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Revisiting Risk and Rationality: a reply to Pettigrew and Briggs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Lara Buchak
Lara Buchak*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

I have claimed that risk-weighted expected utility (REU) maximizers are rational, and that their preferences cannot be captured by expected utility (EU) theory. Richard Pettigrew and Rachael Briggs have recently challenged these claims. Both authors argue that only EU-maximizers are rational. In addition, Pettigrew argues that the preferences of REU-maximizers can indeed be captured by EU theory, and Briggs argues that REU-maximizers lose a valuable tool for simplifying their decision problems. I hold that their arguments do not succeed and that my original claims still stand. However, their arguments do highlight some costs of REU theory.

Keywords

Risk-weighted expected utilityexpected utilitydecision theorysure-thing principleriskaccuracyAllais paradox
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 5-6: Special Issue: Belief, Action, and Rationality over Time , December 2015 , pp. 841 - 862
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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