I have been invited to present to you my thesis regarding Puritanism and Democracy in seventeenth-century England. The thesis in question is simple and obvious, though some of its ramifications are (I hope) neither simple nor altogether obvious. The period of the Puritan revolution was one in which religion and even theology dominated the common modes of thought and expression. Lord Acton, who (unlike some historians) was sufficiently unenlightened to know theology when he saw it, described the period as “the middle ages of Protestantism”. It follows that the concepts whether of liberty or of authority which the Puritans developed, can be fully understood only if they are studied in their proper setting, and their native terminology. Dogma formed that terminology and the Puritan church organization constituted the setting. Without denying the validity of other approaches (the constitutional approach for example, in which the liberals have long had their own way, or the economic, in which the Marxists are, I understand, taking theirs)—without denying the usefulness of these approaches, I suggest the value to the student who would know what really happened, of a third, namely the religious approach. For the Puritan concept of democracy, if it did not spring from Puritan religion, at least sprang up in closest contact with it. Puritan religion constituted the climate of opinion in which the concept was born and nourished. The religious approach has one advantage (shared in measure with the constitutional): it can stay within the period under discussion, and it can afford to rest its case on the actual words used. It does not require a transposition of terms, whereby theology is shown to be a roundabout way of saying economics, and St. Mark's gospel gets spelled with an x. Nor does it ask us to make any large assumptions—to believe that Calvin built better than he knew: he intended a church and it turned out to be a bank! One will no doubt be told that some of the theological argument with which the pamphlets in the Thomason Collection are filled, and most of the reasons urged in the Councils of the Army at Putney and Whitehall, are what are now called “rationalizations”, and that we gain nothing by refusing to recognize this fact. So be it. But if these are rationalizations they involve the terms in which the Puritan viewed his world and they rest upon the convictions with which he was prepared to face not only his fellows, but his Maker. We shall gain nothing by brushing those terms and those convictions aside, though to comprehend them requires patient study and a modicum of historical sympathy. “Nothing”, says Lord David Cecil, “is more baffling to the imagination than the religion of another age.”

In recent years, an attempt has been made by the present author to measure the probable slope of the marginal productivity functions of labour and capital in various economies. This has been done by computing indexes of capital (C), labour (L), and product (P) for manufacturing in the United States for the years 1899-1922, Massachusetts 1890-1926, New South Wales 1901-1927, and Victoria 1907-1929. The formula used is that P' (representing an index of computed product) = b LkC(1−k). By making the sum of exponents equal to unity, we assumed for purposes of simplicity that production could be described by a homogeneous function of the first degree and that equal proportionate increases in the quantities of labour and capital would cause the same proportionate increase in product. The exponents of L and C were found by the method of least squares, so that the sum of the squares of the deviation of P′ from P would be reduced to a minimum, and the sum of the arithmetic deviations to zero. The exponents for labour and capital in manufacturing which were found by this method were as follows:

It will be noticed that there is a substantial degree of similarity between the exponents found for these economies.

A mathematical analysis of the above function discloses: (1) that the share of the net product to be received by a factor should, according to marginal productivity theory, be equal to its exponent; (2) that the elasticity of the marginal productivity curve of, and hence, under competitive conditions, the demand curve for, a factor is the reciprocal of the sum of the exponents of other factors. This would mean a “normal” elasticity of demand for labour of between −2.86 and −4.0, and for capital of between −1.33 and −1.54.

The opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, dealing with the cornpetence of the Dominion Parliament to implement international labour conventions, has received widespread comment not only in Canada and in England but particularly in Australia and even in the United States. The Commonwealth of Australia, like Canada, suffers certain disabilities peculiar to federations, because there, too, the power to legislate on conditions of labour rests in general with the Legislatures of the several states and not with the central Parliament. It is interesting, therefore, to compare Canadian and Australian procedures with respect to international labour conventions.

The Commonwealth constitution contains no exact parallel either to section 132 of the British North America Act, giving to the Dominion express power to perform obligations of Canada arising under treaties made between the British Empire and foreign countries, or to the residuary powers of the Dominion under section 91. The Commonwealth Parliament is endowed with the power of legislation only upon certain enumerated subject-matters, the residuary powers remaining with the states. Somewhat comparable to section 132, however, is the provision in section 51 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act that the Parliament of the Commonwealth shall have power “to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to … (xxix) External Affairs”. In regard to the meaning of this provision a Commonwealth communication of February 26, 1909, was addressed to the secretary of state for the colonies, informing him that the law advisers of the government had expressed the view that the Commonwealth Parliament possessed the power under section 51 (xxix) “to make such legislative provision as is necessary to secure the fulfillment of treaty obligations, and that accordingly the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament are substantially identical with those of Canada”. This interpretation had been reaffirmed by Justice Evatt in 1933.

Until last August, it was widely assumed that the Dominion's power to disallow provincial Acts was fast becoming obsolete. No disallowance had taken place since 1924; and the minister of justice, the Right Honourable Ernest Lapointe, speaking in the House of Commons on March 30, 1937, had said : “For many years the power of disallowance has not been resorted to by the government of Canada…. I do not think that in a federation such as this the power of disallowance could be exercised by the central government.” On the question of reservation of provincial bills, there was no official pronouncement; but as there had been no case of reservation since 1920, the same dictum would doubtless have been considered to apply to that power also. On August 17, 1937, the Dominion government disallowed three Alberta Acts, and two months later the lieutenant-governor of Alberta reserved three bills for the signification of the governor-general's pleasure. The discussion which arose out of these events has been more remarkable for heat than light. It seems pertinent, therefore, to try to set down clearly the constitutional law and practice governing these two powers, and incidentally the lieutenant-governor's power to refuse the royal assent outright.

This is an account of the issue of dated stamp scrip in Alberta in 1936. The data were gathered a year later, and the scantiness of the information then available has resulted in important gaps which cannot be filled. But for several reasons it has seemed desirable to attempt a description and explanation of what happened. First, there is general interest in the actions of the present Alberta government, the only Social Credit government which has been elected to office in any country. The second reason is the paradox that the Social Credit government's first monetary innovation was not the installation of Social Credit, but the adoption of a rival monetary reform, the dated stamp money of Gesell. Thirdly, the interest of many people, including the monetary theorists, J. M. Keynes and Irving Fisher, in the economic ideas of Gesell seems to make an investigation of the Alberta episode worth while, even though Gesell's device was not introduced in exactly the manner he would have adopted. Fourthly, the prevalence in our time of many types of movements for monetary reform calls for as much documentation as possible of what is actually done. Finally, the economic problems of the Prairie Provinces are persistent enough to justify a record and analysis of each type of solution which is offered.