This paper reports the making and testing of an attitude scale to be used in measuring toryism-conservatism in both English Canada and the United States (and any other English-speaking country). The fact that the scale is to be used on both sides of the border affects the kinds of items included in the scale, but more of that later.

The inspiration for creating the toryism-conservatism scale came from Gad Horowitz's contention that the political cultures of both the United States and English-speaking Canada are Lockean liberal in content, but the English-Canadian political culture is different from the American because it has a “tory streak” which came in with the United Empire Loyalists, the expelled American “tories,” and was reinforced by later immigrations from the United Kingdom.

Dans toutes les sociétés où elles existent, les organisations partisanes ont ceci de particulier: certains de leurs membres occupent ou visent à occuper des postes d'autorité dans l'appareil gouvernemental, leur sort étant lié de quelque façon au travail fait par d'autres membres (ou par les mêmes membres) dans les publics qui sont à la base de la société. Dans cette perspective les organisations partisanes éclatent en quelque sorte vers le haut (dans l'appareil gouvernemental) et vers le bas (dans les publics), mais non sans que des militants travaillent plus spécialement à maintenir l'organisation, c'est-à-dire le pont jeté entre les gouvernants (ou les aspirants gouvernants) et ceux qu'on peut nommer, faute d'un meilleur terme, les publicitaires, qui mettent les partis en relation avec les publics. Evidemment, ce sont là des rôles qui peuvent être remplis par un même acteur. Par exemple, un député qui est aussi ministre joue un rôle de gouvernant dans l'appareil gouvernemental, ce qui ne l'empêche pas d'agir comme militant dans l'organisation interne, et d'exercer un rôle de publicitaire quand il cherche à se faire réélire auprès des électeurs.

The systematic investigation of party-projected images is a relatively recent development in political science. Past studies into this subject have largely dealt with the perceptions of political parties held by various groups, and the perceived mobility of the parties over time with regard to selected dimensions. For the determination of party images held by individuals, most previous works in the field have made use of the semantic differential technique pioneered by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum. This approach consists of respondents being asked to rank political parties along a number of seven-point scales, each demarcated by a pair of antonyms such as “good-bad” or “slow-fast.” Tests confirming the reliability, validity and comparability of the measure have also been conducted by Osgood et al., as found in The Measurement of Meaning.

In an interesting and insightful article published in 1969, James Lightbody has attempted an improvement of the theoretical basis for the study of nationalism among political scientists. He suggests that the historical perspective which has characterized most previous treatments of the subject should be abandoned, and that its replacement should be a model which perceives nationalism as the result of ethnic group demands upon a functioning political system. Lightbody argues that the adoption of this sort of model would permit political scientists to determine the characteristics which distinguish “nationalist” movements from similarly configured “non-nationalist” groups. Further-more one could look beyond the “collective enumeration of the various demands that have been made by various nation-seeking groups and their self-appointed spokesmen” which serve as the focus of concern for those who see nationalism as ideology. One could examine ethnic group demands without rejecting them a priori as unnaturally disruptive, and one could make comparisons between majority and minority expressions of nationalist views. The model is an “ideal-type” model, bordering on formalism, since it abstracts the demands of ethnic groups from other similar group demands made on the political system, but it has been constructed with a view to the selection of data which could provide empirical tests of its usefulness.

Introduction

At present, little is known about the role socialization of Canadian legislators, that is, the processes by which incumbents of legislative positions acquire “a set of values, skills, loyalties and cognitive maps.” Defined in this way, legislative role socialization involves not only the acquisition of role orientations in the narrow sense of “a pattern of norms making up a particular role,” but also the development of the total set of cognitions and evaluations which, in their entirety, constitute a legislator's image of his job. To the extent that existing research is relevant for understanding the development of these job images, the normal procedure has been simply to examine relationships between narrowly defined role orientation variables (for example, representational role style or focus) and a set of socio-demographic and political characteristics the potential theoretical significance of which is often left unarticulated. Not surprisingly, these inquiries have shed little light on the role socialization of Canadian legislators.

The bureaucratization of the political process that characterizes twentieth century politics in many countries has not bypassed Canada—as evidenced by skyrocketing rates of government employment and expenditure and, even more dramatically, by the ever-expanding policy-making power of Canadian bureaucracy. One observer sees the civil service as occupying an increasingly strategic role in Canadian politics, a condition that

reflects in part the expanding role of modern government into highly technical areas, which tends to augment the discretion of permanent officials because legislators are obliged to delegate to them the administration of complex affairs, including the responsibility for drafting and adjudicating great amounts of sub-legislation required to “fill in the details” of the necessarily broad, organic statutes passed by Parliament. Some indication of the scale of such discretion is found in the fact that, during the period 1963–8, an annual average of 4,130 Orders-in-Council were passed in Ottawa, a substantial proportion of which provided for delegating authority to prescribe rules and regulations to ministers and their permanent advisers. By contrast, the number of laws passed annually by Canadian federal parliaments is rarely over one hundred.

Does the single-member plurality electoral system encourage a party to make sectional appeals? As put, such a question would daunt the most energetic historian of party strategy. But we can address a closely related question: does the single-member plurality system actually reward parties whose support is geographically concentrated and punish parties whose support is dispersed?

Le but de cette étude est d'analyser et de décrire statistiquement la violence collective en Ontario et au Québec entre 1963 et 1973. Il y a un cas de violence collective dans la perspective de cette recherche, chaque fois qu'au moins cinquante individus (« insurgés » aussi bien que membres des forces de l'ordre) infligent des dégâts à des personnes ou à la propriété. Nous avons exclu les dommages rattachés aux jeux comme le rugby, le hockey et les courses de voiture (où des règles déterminent les modalités et l'intensité de la violence) de même que les dégâts psychiques. Notre étude se limite donc à la violence collective dite « ouverte », ce qui par conséquent élimine de notre recherche les cas de terrorisme.