache, Aug. 14, 1939. The author is indebted to G. D. Lawson of the British Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, for the copy of this document. Also, letters from Kapitän zur See a. D. Werner Stoephasius, Feb. 8, 19, 1969.

10. O.K.W. /Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 598/39 g. Kdos. Ausl. IV, Aug. 15, 1939. While this order was not the first expression of German interest it was the most serious and detailed effort. Captain Wilhelm Meisel had recently completed a detailed study of Arosa Bay for possible naval use. Flottenkommando B.Nr. g. Kdos. Chefs. 44/39 A 1, May 23, 1939; letter from Admiral a. D. Wilhelm Meisel, Oct. 10, 1966.

11. O.K.W./Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 657/39 g. Kdos. Ausl. IV, Aug. 25, 1939.

12. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 74/39 g. Kdos., Aug. 25, 1939.

13. Menzell had entered the German Navy with Meyer-Döhner in 1916 and subsequently had moved to Spain, where he had established various financial enterprises. A man of great energy and business acumen, he served as economic advisor to the Naval attaché. Klingenberg headed a highly successful export-import firm, while Eitzen was a shipping agent for several German firms in Vigo.

14. They envisaged two possible actions with the ship. One was simply to dump the unwanted fuel overboard on the high seas at night. They feared that this operation was overly risky because of enemy observation, the danger of torpedo attack while outside the harbor, and possible trouble with the uninformed harbor authorities.As a result they opted in favor of the second course, i.e., direct talks with the aid of a small token of preliminary appreciation.

15. Within a short time they had assembled all of the required material, arranged for the baking of a bread supply, purchased those foodstuffs not aboard the Wangoni or Nordatlantik (bananas, cognac, sardines, etc.), transferred a large pump to the Nordatlantik, and assigned personnel responsible for the supply effort. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 80/39 g. Kdos., Sept. 16, 1939. These vessels were among the 58 German ships which were either in Spanish harbors at the war's outbreak or made port shortly thereafter by evading the British blockade.

16. At this time the German naval agents functioned through the Naval Attaché's office. The actual leader was Christoph Janssen, a particularly well informed man with wide contacts in the business and industrial community. Under his direction and supervision were several subordinate, geographically oriented officials. In the north was Klingenberg, who supervised the execution of supply missions. Under him were Christiansen in Pasajes, Erhardt in Bilbao, and Eitzen in Vigo. In the southwest was Draeger with several members of his personal business firm. Büttner, a former naval translator, served there as a general contact because of his intimate knowledge of the area. Since he did not have a specific headquarters he also had a general liaison function.

17. O.K.W./Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 757/39 g. Kdos. Ausl. IV (a), Sept. 2, 1939; letter from Georg Büttemeyer, Jan. 21, 1969.

18. Auswärtiges Amt Nr. Pol. I 1180 g. Kdos. (Abschrift), Sept. 5, 1939; Telegramm (Geh. Ch. V.) Stohrer nach Auswärtiges Amt, Sept. 4, 1939.

19. Telegramm (Geh. Ch. V.) Stohrer nach O.K.M. und O.K.W., Sept. 4, 1939.

20. O.K.M. Seekriegsleitung B.Nr. I /Ski. Ig 4840 g. Kdos. (Abschrift), Sept. 6, 1939. Another telegram indicated that, in view of the difficulties already encountered in Vigo, that city would be watched with particular care. It might be more advantageous to shift preparations to El Ferrol where two German ships, Max Albrecht and Heinrich Arp, already had foodstuffs on board. Telegramm Nr. 913, Stohrer nach O.K.M. und O.K.W., Sept. 4, 1939.

21. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 80/39 g. Kdos., Sept. 16, 1939. This report provides a useful summary of information for the first two weeks of the war.

22. Telegramm Nr. 976, Stohrer nach Auswärtiges Amt (Abschrift), Sept. 8, 1939.

23. Telegramm Nr. 998, Botschaft nach O.K.M. und O.K.M. [sic] (Abschrift), Sept. 9, 1939.

24. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 80/39 g. Kdos., Sept. 16, 1939.

