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Imperial Berlin and Washington: New Light on Germany's Foreign Policy and America's Entry into World War I

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Reinhard R. Doerries
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Extract

Since the early 1960s we have witnessed in West German historical writing noteworthy changes in the interpretation of the causes of the First World War and, therefore, of the meaning of that war for Germany. One is particularly struck by the refreshing debate which ensued among German scholars on Germany's war aims specifically and on Imperial Germany's foreign policy prior to the World War in general. The so-called captured German documents of the Foreign Office and other branches of the government were returned to Germany, and a younger generation of historians eagerly examined the newly available material. Remarkable, if at times controversial, studies were the result of the scholarly reexamination of the German imperial era. Yet, in all the commotion and controversy, there was one area of German foreign policy which conspicuously remained ignored or treated with astonishing marginality

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Central European History , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 1978 , pp. 23 - 49
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Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1978

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References

This essay is the revised version of a paper presented by invitation of the Council of West European Studies at Yale University and in somewhat different format upon invitation by the Department of History at the University of Maryland. I would like to express my gratitude for comments and criticism to the friends and colleagues at both universities.

1. See especially Fischer, Fritz, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 3rd rev. ed. (Düsseldorf, 1964).Google ScholarFischer, Fritz, Krieg der Illusionen (Düsseldorf, 1969).Google ScholarGeiss, Imanuel, ed., July 1914 (New York, 1967),Google Scholar Introduction and Conclusion. For a more traditional German interpretation see Ritter, Gerhard, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, vols. 2–4 (Munich, 1960–1968).Google ScholarCf. Epstein, Klaus, “Gerhard Ritter and the First World War,” Journal of Contemporary History 1 (1966): 193–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Imanuel Geiss, “The Outbreak of the First World War and German War Aims,” ibid., pp. 75–91. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “The Debate on German War Aims,” ibid., pp. 47–74.

2. An exception is the study by Möckelmann, Jürgen, Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen in der Krise (Frankfurt, 1967),Google Scholar a revised and considerably abbreviated version of his dissertation, “Das Deutschlandbild in den USA 1914–1918 und die Kriegszielpolitik Wilsons” (University of Hamburg, 1965).

3. A Catalogue of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives 1867–1920 (Oxford, 1959).Google ScholarKent, George O., ed., A Catalog of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives 1920–1945, 4 vols. (Stanford, 1962–1972).I wish to express my appreciation to the officials of the Politisches Archiv in Bonn, especially Dr. Theodor Gehling, for ample assistance and helpful advice.Google Scholar

4. The Abteilung IIIb of the German General Staff which was responsible for a great number of intelligence and sabotage projects in the U.S. destroyed its own files at the end of World War I in order to keep the records from falling into the hands of the revolutionaries. Cf. Rudolf Nadolny to Franz von Papen, Dec. 15, 1952, Auswartiges Amt, Bonn (hereafter AA), Nadolny Papers.

5. Cf.Beale, Howard, “Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II. und die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen,” Die Welt als Geschichte 14 (1954).Google ScholarCf. the views presented by Hagan, Kenneth J. of the U.S. Naval Academy (comments) and by Manfred Jonas of Union College in his important paper, “The Case of Germany,” at the First National Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, held in Washington, D.C., Aug. 15–16, 1976.Google Scholar

6. A brief summary of German-American relations is Gatzke, Hans W., “The United States and Germany on the Eve of World War I,” offprint from Geiss, Imanuel and Wendt, Bernd J., eds., Deutschland in der Weltpolitik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Düsseldorf, 1973).Google Scholar

7. Toward the end of the frustrating negotiations which lasted over a period of several years the German government argued that the financial claims of certain German citizensagainst the State of Georgia would have to be satisfied prior to an arbitration treaty. AA, Botschaft Washington, Deutsche Ansprüche gegen den Staat Georgia. For the German side of the arbitration treaty negotiations see AA, Botschaft Washington, Deutsch-Amerikanischer Schiedsgerichtsvertrag.

8. The degree to which the German-Americans had shed their ethnic identity at the time of World War I is still a matter of scholarly investigation. Among recent publications see especially Luebke, Frederick C., Bonds of Loyalty (DeKalb, Ill., 1974),Google Scholar and Dobbert, G. A., “German-Americans between New and Old Fatherland, 1870–1914,” American Quarterly 19 (1967).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9. See Katz's, Friedrich impressive study, Deutschland, Diaz und die mexikanische Revolution (Berlin, 1964).Google Scholar for a more traditional German view arguing against Katz see Baecker, Thomas, Die deutsche Mexikopolitik 1913/1914 (Berlin, 1971).Google Scholar Cf. also Doerries, Reinhard R., “Amerikanische Aussenpolitik im Karibischen Raum vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien 18 (1973): 62–77.Google Scholar In June 1914 the Kaiser even ordered the ill-famed S.M.S. Panther to the coast of Mexico, and the Foreign Office was obliged to point out that the American press would react hostilely to the dispatch of this ship. Various documents in AA, Mexiko I, vol. 48.

