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Prospects for Peircean Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Andrew Howat
Andrew Howat*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, California State University, 800 N State College Blvd, Fullerton, CA92831, USA
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Peircean Truth (PT) is the view that truth is in some sense epistemically constrained, constrained that is by what we would, if we inquired long enough and well enough, eventually come to believe. Contemporary Peirceans offer various different formulations of the view, which can make it difficult, particularly for critics, to see exactly how PT differs from popular alternatives such as correspondence theories or deflationism. This article, therefore, considers four possible formulations of PT, and sets out the different objections and challenges they each face and their relationships with one another. I focus upon the question of what, if anything, PT has to say about the property of truth.

Keywords

truthPeircepropertiesanti-realismpragmatism
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 3-4 , August 2014 , pp. 365 - 387
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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