25. Telegramm (geh. Ch. V.) Nr. 1120, Marineattaché nach O.K.M. und O.K.W. (Abschrift), Sept. 18, 1939.

26. O.K.W. Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 900/39 g. Kdos. Ausl. IV (a), Sept. 22, 1939. Lorek had been involved in the earlier German efforts to build a prototype submarine in Spain in avoidance of the naval provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. As a precautionary measure O.K.M. took this opportunity to send sealed instructions to various ship's captains concerning the general guidelines for future activity. Included were the Max Albrecht in El Ferrol, Nordatlantik, Antarktis, and Heinrich Arp in Vigo, Charlotte Schliemann and Winnetou in Puerto de la Luz, and the Recum and Gedonia in Santa Cruz de Tenerife.

27. See the Kriegstagebuch des Befehlshabers der Unterseeboote, Oct. 11, 1939. The writer is grateful to Grossadmiral a. D. Karl Dönitz and Dr. Jürgen Rohwer of the Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte for permission to use these records.

28. Protokoll (2. Ausfertigung) (Abschrift) of a conference among Juan March, Direktor Karl-Ernst Erk, Christoph Janssen, and Dr. Hans Schirmer, Madrid, Oct. 10, 1939. See also O.K.W. Ausl. IV Nr. 3162/39 g. Kdos., Sept. 30, 1939.

29. See Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 88/g., Oct. 10, 1939. A small, preliminary effort in money manipulation was a complete failure. Ausland-Direktion an das O.K.M., Geheim, Oct. 17, 1939. Meyer-Döhner personally agreed with these objections but thought that the desired action could only be carried through by a man of March's character. In all events the latter figure did not enter into the submarine fuel question again. That German fears were correct may be seen in McLachlan, Donald, Room 39: A Study in Naval Intelligence (New York, 1968), pp. 203–204.Google Scholar

30. “Aktennotiz für Marineattaché Madrid” (O.K.W. Ausl. IV (a) Geheime! Kommandosache!), Sept. 30, 1939.

31. “Besprechungsergebnis bei A VI unter Teilnahme von Abw. C und A II am 7. Okt. 1939,” O.K.M. /Skl. 57/39 g. Kdos., Oct. 7, 1939. The Naval High Command promptly put these thoughts into action and sent out orders on October 9 for the purchase of approximately 300 tons of foodstuffs.They dispatched a representative for effective control at the same time. O.K.M. /lSkl. 2233 /39 g. Kdos. II Ang., Oct. 9, 1939.

32. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 904g, Oct. 10, 1939. Lorek himself had little time to consider these issues because Meyer-Döhner immediately put him to work examining qualities of available fuels. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 906g, Oct. 10, 1939.

33. ibid. On some of the worries involving the supply difficulties see Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 935g, Oct. 16, 1939.

34. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 930/39 g. Kdos., Oct. 16, 1939. The suggestion concerning the possible use of the Thalia came from Lieutenant Rolf Rüggenberg who, with a group of twelve German sailors, was on the faculty of the Spanish naval school near Cádiz. Meyer-Döhner wanted smaller vessels because the local authorities could not effectively control their activities. Also, the smaller crews simplified security measures. Letter from Kapitän zur See a. D. Rolf Rüggenberg, Nov. 22, 1969.

35. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B. 91/39 g. Kdos., Oct. 19, 1939.The fuel quality concern was a consistent worry because the Spanish did not possess enough useful fuel for high compression engines nor could they obtain it. The Spanish regulations and Franco's continuing difficulties with the Americans posed frustrating dilemmas for the entire German staff in Madrid. See Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 92/39 g. Kdos., Oct. 19, 1939. On the fuel issue consult Medlicott, W. N., The Economic Blockade (2 vols., London, 1952, 1959).Google Scholar

36. Under a carefully prepared agreement the captain and his chief machinist would receive four months' pay for refueling a submarine. The rest of the crew would learn from the actual event. In Vigo, however, the captain received a strong oral caution about supplying belligerent naval vessels while the abrupt innocent change of cargos, i.e., coal to oil barrels, alerted the crew, who were not particularly interested in adventure. These threats of possible imprisonment and mutiny frightened the captain out of any participation. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B. 101/39 g. Kdos., Oct. 24, 1939; Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 135/39 g. Kdos., Nov. 1, 1939.