10. Cf. for instance the statement of Eduard von Capelle, Chief of the Reichsmarineamt, Jan. 31, 1917(!): “from a military point of view, her [the American] entrance means nothing. I repeat: from a military point of view America is as nothing. I am convinced that almost no Americans will volunteer for war service… America has neither commissioned nor noncommissioned officers enough to train large bodies of troops. And when the men have been trained, how are they to cross the ocean? … Should America be able to provide the necessary transport ships, our submarines could not wish for a better piece of hunting. I repeat, therefore, once more: from a military standpoint, America's entrance is as nothing.” English text here cited from Arthur S. Link, Wilson, 5 (Princeton, 1965): 289. The German archives contain countless examples of similar estimates of U.S. strength, coming from military as well as civilian personages. Though it might be argued that the U.S. government was no better informed on conditions in Germany, William II had been in power for some time. Woodrow Wilson, by contrast, had become U.S. president less than two years prior to the beginning of World War I, and the Germans had had less opportunity to observe him in action.

11. In the fall of 1916 Berlin even attempted to have Gerard recalled or at least held back in the U.S. See documents in AA, Deutschland 127, no. 22, vol. 6.

12. Cf. also the slanted Nazi-jargon review of the ambassador's memoirs (Erinnerungen und Briefe, published 1936 in exile in Zurich) by the German historian Hölzle, Erwin in Historische Zeitschrift 158 (1938): 381–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13. Langer, William L., “An Honest German Diplomat,” New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 25, 1936, sec. X, p. 2.Google Scholar Numerous references in Arthur Link, S., Wilson, vols. 3–5(Princeton, 1960–1965).Google ScholarSeymour, Charles, “The House-Bernstorff Conversations in Perspective,” in Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in Honour of G. P. Gooch, ed. Sarkissian, A. O. (London, 1961). Cf. House-Bernstorff correspondence in AA, Botschaft Washington, Friedensverhandlungen.Google Scholar

14. Many of the relevant documents can be found in, for instance, AA, Weltkrieg 11, adh. 2, vols. 1–6; AA, Weltkrieg 11k, seer., vols. 1–13; AA, Presse-Abteilung, Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika. David Hirst's unpublished dissertation, “German Propaganda in the United States, 1914–1917” (Northwestern University, 1962), treats the work of the German group, but Hirst could not see important archival material which has become available since.

15. Zeman, Z. A. B., A Diplomatic History of the First World War (London, 1971), p. 169.Google Scholar

16. On Dernburg see Ritter, , Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, 3: 170.Google ScholarCh. Appuhn, , “L'Ambassade du Comte Bernstorff à Washington,” Revue d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale, 1925, pp. 302–3.Google ScholarAchterberg, Erich, Berliner Hochfinanz (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 195.Google ScholarSchnee, Heinrich, Als letzter Gouvemeur in Deutsch-Ostafrika, ed.Schnee, Ada (Heidelberg, 1964), pp. 82–83.Google ScholarBarnes, Harry Elmer, “Wie es erzählt wurde,” Berliner Monatshefte für internationale Aufklärung (Die Kriegsschuldfrage) 8 (1930): 152.Google Scholar The curious appraisal in Meyer, Eduard, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (Frankfurt, 1920), p. 173.Google Scholar Cf. the opinion of Georg von Skal, an intelligent German-American who assisted the German propaganda effort in the U.S., as expressed to Maximilian Harden (editor of Die Zukunft), Dec. 15,1915, English version here quoted from New York Herald, Feb. 8,1916, National Archives, Record Group 38: “The fact that for a time B. [Bernstorff] could accomplish but little here was mainly due to the presence of our friend B.D. [Bernhard Demburg]… His immense vanity, his desire to come to the front, his tactlessness—did a great deal of harm.” As an example of Dernburg's written propaganda see “Germany and the Powers,” North American Review 200 (1914).Google Scholar The recently published Schiefel, Werner, Bernhard Demburg 1665–1937 (Zurich and Freiburg, n.d.), supplies no additional information in this respect.Google Scholar

