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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Carl Hempel has proposed the following model for explanations by reasons.
(R) (i) A was in a situation of type C.
(ii) A was a rational agent at the time.
(iii) In a situation of type C, any rational agent will do X.
(iv) Therefore, A did X.
According to Hempel (R) overcomes the shortcomings of alternative accounts of explaining by reasons such as William Dray's model, in that the so-called evaluative principle is replaced by an empirical law. It is William Dray's contention that to understand the action of a rational agent is to see that his action was appropriate in his situation. Following Dray this then means that in explaining such an action one makes use of a normative ‘principle of action', not an empirical law, which has the form ‘when in a situation of type C1… Cn the thing to do is X'.