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Hylemorphism, remnant persons and personhood

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Patrick Toner
Patrick Toner*
Affiliation:
Wake Forest University
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Animalism is the doctrine that we human beings are – are identical with – animals. Hylemorphism is a form of animalism. In this paper, I defend hylemorphism by showing that while other forms of animalism fall prey to the problem of ‘Remnant Persons, ’ hylemorphism does not. But hylemorphism’s account of personhood seems to have some very implausible implications. I address one of those implications, and argue that it isn’t nearly as objectionable as it might at first appear.

Keywords

Aquinaspersonhoodanimalismhylemorphismpersonal identity
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 1 , February 2014 , pp. 76 - 96
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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