17. Viereck has published his own views on this period in Spreading Germs of Hate (New York, 1930)Google Scholar and The Strangest Friendship in History: Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (New York, 1932).Google Scholar A recent biographical study is Johnson, Neal, Sylvester Viereck: German-American Propagandist (Urbana, Ill., 1972).Google Scholar

18. Correspondence between Bernstorff and Auswärtiges Amt, AA, Vereinigte Staaten von Nord Amerika 2, seer., vol. 1; AA, Deutschland 126a, vol. 4. Link, , Wilson, 3 (Princeton, 1960): 20–21.Google ScholarNizer, Louis in his My Life in Court (New York, 1961), chap. 4, “Issue of Nazism in America,” reports on legal problems of the Ridder family arising from their connections with Germany in another era. Victor Ridder's opponent in court turned out to be the well-known German pacifist Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster.Google Scholar

19. For further details see Doerries, Reinhard R., Washington-Berlin 1908/1917 (Düsseldort, 1975), pp. 69–72.Google Scholar

20. See Kühnemann's Reden an Deutsch-Amerika: Gedruckt zum Besten der Arbeiterhilfe in New York (n.p., n.d.). The booklet containing speeches given before German-Americans was distributed through Hans Liebau of the Liebau Bureau in New York. Cf. von Papen to Königliches Kriegsministerium, Nov. 1914, AA, Vereinigte Staaten von Nordamerika 5, vol. 16. Kühnemann at a celebration of Bismarck's birthday in Passaic, N.J.: “ Wir werden Sieger bleiben auf dem Felde der Waffen, der Wirtschaft und des Geistes.” Monatshefte für deutsche Sprache und Paedagogik, 1915, p. 160.

21. Kuno Meyer is said to have first suggested the ill-fated Irish Brigade, a force to be made up of captured Irish soldiers and to be employed in connection with German military designs in Ireland. He came to the U.S. in the fall of 1914 with false papers provided for him by the Auswärtiges Amt. “Working for the German propaganda office in New York, he maintained close contacts with Irish-American circles. Like other “private” German citizens he wrote to Germany and contradicted Bernstorff's reports to the Foreign Office. Cf. Kuno Meyer to Eduard Meyer, July 17, 1916, passed on to the Auswärtiges Amt by E. Meyer, AA, Weltkrieg 18, adh. 2, seer., vol. 3, advising the Germans that contrary to Bernstorffhe did not think Wilson would break diplomatic relations over the submarine issue.

22. Eduard Meyer repeatedly exhibited unsound judgment in politics. See his “Nordamerika und die Stellungnahme gegen Deutschland im Weltkriege,” Leipziger Illustrierte Zeitung, Feb. 18, 1915, reprinted in Meyer, Eduard, Nordamerika und Deutschland (Berlin, 1915),Google Scholar in which he bemoans the “Deutschenhass” in America (p. 9) and predicts that the political union of Germans and Irish in the U.S. will certainly defeat Wilson at the polls in 1916 (pp. 21, 45). England: Seine staatliche und politische Entwicklung und der Krieg gegen Deutschland (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1915).Google ScholarDer amerikanische Kongress und der Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1917),Google Scholar where (shortly after the rupture of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Germany in Feb. 1917) he still doubts that America will be able to make war because it will, in his opinion, find it most difficult to raise an army. Cf. Meyer to Zimmermann, Feb. 1, 1917, expressing his joy about the good news of that morning, namely the final German submarine-warfare declaration. AA, Weltkrieg 18, adh. 2, seer., vol. 3. Incidentally, Eduard Meyer, as Rector of the University of Berlin, went so far as to follow the “orders” of the short-lived antidemocratic “government” of Wolfgang Kapp in Mar. 1920. Mitteilungen aus dem Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus 30 (03. 30, 1920): 45.Google Scholar

23. Cf. Doerries, Reinhard R., “Die Mission Sir Roger Casements im deutschen Reich 1914–1916,” Historische Zeitschrift 222 (1976): 590–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24. See his The War and America (New York, 1914)Google Scholar and The Peace and America (Leipzig, 1915).Google Scholar Also Münsterberg, Margaret, Hugo Münsterberg: His Life and Work (New York, 1922).Google Scholar He worked with the German representatives in the U.S. and engaged in various pro-German activities. Concerning his correspondence with Wilson see Link, Wilson, 3:162. Lansing called him “an agent of the German Government” (ibid.). After his death in Dec. 1916, his brother Otto approached the German government for financial support for the family. AA, Vereinigte Staaten von Nordamerika 16, vol. 46.

25. Apparently out of touch with American public opinion, Dernburg claimed the sinking of the Lusitania to be justified and thus ended his fruitless career as chief of German propaganda in the U.S. In this connection see also the interesting “Notes of a meeting with the German ambassador at lunch, May 15,1915, at the Embassy,” O. G. Villard Papers, Harvard University.

