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State Enterprise and Partisanship in Provincial Politics*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Marsha A. Chandler
Marsha A. Chandler
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , December 1982 , pp. 711 - 740
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Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1982

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References

1 See, for example, Tupper, Allan ”The Nation's Businesses” (unpublished doctoral thesis, Queen's University, 1977);Google Scholar.Musolf, Lloyd D.Public Ownership and Accountability (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1959);CrossRefGoogle ScholarDon Gracey, , “Public Enterprise in Canada, ” in André Gélinas (ed.), Public Enterprise and the Public Interest (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration in Canada, 1978), 25–47;Google Scholar and Beatty, Gary “Bridling the Beasts, ” Policy Options 2 (1981), 35–38Google Scholar. Corbett, David C.Politics and the Airlines (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), focusses on pragmatic explanations but argues that ideology may at times be a factor.Google Scholar

2 The environmental conditions take many forms, for example the “hard frontier” which acted as a barrier to economic development and required collective action beyond the scope of any individual. See Clarke, S. D.The Developing Canadian Community (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For more on environmental factors see Aitken, H. G. J. “Defensive Expansion: The State and Economic Growth in Canada, ”.Google Scholar in Easterbrook, W. T. and Watkins, M. H. (eds.), Approaches to Canadian Economic History (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1967), 183–221 A related argument is that the distinctive Canadian political culture, which acts as a common screen for perceiving environmental conditions, has generated a willingness among political and business elites to use the power of the state for purposes of economic growth.Google Scholar See Hardin, HerschelA Nation Unaware (Vancouver: J. J. Douglas, Ltd., 1974) Also, see a discussion of the cultural thesis in.Google ScholarNelles, H. V.The Politics of Development (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), 40–44. Yet another variant of the environmental argument is that the widely differing western provincial governments have all increased their use of public ownership in common response to the problems of regional dependency and hinterland status.Google Scholar See Berkowitz, S. D. “Forms of State Economy and the Development of Western Canada, ” Canadian Journal of Sociology4 (1979), 287–312.Google Scholar

3 Kirschen, O. et al., Economic Policy in our Time (New York: North Holland Publishing, 1964);Google ScholarSeymour Edwin Harris, The Economics of the Political Parties (New York: Macmillan, 1962).Google Scholar and Tufte, Edward R.Political Control of the Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).Google Scholar

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5 It is worth noting that many policy instruments can and have been used to intervene in the economy. The choice of public ownership as opposed to other instruments is not at issue here. Rather we are concerned with the question of whether the crown corporations that have been created can be associated with governments of a particular ideology.

6 State or public enterprise is a generic term that refers to a broad spectrum of organizations including departments, quasi-independent boards and agencies as well as crown corporations. It may refer to administrative or departmental activity as well as commercial and quasi-commercial activity.

7 A number of valuable studies have had as one of their primary objectives the specification of the characteristics of government enterprise. See for example,Hodgetts, J. E. “Canada, ” in Friedmann, W. G. (ed.), The Public Corporation (Toronto:Carswell 1954), 51–92;Google ScholarAshley, C. A. and Smails, R. G.Canadian Crown Corporations (Toronto:Macmillan 1965);Google ScholarLangford, John “The Identification and Classification of Federal Public Corporations: A Preface to Regime Building, ” Canadian Public Administration 23 (1980), 76–104;Google ScholarSexty, RobertCanadian Government Business Corporations: Definition and Characterization, [Memorial University] Working Paper No. 78-7 (mimeo., 1978);Google ScholarHodgetts, J. E. “The Public Corporation in Canada”Google Scholar in Friedmann, W. G. and Gamer, J. F. (eds.), Government Enterprise: A Comparative Study (New York:Columbia University Press, 1970)Google Scholar and Report of the Royal Commission on Government Accountability (Lambert Report) (Ottawa, 1979), Part IV.Google Scholar