37. Fernschreiben an B.D.U. [Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote], Oct. 31, 1939. Although plans had already been made for resupplying the U 25 in a Spanish port, Admiral Dönitz had remained a pessimist. The continued uncertain progress with both the delivery apparatus and the Spanish leaders made him dubious of any success. Kriegstagebuch des Befehlshabers der Unterseeboote, Nov. 1, 1939. At almost the same time the German Ambassador, von Stohrer, submitted a lengthy review of Spain's general position to Berlin. He touched on virtually every facet of this question, including a few words on the supply issue. He submitted that neutrality was Franco's main concern and that Germany had no alternative to time, patience, and general support of the regime. There was no way to force Spanish compliance. Abschrift Pol. III 2387 g. Deutsche Botschaft in Spanien Nr. 1063 g., Oct. 28, 1939.

38. Meyer-Döhner had already moved in this direction. On October 19 his agent in Las Palmas had suggested that submarine refueling in that area posed few dangers. Likewise he had pointed out that the German steamer Corrientes, which was lying there, could be outfitted for supply purposes. She had storage space for some 500 tons of fuel, a high deck able to obscure land observation, a reduced and trustworthy crew, and an unusual freedom from local controls. Meyer-Döhner had accepted this proposal with alacrity, as did his superiors, and they ordered the Corrientes prepared for this purpose. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 94/39 g. Kdos., Oct. 19, 1931; Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 100 /39 g. Kdos., Oct. 23, 1939. At the same time Meyer-Döhner considered purchasing the Spanish trawler, Santa Maria P (formerly the British Wellington), built in 1911, for use in the Canaries. The asking price eventually proved too high, however, and the negotiations broke down without resolution. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 118/39 g. Kdos., Nov. 2, 1939.

39. The German Naval Staff, on Nov. 4, asked for additional pressure on Franco for a general commitment of support and an assurance of energetic measures concerning all subordinate agencies. In this fashion a foundation for future planning might be established. O.K.M. Seekriegsleitung B.Nr. 685/39 g. Kdos. I/Skl.Ic, Nov. 4, 1939.

40. The purpose here was twofold. On one hand it was to remind the Spanish authorities of their earlier support and, on the other hand, to avoid any doubts about harming Spanish neutrality. The desired supply activity would take place outside Spanish territorial waters and would not require anything more than official permission to load the steamers. See Fernschreiben Nr. 1803, Nov. 12, 1939.

41. Beigbeder's position was all-important at this time because of the supplies coming from Italy. “Aktennotiz über Besprechung mit Intendanturrat Dr. Abraham am 14.11. 39.” Abraham personally filed his report in Berlin and carefully stressed the importance of the “new” Spanish position. He also detailed the progress with the Italian supplies.

42. “Aktennotiz über die Besprechung mit dem Mil. Leiter Spanien Portugal am 13.11.39.” The conversation also cleared up the operational procedures for submarines which were discovered by local functionaries. The commander would plead an emergency situation and report officially to the Spanish civil servants. Within a brief time he would then move back out to sea before the British could take effective counteraction.

43. Telegramm (geh. Ch. V), Stohrer nach Auswärtiges Amt, Nov. 22, 1939.

44. Funk-Telegramm (geh. Ch. V) Nr. 2066, Stohrer nach Auswärtiges Amt, Nov. 25, 1939.

45. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 137/39 g. Kdos., Nov. 1939. Franco's views on chartering ships made Meyer-Döhner most happy that the Landro efforts had not been consummated. Had they been completed serious difficulties would certainly have complicated discussions. As a result he ceased thinking about this possibility. O.K.W. Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 1484/39 g. Kdos., Ausl. IV (a), Dec. 5, 1939.