26. He has published his own version in the almost unknown Aufzeichnungen (Berlin, n.d.). See also “Statement of Heinrich Albert, F., Berlin, April 1947,” National Archives, Department of Justice, Jensen Files.Google Scholar

27. In May of 1915 Bernhard Dernburg went so far as to forge plans with Francisco Villa to bring about an American military intervention in Mexico. AA, Mexiko 1, seer., vol. 1. The famed rebellious Irish labor organizer Jim Larkin, who stayed in the U.S. during World War I, was approached by Dernburg and offered employment in German sabotage projects in American harbors. Larkin, Emmet, James Larkin (London, 1965), pp. 206–7. I have been collecting material for a more extensive study of German propaganda and sabotage in the U.S. during the period of American neutrality in World War I. Although the intelligence services of the U.S. were rather underdeveloped at the outbreak of the war, they soon expanded their activities and began to observe closely numerous German representatives and agents.Google Scholar

28. One of the most telling documents of the time is a long letter from Schiff, Jacob H. to the Undersecretary of the Auswärtiges Amt, Zimmermann, Oct. 1914, in which the highly regarded German-Jewish financier writes: “… ich kann nicht umhin zu konstatieren, dass eine grosse Anzahl speziell im Land geborener Juden, deren Eltern vor vielen Jahren aus Deutschland hierherkamen, diese Sympathie für Deutschland nicht vollständig teilt, weil diese jüngere, sehr von ihrer Menschenwürde überzeugte Generation es nicht vergessen kann, dass Deutschland die Brutstätte des Antisemitismus gewesen ist, und diese unverantwortliche Bewegung sich von Deutschland aus weiter verbreitet hat…. [Es] müsste ein neuer Geist im deutschen Volk systematisch grossgezogen werden, wozu natürlicherweise die Initiative von der Regierung ausgehen muss, so dass das Unheil, welches der Antisemitismus angerichtet hat, zuerst völlig gebannt, und mit der Zeit, der Virus, der in dieser Beziehung in das Blut des deutschen Volkes übergegangen ist, völlig ausgemerzt werde.” AA, Weltkrieg 11, adh. 2, vol. 2.Google Scholar

29. For details of the campaign among American Jews see AA, Weltkrieg 11, adh. 2, vols. 1–6. See Rappaport, Joseph, “The American Yiddish Press and the European Conflict in 1914,’ Jewish Social Studies, 1957, pp. 113–28.Google Scholar Also Zechlin, Egmont, Die deutsche Politik und die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg (Gottingen, 1969).Google Scholar

30. For details see AA, Weltkrieg 11k, seer., vols. 1–13. Cuddy, Joseph Edward, Irish-America and National Isolationism, 1914–1920 (New York, 1976), is very informative, but the author has seen neither the pertinent documents in Germany nor those in Dublin.Google Scholar

31. Duff, John B., The Irish in the United States(Belmont, Calif., 1971), p. 69.Google ScholarGlazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel P., Beyond the Melting Pot, 2nd rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass, and London, 1970), p. 244.Google Scholar Woodrow Wilson himself used the term “disloyal Americans” during the campaign of 1916 when he replied to Jeremiah O'Leary's sharp attacks. For details see Link, , Wilson, 3: 104–5,Google Scholar and the virulent Irish-American leader's own account in My Political Trial and Experiences (New York, 1919).Google Scholar

32. Sir Roger Casement came to Germany in late 1914 as an emissary of the Irish revolutionaries. His mission included the following tasks: to persuade the German government to issue a declaration in favor of Irish independence; to obtain German aid for an Irish rebellion; Irish publicity in Germany; and the organization of a military unit made up of Irish prisoners of war. Publications concerning the activities of Casement are numerous. In Germany, where research on Irish history has been rather neglected in recent years, Karin Wolf has published Sir Roger Casement und die deutsch-irischen Beziehungen (Berlin, 1972). Cf. now my own assessment of the Casement affair, not in agreement with Wolf's study (above, n. 23).Google Scholar

33. For Devoy's standpoint the best published source is still O'Brien, William and Ryan, Desmond, eds., Devoy's Post Bag, 1871–1028, 2 vols. (Dublin, 1948–1953).Google Scholar A large part of his personal papers has been deposited in the National Library in Dublin. On Joseph McGarrity published sources are most scarce. See now Cronin, Sean, The McGarrity Papers (Tralee, 1972),Google Scholar and Tarpey, Marie V., “The Role of Joseph McGarrity in the Struggle for Irish Independence” (Ph.D. diss., St. John's University, 1969). Many of his personal papers also have been deposited in the National Library in Dublin.Google Scholar

34. My view is based on extensive research on the overall acculturation process of the German-American ethnic minority. It is not my intention to belittle the sufferings of countless German-Americans caused by what can only be considered national hysteria following U.S. entry into the war.