8 Vining, Aiden and Botterell, J. “An Overview of the Origins, Growth, Size and Functions of Crown Corporations,”Google Scholar in Prichard, J. R. S. et al., Crown Corporations: The Calculus of Instrument Choice (Toronto:Butterworths, forthcoming 1982)Google Scholar. The general methodology for compiling the inventory can be found in Appendix 8. In some cases in which several crown corporations were later consolidated into a single entity, such as Saskatchewan Wool Products (1945) and Saskatchewan Leather Products (1945) becoming part of Saskatchewan Industries (1949), the original corporations are included in the data here because although it may inflate the overall number, each represents an instance of decision-making. Vining and Botterell used only the consolidated units. Excluded from their categorization of state enterprises are entities which have primarily judicial, quasi-judicial, regulatory or self-regulatory functions. Thus Workers' Compensation Boards and provincial marketing boards have been omitted.

9 See Heidenheimer, Arnold J. et al., Comparative Public Policy (New York:Norton, 1977)Google Scholar, and Ashford, Douglas E. (ed.), Comparing Public Policies (Beverly Hills:Sage Publications, 1978).Google Scholar

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11 See, for example, Kirschen, et al., Economic Policies in our Time, chap. 8.Google Scholar

12 Hon. Blakeney, A. E.Budget Speech, March 10, 1972.Google Scholar

13 See, for example, Sartori, GiovanniParties and Party Systems, Vol. 1 (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1976);Google Scholar and Barry, Brian, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London:Collier-Macmillan, 1970).Google Scholar

14 Sartori, Parties and Party System, 335–36.Google Scholar

15 See Converse, Philip E. “The Problem of Party Distances in Models of Voting Change, ”Google ScholarJennings, M. Kent and Zeigler, L. Harmon (eds.), The Electoral Process (Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 175–207.Google Scholar

16 See Ogmundson, Rick “On the Measurement of Party Class Positions: The Case of Canadian Federal Political Parties, ” in Orest Kruhlak, et al., The Canadian Political Process (3rd ed.; Toronto:Holt Rinehart Winston, 1979), 192–203Google Scholar, and Engelmann, Frederick C. and Schwartz, Mildred A.Canadian Political Parties: Origin, Character, Impact (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1975).Google Scholar

17 See, for example, Laponce, Jean“Note on the Use of the Left-Right Dimension,” Comparative Political Studies 2 (1970), 481–502;CrossRefGoogle ScholarKornberg, Allan et al., “Elite and Mass Perceptions of Canadian Party Location on Issue Space; Some Tests of Two Theories, ” (paper presented at the International Political Science Association meetings, 1973);Google Scholar and Elkins, David J.“The Perceived Structure of the Canadian Party Systems,” this JOURNAL 7 (1974), 502–24.Google Scholar

18 See McLeod, John T. “Explanations of our Party System,”Google Scholar and Fox, Paul W. “Politics and Parties in Canada,” in Fox, (ed.) Politics: Canada (4th ed.; Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977) 246–57;Google ScholarChristian, William and Campbell, ColinPolitical Parties and Ideologies in Canada (Toronto:McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1973).Google Scholar

19 On the impact of the CCF-NDP as an opposition force see Chandler, William, “Canadian Socialism and Policy Impact: Contagion from the Left?” this JOURNAL 10 (1977), 755–80.Google Scholar

20 See MeRoberts, Kenneth and Posgate, DaleQuebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (rev. ed.; Toronto:McClelland and Stewart, 1980)Google Scholar, Niosi, Jorge“The New French-Canadian Bourgeoisie,” Studies in Political Economy 1 (1979), 113–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Foumier, Pierre “Les nouveaux paramètres de la bourgeoisie québé coise, ” in Pierre Fournier (ed.), Le Capitalisme an Québec (Montréal:Albert St.-Martin, 1978), 135–82.Google Scholar

21 For a comparison of the two parties see Ivan Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada (Toronto:McClelland and Stewart, 1978), 210–15.Google ScholarFor an analysis of the programme of the PQ see Vera Murray, Le Parti Québécois, De la Foundation a la Prise du Pouvoir (Montréal:Hurtubise HMH, 1976), chaps. 2 and 3.Google Scholar

22 Otherparties, such as the United Farmers of Alberta, United Farmers of Ontario and Progressives have contested and won provincial elections. Also, in Manitoba and BC, governments have been formed by coalitions rather than a single party. Because none of these “other” parties or coalitions had created any crown corporations, we have not included them in the analysis.