46. Abschrift AMA / CIc B.Nr. 992/39 g. Kdos., Nov. 25, 1939. A single supply unit should be enough for an additional 14 days at sea. In addition, Meyer-Döhner awaited the large amount of foodstuffs which he had learned were en route from Germany. O.K.W. Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 1451/39 g. Kdos. Ausl. IV (a), Nov. 29, 1939.

47. ibid. On Dec. 4 Meyer-Döhner spoke at considerable length with Admiral Moreno. The Naval Minister expressed interest in joint submarine construction in Spain, dividing the 500-ton products equally between the two countries. He went into considerable detail about these possibilities. They also discussed Franco's new cooperative attitude although Moreno knew amazingly little about it. Nonetheless he expressed his unqualified support of the German cause and recommended Cádiz as the best port for supply operations. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 139/39 g. Kdos., Dec. 5, 1939. Nothing came of the construction proposal.

48. The document heading, aside from the date Dec. 22, 1939, is illegible. Its context makes its origins clear.

49. Fernschreiben SSD MB2 01972 30/12 1145. At the same time the Naval Staff in Berlin informed Dönitz that the Corrientes was available for supply use. Neu I Ski. I g. 2910/39 g. Kdos., Dec. 29, 1939.

50. O.K.W. Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 1692/39 g. Kdos. Ausl. IV (a), Dec. 31, 1939. This code name covered several resupply actions. Other subsequent designations included “Bernardo,” “Arroz,” “Culebra,” “Gata,” “Lima,” and “Verano.”

51. Fernschreiben von MUW 0271 24.1.1825; KTB des Befehlshabers der Unterseeboote, Jan. 18, 26, 1940.

52. Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 25/40 g. Kdos., Feb. 1, 1940; KTB des Befehlshabers der Unterseeboote, Jan. 31, 1940. This was the third supply attempt since the war's outbreak, and the first successful one. The first had failed when the supply vessel, Emmy Friedrich, had to be scuttled in the Caribbean. The second effort, using the motor ship Dresden had not worked out because of various operational adjustments. U 25's good fortune, then, was more important than a single event; it was a beginning. “Auszug aus dem Kriegstagebuch der Etappenorganisation der Kriegsmarine” (no date).

53. Two days after the event Moreno took Meyer-Döhner aside and complained about the noisy festival which had taken place aboard the Thalia. The Spanish ferry between Cádiz and Matagorda passed the ship every half hour until midnight. Under the circumstances the Germans had unduly alarmed the Spaniards. Moreno suggested that in the future the Germans should not disturb the local officials. Meyer-Döhner understood the warning as well as the indication of Spanish watchfulness and telegraphed Berlin that silence was important. There were no more celebrations.

54. Fernschreiben MB2 0780 1820 Uhr, Feb. 23, 1940. On Feb. 18 the U 53 discovered the Banderas wallowing behind an Allied convoy and, assuming that she belonged to the group, torpedoed her. See Rohwer, Jürgen, Die U-Boot-Erfolge der Achsenmächte 1939–1945 (Munich, 1968), p. 14.Google Scholar

55. Abschrift Verschlüsseltes Telegramm aus Madrid 90 52/5/21, no date; letter from Kapitän zur See a. D. Otto Schuhart, Oct. 2, 1966; interview with Kapitän zur See a. D. Otto Schuhart, July 1969.

56. For a description of these plans see Burdick, Charles, Germany's Military Strategy and Spain in World War II (Syracuse, 1968).Google Scholar

57. Anlage I zu O.K.W. Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 1906/418 Kdos. Ausl. IV (a), July 13, 1941; Deutsche Botschaft Der Marineattaché B.Nr. 411/41 g. Kdos., July 8, 1941.

58. O.K.W. Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 1853/41 g. Kdos., July 8, 1941; O.K.W.Abt.Ausland B.Nr. 1964/41 g. Kdos. Ausl. IV (a), July 19, 1941.