35. See especially Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty.

36. Actions included the placing of bombs on outgoing freighters, the use of funds (through “Labor's National Peace Council” and the “Liebau Bureau”) to foment strikes, the poisoning of mules destined for use on European battlefields, the planning of military measures against Canada, and the sabotage of vital production facilities and transport installations such as the huge Black Tom Terminal facilities in the harbor of New York (July 29/30, 1916) or the Kingsland Assembly Plant of the Canadian Car and Foundry Co. in Kingsland, N.J. For details on these undertakings see the Sabotage Claims series in AA and the American and German documents from the Mixed Claims Commission. Published literature includes the surprisingly reliable works by von Rintelen, F., The Dark Invader (New York, 1933)Google Scholar and The Return of the Dark Invader (New York, 1935).Google Scholarvon Papen, Franz's memoirs, Der Wahrheit eine Gasse (Munich, 1952),Google Scholar are unreliable in this respect. Helpful is Voska, Emanuel V. and Irwin, Will, Spy and Counterspy (New York, 1940).Google Scholar Also, Hall, William R. and Peaslee, Amos J., Three Wars with Germany (New York, 1944).Google Scholar

37. Bernstorff's first memoirs, Deutschland und Amerika (Berlin, 1920), are in this respect largely apologetic and shed little light on the question of his personal viewpoint while in the U.S.Google Scholar

38. Most significant are the extensive publications by Link, Arthur S.. Also Birnbaum, Karl E., Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare (Stockholm, 1958), and Doerries, Washington- Berlin 1908/1017.Google Scholar

39. Bauer, Hermann, Als Führer der U-Boote im Weltkriege (Leipzig, [1940]), pp. 139–40,143.Google Scholar Jagow to Auswärtiges Amt (copy of Bethmann Hollweg memo), Dec. 29, 1914, AA, Weltkrieg 18, seer., vol. 1.

40. Cf. von Bernstorff, Johann Heinrich Graf, Memoirs of Count Bernstorff (New York, 1936), p. 130:Google Scholar “I always held the view that after the first battle of the Marne, we were no longer in a position to obtain a military victory by force of arms, while the Supreme Army Command hoped to obtain one as late as the beginning of the year 1918.” May, Ernest R., The World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917 (Chicago, 1966), p. 116:Google Scholar “Few [in Germany] knew the extent to which operations in the west had failed. Official reports had so disguised the importance of the Marne engagements that they had passed almost unnoticed.” Gatzke, Hans W., Germany's Drive to the West (paperback ed., Baltimore, 1966), p. 8: “ … the majority of Germans were quite unaware that things had not gone according to schedule.”Google Scholar

41. The chief of staff, apparently having realized that the war could not be won on land anymore, now noted that he did not believe the U.S. would, in the face of German toughness, actively enter the European conflict, and he added his opinion that America would hardly be able to muster up enough troops in time anyway. von Falkenhayn, Erich, Die Oberste Heeresleitung 1914–1916 in ihren wichtigsten Entschliessungen (Berlin, 1920), pp. 181–82.Google Scholar Also Verfassunggebende deutsche Nationalversammlung, 15. Ausschuss, 2. Unterausschuss, Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Berichten über die öffentlichen Verhandlungen des Untersuchungsausschusses (Berlin, n.d.), pp. 143–44.Google Scholar Cf. Janssen, Karl-Heinz, Der Kanzler und der General (Göttingen, 1967), pp. 196–97.Google Scholar

42. Especially the impressive score of the submarine U-9, which sank three British battleships in Sept. 1914.

43. In the autumn of 1914 Germany had only 21 submarines of various age and range.

44. On the demonstration of the U-53 in U.S. coastal waters see Hans Rose, Auftauchenl (Essen, 1939). Spindler, Arno, Der Handelskrieg mit U-Booten (Berlin, 1934), pp. 240–41.Google Scholar

45. Examples: Sering, Triepel, von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, von Gierke, Kahl, von Harnack, von Schmoller, Schiemann to Bethmann Hollweg, Jan. 26, 1915, AA, Weltkrieg 18, seer., vol. l.“Vorstand der Konservativen Partei Pommerns” to Bethmann Hollweg, ibid., vol. 17. (The chancellor let the writers know that he could not accept the presentation.) “Zentralvorstand der Nationalliberalen Partei,” decision of May 21,1916, ibid., vol. 17. Cf.Stern, Fritz, Bethmann Hollweg und der Krieg: Die Grenzen der Verantwortung (Tübingen, 1968), p. 35:Google Scholar “Die bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit, angestachelt von namhaften Gelehrten und den meisten nichtsozialistischen Abgeordneten, zeigte sich ausgesprochen aufhahmebereit fur diese Thesen.” The press also jubilated over the sinking of passenger ships. Cf. Hamburger Nachrichten, Deutsche Tageszeitung, Frankfurter Zeitung, all of May 8 and 9, 1915.