23 Although the early populistic protest parties in the west were supportive of an altered economic order, they were committed to private property.

24 See Heclo, HughModern Social Policies in Britain and Sweden (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1974). 270–76Google Scholar, and Lipset, S. M.Agrarian Socialism (New York:Doubleday, 1965).Google Scholar

25 For a summary of the American material see Dye, Thomas R.Politics, Economics and the Public (Chicago:Rand McNally, 1966).Google Scholar For the Canadian findings see Falcone, D. J. and Whittington, M. S. “Output Change in Canada: A Preliminary Attempt to Open the ‘Black Box, ’ ” paper presented to Canadian Political Science Association, June, 1972.Google Scholar See also Bird, RichardThe Growth of Government Spending in Canada (Toronto:Canadian Tax Foundation, 1970).Google Scholar

26 See, for example, Rakoff, S. R. and Schaefer, G.“Politics, Policy and Political Science; Theoretical Alternatives, ” Politics and Society 1 (1970), 51–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Munns, Joyce“The Environment, Politics and Policy Literature: A Critique and Reformulation, ” Western Political Quarterly 28 (1975), 646–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 See Hibbs, “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy, ” Tufte, Political Control of the Economy, Cameron, “Expansion of the Public Economy, ” Christopher Hewitt, “The Effect of Political Democracy and Social Development in Equality in Industrial Societies, ” American Sociological Review 42 (1977), 450–63Google Scholar, and Poel, Dale“Diffusion of Policy Innovations Among Provinces,” this JOURNAL 9 (1976), 605–26.Google Scholar

28 On various aspects of provincial party systems see Robin, Martin (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics (2nd ed.; Toronto:Prentice-Hall, 1976)Google Scholar, Chandler, Marsha and Chandler, WilliamPublic Policy and Provincial Politics (Toronto:McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), chap. 3Google Scholar, Elkins, David J. and Simeon, RichardSmall Worlds (Toronto:Methuen, 1980)Google Scholar, and Bellamy, David et al. (eds.), Provincial Political Systems (Toronto:Methuen, 1976).Google Scholar

29 For a description of the public enterprises established by the CCF governments see Government Finance Office, Public Enterprise in Saskatchewan, paper for Institute of Public Administration Seminar, June, 1977.

30 Inferring relationship from the record of the party rather than individual governments is an example of ecological fallacy.

31 Constitutionally there is only one government or ministry from the time a party is first elected and the cabinet sworn in until the first minister changes. However, the term government as it is commonly employed and as it is used here refers to legislative periods or parliaments rather than to ministries. For example, constitutionally there was only one CCF government from 1944 until 1961 when T. C. Douglas was succeeded by Woodrow Lloyd as premier of Saskatchewan. However, based on the elections of 1944, 1948, 1952, 1956 and 1960 there were five legislatures in which the CCF was the governing party. Each of these five constitutes a case or government in our tabulations. Since 1920 there have been 119 provincial legislatures in total. In the tables and text these 119 are referred to as governments.

32 For a discussion of the effects of longevity in office at the federal level see Meisel, John “Howe, Hubris and '72: An Essay on Political Elitism, ” in Working Papers on Canadian Politics (Montreal:McGill-Queens, 1973).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33 For excellent discussions of Saskatchewan under CCF governance see Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, and Richards, J. and Pratt, L.Prairie Capitalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979).Google Scholar

34 Two of the fourteen can be traced back to before the CCF took office: Saskatchewan Government Telephones (1947) had been operated as a government department since 1908 and Saskatchewan Power Corporation (1949) had been organized as an independent commission in 1929. These and other organizational changes are carefully charted in Crown Investments Corporation, Public Enterprise in Saskatchewan (Regina, 1979), 3-9.

