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“I Do What Happens”: The Productive Character of Practical Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Rory O’Connell Open the ORCID record for Rory O’Connell [Opens in a new window]
Rory O’Connell*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
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Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Elizabeth Anscombe introduced the notion of “practical knowledge” into contemporary philosophy. Philosophers of action have criticized Anscombe’s negative characterization of such knowledge as “non-observational,” but have recently come to pay more attention to her positive characterization of practical knowledge as “the cause of what it understands.” I argue that two recent Anscombean accounts of practical knowledge, “Formalism” and “Normativism,” each fail to explain the productive character of practical knowledge in a way that secures its status as non-observational. I argue that to do this, we must appreciate the role of know-how or skill in practical knowledge.

Keywords

Philosophy of actionpractical knowledgepractical reasoningElizabeth Anscombeknow-howskill
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 5 , July 2020 , pp. 670 - 686
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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