46. For instance Meyer, E., Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, p. 268, clumsily attacks Bernstorff's supposed naiveté. Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, 3: 167: “…das von Bernstorff angestiftete Friedensmanöver …” p. 174: “Graf Bernstorff hat sich von einer Preisgabe des U-Boot-Krieges auch einen positiven Gewinn versprochen … eine grosse Aktion aller Neutralen zur Friedensvermittlung—also rum Verständigungsfrieden. Dies aber war… reine Illusion” p. 324: “Hätte Bernstorff die Lage in Amerika nicht immer zu optimistisch gesehen….” Hölzle (above, n. 12): “Noch heute meint er … dass Deutschland nach Westeuropa gehöre.… Er weiss nichts vom Reich der Mitte Europas, das gerade aus Krieg und Niedergang zu seiner naturgegebenen Aufgabe zurückkehren musste. Noch heute hofft er auf Völkerbund und Abrüstung.” See also Jahresberichte für deutsche Geschichte, 1936, p. 307: “In den politischen Anschauungen ist jedoch das Buch [Erinnerungen und Briefe (1936)], in dem sich derVerfasser in den schärfsten Gegensatz zum Dritten Reich stellt, unbedingt abzulehnen.”Google Scholar

47. Cf. Bernstorff to Charles Seymour, Nov. 13, 1928, Charles Seymour Collection, Yale University: “I have continually had to defend my action [negotiations toward mediation by Woodrow Wilson], because so many people in Germany say—and are interested in saying so—that I was misled by President Wilson and Colonel House.” Bernstorff's political activities in postwar Germany have not been the subject of any scholarly publication. For some details see his second volume of memoirs, Erinnerungen und Briefe.

48. Cf. AA, Nachlass, Brockdorff-Rantzau. Also Warburg, Max M., Aus meinen Aufzeichntmgen (private publication, 1952), p. 75.Google ScholarBonn, M. J., So macht man Geschichte (Munich, 1953), PP. 223–24.Google Scholar

49. Gerard to Bryan, Sept. 14, 1914, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement, p. 104. On the Bernstorff-Straus encounter and its consequences see Cohen, Naomi W., A Dual Heritage: The Public Career of Oscar S. Straus (Philadelphia, 1969), pp. 237–42.Google ScholarJusserand, Jean A. A. Jules, Le Sentiment Americain pendant la Guerre (Paris, 1931), pp. 27–29.Google ScholarMay, Ernest R., The World War and American Isolation (Chicago, 1966), pp. 73–74.Google ScholarGwynn, Stephen, ed., The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, 2 (London, 1929): 221–27.Google ScholarLink, , Wilson, 3: 196–206. The relevant Bernstorff-Straus correspondence is found in AA, Botschaft Washington, Friedensvorschläge.Google Scholar

50. Bernstorff, Deutschland und Amerika, p. 9.

51. Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, 3: 170: “House hat deshalb auch in den Unterredungen … gar nicht erst von Belgien gesprochen.” House in fact did speak to Bethmann Hollweg about Belgium. House to Wilson, Mar. 27, 1915, and Apr. 11,1915, in Seymour, Charles, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (London, 1926), 1: 414–15, 417–18.Google Scholar

52. The sinking of the Lusitania has continued to capture the imagination of historians and other authors. Much of the published information is unreliable and based on assumption rather than examination of the documents. Cf. my review, Historische Zeitschrift 220 (1975): 225–26,Google Scholar of Simpson, Colin, Die Lusitania (Frankfurt, 1973), originally published as The Lusitania (London, 1972).Google Scholar See now the carefully researched study of Bailey, Thomas A. and Ryan, Paul B., The Lusitania Disaster (New York, 1975).Google Scholar

53. Frankfurter Zeitung, May 9, 1915, p. 1 (my translation). Original text: “England, das Volk zur See, die Weltmacht, ist eingeholt von uns Jüngeren, und es gibt Dinge, durch die wir ihm vorausgehen.”