59. Letter from Korvettenkapitän a. D. Heinrich Bleichrodt, Nov. 24, 1966; O.K.M. 1/Skl. 15188/41 g. Kdos., July 10, 1941. The Berlin authorities had already instituted security changes. On July 17 they ordered a change in the code name for Cádiz to “Gata.” O.K.W. Abt. Ausland Abt. 1934 g. Kdos. Ausl. IV (a), July 17, 1941. Shortly afterward Meyer-Döhner confirmed his fears that the British had learned something about the operations. He suggested that Berlin be most cautious about any supply activity. The enemy's watchfulness was certain to bring potentially painful revelations. O.K.W. Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 20961/41 g. Kdos. Ausl. IV (a), Aug. 12, 1941.

60. Funkspruch von Schaltung U-Bootskurzwel an Südbotte, July 25, 1941. The supply of the U 331 had to be carried through in order to get the submarine home. Because of the moon and the fear of observation, the action required two nights. Fernschreiben von Marineattaché Madrid 1054 g. Kdos., Aug. 2, 1941.

61. The details of this exchange remain clouded in the military records. O.K.M. Seekriegsleitung zu 1. Skl. 18125/41 g. Kdos., Aug. 13, 1941. O.K.W. Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 1998/41 g. Kdos., Aug. 13, 1941; O.K.W. Abt. Ausland B.Nr. 1998/41 g. Kdos. Ausl. IV (a), July 22, 1941.

62. Letter from Fregattenkapitän a. D. Reinhard Suhren, Oct. 27, 1969; O.K.M. Seekriegsleitung 1/Skl. Ig 1950/41 g. Kdos. Chefs., Nov. 31, 1941.

63. O.K.M. Seekriegsleitung 1/Skl. Iga 2101/41 op. g. Kdos. Chefs., Dec. 1, 1941; O.K.M. Seekriegsleitung 1/Skl. Iga 114/42 g. Kdos. Op. Chefs., Jan. 13, 1942.

64. “Report of Interrogation of Survivors from ‘U 434’, A 500 Ton U-Boat, sunk at about 1000 on 18th December 1941, in approximate position 36° 08' N., and 16° 02' W.“ Rear Admiral P. N. Buckley of the Naval History Branch, Ministry of Defence, Great Britain, kindly provided this report to the author.

65. O.K.M. Seekriegsleitung 1/Skl. Iga 114/42 g. Kdos. Op. Chefs., Jan. 13. 1942; O.K.M. Seekriegsleitung 1/Skl. Iga 410/42 g. Kdos. Chefs., Feb. 17, 1942; O.K.M. Seekriegsleitung 1/Skl. Ig 901/42 g. Kdos. Chefs., Apr. 16, 1942. Subsequently the Spanish declined permission for renewed submarine actions. The two later supply efforts resulted from mechanical malfunctions. The U 68 developed a defective valve shortly after leaving Lorient while the U 66 broke a fuel line at sea. In both cases the Spanish authorities provided a memorable reception which included a departure present of fruits and vegetables. Kriegstagebuch der Marineattaché Madrid.

66. See Roskill, S. W., The War at Sea, 1939–1945, 1: The Defensive (London, 1954), p. 348. For the subsequent successes of the various submarines consult the relevant pages in Rohwer, op. cit.Google Scholar

67. Letter from Korvettenkapitän a D. Jost Metzler, Sept. 22, 1966; letter from Korvettenkapitän a. D. Otto Salmon, Oct. 19, 1966; letter from Korvettenkapitän a. D. Otto Schulz, Nov. 29, 1966; letter from Kapitän zur See a. D. Karl-Friedrich Merten, Nov. 17, 1969. A version of the refueling, albeit without mentioning the specific harbor, is in Metzler, Jost, The Laughing Cow: A U-Boat Captain's Story (London, 1955), pp. 176–79.Google Scholar

68. The Spanish provided additional support to the German Navy but it never went beyond searching or caring for submarine survivors or allowing the continuance of observation posts off Gibraltar. Letter from Hanns Parsch, May 14, 1969, Kriegstagebuch der Marineattaché Madrid, 1942–44.