35 Trebilcock, Prichard “The Choice of Governing Instrument, ” in Prichard, et al., Crown Corporations: The Calculus of Instrument Choice.Google Scholar See also Shepherd, W. G. S. (ed.), Public Enterprise: Economic Analysis of Theory and Practice (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1976).Google Scholar

36 Tupper, The Nation's Businesses, chap. 1.Google Scholar See also Gordon, MarshaGovernment in Business (Montreal:C. D. Howe Institute, 1981).Google Scholar

37 Tufte Political Control of the Economy, and Cameron, “The Expansion of the Public Economy.” See also Simeon, Richard“Studying Public Policy,” this JOURNAL 9 (1976), 548–80.Google Scholar

38 On this question of conceiving theoretically appropriate linkages between political forces and public policies, see Jennings, “Competition, Constituencies, and Welfare Policy. ”

39 See Faucher, Philippe “L'entreprise publique comme instrument de politique économique, ” Departement de science politique, Universite de Montreal, 1981, and Pierre Fournier, The Quebec Establishment (Montreal:Black Rose Books, 1976).Google Scholar

40 Whitaker, Reginald “Images of the State in Canada, ” in Leo Panitch (ed.), The Canadian Stale (Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1978), 28–70.Google Scholar In the same vein see Lloyd, Trevor “State Capitalism and Socialism, ” in Laurier LaPierre (ed.), Essays on the Left (Toronto:McClelland and Stewart, 1971).Google Scholar See also Bliss, Michael “Rich by Nature, Poor by Policy: The State and Economic Life in Canada, ”Google Scholar in Carty, R. Kenneth and Ward, W. Peter (eds.), Entering the Eighties: Canada in Crisis (New York:Oxford University Press, 1980), 78–90.Google Scholar

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44 This is demonstrated in the conflict that arose around Manitoba's Hydro Corporation. See Nelles, H. V.“Public Ownership of Electrical Utilities in Manitoba and Ontario, 1906-1930, ” Canadian Historical Review 57 (1976), 461–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

45 Richards, and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism, 237.Google Scholar

46 Pierre Fournier, Les Sociétés d'Etat et les objectifs économiques du Québec: une évaluation préliminaire (La Documentation Québécoise, 1977).

47 Tupper, The Nation's Businesses, 99–113Google Scholar, and Richards, and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism, chap. 9.Google Scholar

48 Established in 1954, the Alberta Gas Trunk Line was owned in part by the Province of Alberta. Most important, ownership and membership on the Board of Directors was so constituted as to prevent extra-provincial interests from gaining control.

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51 The fact that left governments have also employed facilitative corporations is in keeping with the general character of the left in Canada. Parties of the left have been distinctive but not doctrinaire. As moderate social democratic parties (and governments) they have not stood in general opposition to the private sector.

52 See Holland, Stuart (ed.), The State as Entrepreneur (London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972);Google ScholarBennett, D. and Sharp, K.“The State as Banker and Entrepreneur: The Last Resort Character of the Mexican State's Economic Intervention, 1917-1976,” Comparative Politics 12 (1980), 165–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Vernon, Raymond (ed.), Big Business and the State (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1974).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53 As one of the reviewers of this article pointed out, the provincial government may view the redistributive corporation as an instrument for deconcentrating power, but to others it may appear to be just the reverse.

54 Payne, Raymond “Corporate Power, Interest Group Activity and Mining Policy in B.C., 1972-77, ” paper presented at Canadian Political Science Association annual meeting, 1980. See also Government of Manitoba, Guidelines for the Seventies, Vol. 1, Introduction and Economic Analysis (Winnipeg, 1973).Google Scholar

55 “Report on the Nation: Quebec, ” The Financial Post, September 19, 1981, S26.

56 Prairie Capitalism, chaps. 9 and 10.

57 See Stevenson, Garth“Political Constraints and the Province-Building Objective, ” Canadian Public Policy 6 (1980), 265–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

58 Cameron, “The Expansion of the Public Economy. ”

59 Gerschenkron, AlexanderEconomic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1966).Google Scholar