54. Bernstorff to Auswärtiges Amt, May 9 and 10,1915, in Bemstorff, Deutschland und Amerika, p. 143.

55. For a reliable general description of the incident see Link, Wilson, 3: 554–58. Heinrich Albert played a key role in the imperial German intelligence network in the U.S. A cultured and well-educated man with a commercial background, he was in charge of a good part of the financial management of German clandestine operations. So far his activities have not been covered adequately by historians. In July 1915 Albert's briefcase, stuffed with highly sensitive documents, fell into the hands of American agents.

56. Cf. n. 36. Rintelen was sent to the U.S. by direct order of the Imperial Naval Command (Reichsmarineamt). A cosmopolitan and daring man, he had considerable funds at his disposal.

57. Seymour, Charles, American Diplomacy during the World War, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, 1942), p. 102.Google ScholarLink, , Wilson, 4 (Princeton, 1964): 55.Google Scholar Concerning the unpleasant exchange between Bernstorff and the Auswärtiges Amt see Jagow to Bernstorff, Sept. 10, 1915, AA, Weltkrieg 18, secr., vol. 3; Bernstorff to Auswärtiges Amt, Oct. 2,1915, in Bernstorff, Deutschland und Amerika, pp. 178–80. For criticism of Bernstorff see Ritter, , Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, 3: 171.Google Scholar

58. Cf. especially correspondence between House and Bernstorff in AA, Kaiserlich Deutsche Botschaft Washington, Friedensverhandlungen; and the letters exchanged between the two men after World War I, House Collection, Yale University. See also William L. Langer's review of Bernstorff's memoirs (above, n. 13). Seymour, Charles, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (London, 1926), 2: 449–50. Bernstorff also was not sent home in spite of numerous indications that he knew of the so-called “conspiracies.”Google Scholar

59. For instance Anton Meyer-Gerhard (aide to Dernburg) to Wilhelm Solf, Oct. 5, 1914, AA, Akten des AA im Grossen Hauptquartier, 1914–1916, 24, Presse und Journalisten, vol. 3. Dr. Ecker to Albert Ballin, Dec. 18, 1914, AA, Vereinigte Staaten von Nordamerika 1, vol. 27. Heinrich Albert to Prince Heinrich von Preussen, May 7 and May 22, 1915, both submitted to Jagow with letter from Prince Heinrich to Jagow, June 24, 1915, AA, Weltkrieg 18, seer., vol. 2. (Jagow sent copies to Tirpitz.) Stellvertr. Generalkommando, VII. Armeekorps, to AA, Münster, Apr. 15, 1915, forwarding anonymous letter from the U.S., AA, Vereinigte Staaten von Nordamerika 2, vol. 24. Oskar Mezger (consul in Cincinnati) to Undersecretary of AA (also seen by Otto Hammann), Oct. 25, 1915, AA, Presse Abteilung, Die Presse der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, vol. 3. A smear campaign in 1916 directed against Bernstorff and other German officials in the U.S. also achieved a considerable amount of publicity in Germany. Cf. document of 28 pp. in AA, Vereinigte Staaten von Nordamerika 16, vol. 46. Also Boy-Ed, Karl, Verschwörer? (Berlin, 1920), pp. 120–24.Google Scholar

60. Quoted from Ritter, , Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, 3: 184 (my translation). Original text: “Das Ganze lief also praktisch auf eine Unterwerfung Deutschlands unter dem Willen seiner Gegner mit amerikanischer Hilfe hinaus.” Cf. my treatment of this matter in Washington-Berlin 1908/1917, pp. 156–59.Google Scholar

61. Seymour, , ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 2: 140–43, 145–47.Google Scholar

62. Jagow to Bernstorff, June 7, 1916, AA, Weltkrieg 18, secr., vol. 17. Bernstorff to Bethmann Hollweg, July 13, 1916, in Scherer, AndrÉ and Grunewald, Jacques, eds., L'Allemagne et les Problèmes de la Paix Pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale (Paris, 1962), 1: 405–7.Google Scholar

63. Ibid.

64. Doerries, , Washington-Berlin 1908/1917, pp. 227–33.Google Scholar Cf. Blum's, John M. appraisal of the German motivations in Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality (Boston, 1956), p. 126.Google Scholar

65. Zimmermann to Bernstorff, Dec. 26, 1916,Google Scholar in Scherer, and Grunewald, , eds., L'Allemagne et les Problèmes, 1: 640–41 (my translation). Original text: “Die Grundlagen für künftigen Friedensschluss müssen wir durch direktes Benehmen mit unseren Gegnern schaffen, wollen wir nicht Gefahr laufen, durch Druck der Neutralen urn gewünschten Gewinn gebracht zu werden. Wir lehnen daher auch Konferenzgedanken ab.”Google Scholar

66. Cf. the more elaborately presented findings of Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare, pp. 298–99.

67. Concerning the German refusal to announce the war aims cf. Fischer, Fritz, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf, 1961), pp. 382–84;Google Scholar Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare, pp. 261–63. See also the discussion of war aims in Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West, pp. 162–65.

