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Andrew Ortony ed., Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979)

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Andrew Ortony ed., Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Philip P. Hanson
Philip P. Hanson*
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University
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Abstract

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Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 14 , Issue 3 , September 1984 , pp. 477 - 497
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1984

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References

1 M. Black, Metaphor: in Black, M. Models and Metaphors (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Here and elsewhere I will use Black's terminology of primary and secondary subjects, rather than introduce related terminology like ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ or ‘focus’ and ‘frame,’ etc. A feature of Black's as opposed to the other terminology is, however, that it is in the material rather than the formal mode. This must be taken into account.

3 Cf. my ‘Explaining Metaphorical Interpretations,’ Poetics. 9 (1980) 441-56.

4 Bergmann, M.. ‘Metaphorical Assertions,’ Philosophical Review, 91 (1982) 229-45CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Beardsley, M. ‘Metaphorical Senses,’ Nous, 12 (1978) 3–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 P. 69. Interestingly, Cohen also argues (67) that we do not have a ‘Gricean option’ of cancelling an ‘implicatured’ feature, because if + INTENTIONAL is merely implicatured in (5), then what is the force of ‘because'?

7 P. 75. Some critics of Cohen find this generous construal of semantic features question begging; e.g., Beardsley and Bergmann.

8 Ortony, A. ‘Why Metaphors are Necessary and Not Just Nice,’ Educational Theory, 25 (1975) 45–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 It would be interesting to compare and contrast Paivio's dual-coding concept with Miller's notion of a textual concept. At least this much seems probable: Miller's theory of metaphor comprehension stands up to Ortony's theory of metaphor function as well as Paivio's.

10 It is surprising that, apart from Ortony's brief conjectures and a few scattered sentences, this is the only attempt in this large volume on metaphors to explain the distinction.