68. For the minutes of this meeting see Verfassunggebende deutsche Nationalversammlung (above, n. 41), pp. 334–37. The quotation from Bethmann Hollweg comes fromthe minutes of the meeting of the Crown Council on the next day, Jan. 9. Ibid., pp. 337–38 (my translation). Original text: “Ja, wenn der Erfolg winkt, müssen wir auch handeln.” Fritz Stern, “Das Rätsel Bethmann Hollweg: Die Kunst das Böse zu tun,” Die Zeit, Dec. 29, 1967, p. 26 (my translation). Original text: “ … vermutlich doch den übertriebenen Glauben seiner Landsleute an die Autorität der Uniform teilte.” Stern, Bethmann Hollweg und der Krieg: Die Grenzen der Verantwortung, p. 37: “Am 9. Januar 1917 kapitulierte er [Bethmann Hollweg] vor den Militärs.”

69. About Wiseman see Fowler, W. B., British-American Relations 1917–1918 (Princeton, 1969),Google Scholar and Willert, Arthur, The Road to Safety (London, 1952).Google Scholar

70. A general account of the so-called Zimmermann Telegram is Tuchman, Barbara W., The Zimmermann Telegram (New York, 1958). Admiral Hall's own story is found in Hall and Peaslee, Three Wars with Germany. Hall's greatest coup was the capture of Rintelen, with whom he established a friendship in the years after the war.Google Scholar

71. Wilson to House, Jan. 24, 1917, House Collection, Yale University. I wish to express my appreciation to the officials of the Yale Library, especially Miss Judith A. Schiff, for their assistance in my research and for permission to quote from material in the House Collection.

72. Bemstorff to Auswärtiges Amt, Jan. 27, 1917, in Scherer, and Grunewald, , eds., L'Alkmagne et les Problèmes, 1: 684–85 (my translation). Original text: “Wilson anbietet zunächst vertrauliche Friedensvermittlung auf Grund seiner Senatsbotschaft, d.h. ohne Einmischung in territoriale Friedensbedingungen. Als nicht vertraulich betrachte Wilson sein gleichzeitig an uns gerichtetes Ersuchen um Mitteilung unserer Friedensbedingungen…. Wilson hoffe, dass wir ihm Friedensbedingungen mitteilen würden, welche hier und in Deutschland veröffentlicht werden dürften…. Wenn jetzt ohne weiteres U-Bootkrieg begonnen wird, wird Präsident dies als Schlag ins Gesicht betrachten, und Krieg mit den Vereinigten Staaten ist unvermeidlich.”Google Scholar

73. Neue Preussische Zeitung, Feb. 5, 1917, p. 1 (my translation). Original text: “Der Endsieg kann uns nicht mehr entrissen werden. Dafür bürgen uns unsere bisherigen Erfolge, bürgt uns der Siegeswille von Volk und Heer und bürgen uns nicht zuletzt die Namen unserer Führer, deren überragenden Fähigkeiten unsere Gegner Gleichwertiges nicht entgegenzusetzen haben.”

74. Handwritten comment of the Kaiser on: Holtzendorff to William II, Mar. 18, 1917, AA, Vereinigte Staaten von Nordamerika 16, vol. 50 (my translation). Original text: “Es ist jetzt ein für alle Mai Schluss mit Verhandlungen mit Amerika! Will Wilson Krieg, so soil er ihn herbeiführen und ihn dann haben.”

75. For some considerations of Wilson's social and economic viewpoints see Link, Arthur S., Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, Franckel, Ernst, and Nicholas, H. G., Wilson's Diplomacy: An International Symposium (Cambridge, Mass., 1973). Of special significance are the lucid remarks by A. S. Link in bis “Rejoinder” (pp. 115–20).Google Scholar

76. Even if it is assumed that the Germans earlier in the war might have had a chance to sow disunity among the Entente, this hope, as the documents indicate, became increasingly unrealistic toward the end of 1916. Instead of then exploring all means of mediation through President Wilson, the curious idea that Wilson might submit to unrestricted German submarine warfare in order to continue his dabbling in mediation efforts appears to have gained supporters in Germany.