Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 October 2016
This paper analyses how the Court of Justice of the European Union resolves conflicting situations surrounding intellectual property rights (IPR). More specifically, it looks into how it approaches clashes of IPR with other fundamental rights and economic freedoms and with what consequences. Building upon previous literature, I advance the argument that the resolution of the conflict, by means of the proportionality interest-balancing exercise, pursues a pro-harmonisation agenda not only in the obvious context of free movement, but also in the setting of fundamental rights. I show that the recent Coty Germany ruling is likely to accelerate this trend because of its recognition of positive obligations of the Member States in the context of fundamental rights. It is argued that this could also be used by national courts to improve an existing IPR framework, in particular by filing preliminary references that question legislators’ choices such as non-implementation of permissible exceptions and limitations. After highlighting the importance of maintaining a separation between different policy levels (secondary law vs Charter), I outline why Coty Germany is a very worrying reading of Article 17(2) of the EU Charter, and suggest that this could be remedied by synchronising its interpretation with the Court’s doctrine of ‘specific subject matter’ in the context of free movement.
I would like to thank several people for their valuable comments made on the earlier draft of this paper, namely, Pekka Savola, Kenneth Armstrong, the anonymous peer-reviewer and co-participants of the panel at the 23rd International Conference of Europeanists 2016 in Philadelphia: Ermioni Xanthopoulou, Egle Dagilyte and Massimo Fichera.
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2 A quick cursory search in the Curia’s database shows that overall 201 preliminary references on IP (ie without all the appeals of decisions of the EUIPO) were filed before the Court in the last ten years. Just to compare, during the entire earlier period of the Court (1967–15/5/2006), only 183 IP cases were filed. This means that the last decade is responsible for more preliminary references in the field than all the decades before. It is therefore no surprise that scholars are conducting the first empirical legal studies of specifically IP case law: see Favale, M et al, ‘Is There a EU Copyright Jurisprudence? An Empirical Analysis of the Workings of the European Court of Justice’ (2015) 79(1) Modern Law Review 31 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 For instance, the case law on the right of communication to the public became so inscrutable – although mostly handled by a single judge, Judge Malenovsky – that in a recent preliminary reference, the Court instead decided the case as a Grand Chamber (Reha Training, C-117/15, EU:C:2016:379).
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5 See also criticism by Geiger, C, ‘Intellectual Property Shall be Protected!? – Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: A Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope’ (2009) 31 (3) European Intellectual Property Review 113 Google Scholar, p 115; Griffiths, J and McDonagh, L, ‘Fundamental Rights and European IP law - the Case of Art 17(2) of the EU Charter’ in C Geiger (ed), Constructing European Intellectual Property Achievements and New Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2013), p 76 Google Scholar.
6 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, ‘Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, p 168 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf; see also Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007) OJ C 303/17: ‘Protection of intellectual property, one aspect of the right of property, is explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2 because of its growing importance and Community secondary legislation. Intellectual property covers not only literary and artistic property but also inter alia patent and trademark rights and associated rights. The guarantees laid down in paragraph 1 shall apply as appropriate to intellectual property.’
7 See Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v the Netherlands (Application no. 12633/87) decision of 4 October 1990; Balan v the Republic of Moldova (Application no 19247/03) decision of 29 January 2008; Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal (Application no. 73049/01) (2007) 44 EHRR 42. For overview see Helfer, L, ‘The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 49 (1) Harvard International Law Journal 1 Google Scholar; Sebastian, S, ‘Geistiges Eigentum als europäisches Menschenrecht: Zur Bedeutung von Art. 1 des 1. Zusatzprotokolls zur EMRK für das Immaterialgüterrecht’ (2013) GRUR International 524 Google Scholar.
8 Mylly, T, ‘The Constitutionalization of the European Legal Order: Impact of Human Rights on Intellectual Property In The EU’ in C Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 2015), pp 106 Google Scholar, 119.
9 Metronome Musik v Music Point Hokamp, C-200/96, EU:C:1998:172.
10 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Metronome Musik v Music Point Hokamp, C-200/96, EU:C:1998:172, para 21 and fn 19.
11 Metronome Musik v Music Point Hokamp, C-200/96, EU:C:1998:172, para 21.
12 See also Martin Luksan v Petrus van der, C-277/10, EU:C:2012:65, para 68. This is often discussed as a ‘social function of property’, see Geiger, C, ‘The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How Ethics can Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law’ in GB Dinwoodie (ed), Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property Law (Edward Elgar, 2013)Google Scholar; C Geiger, ‘Implementing Intellectual Property Provisions in Human Rights Instruments: Towards a New Social Contract for the Protection of Intangibles’ in Geiger (ed), see note 8 above; Peukert, A, ‘Intellectual Property as an End in Itself?’ (2011) 33 European Intellectual Property Review 67 Google Scholar; Leinemann, F, Die Sozialbindung des Geistigen Eigentums (Nomos, 1998)Google Scholar; Pahud, E, Die Sozialbindung des Urheberrechts (Berne Verlag, 2000)Google Scholar.
13 See Rec 1 of the Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L157/45 ‘The protection of intellectual property is important not only for promoting innovation and creativity, but also for developing employment and improving competitiveness.’ These goals are by no means exhaustive. Different jurisdictions attribute additional roles to diverse intellectual property rights, such as the right to dignity of authors.
14 See note 10 above, para 33.
15 Promusicae¸ C-275/06, EU:C:2008:54. Scarlet Extended, C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771, paras 43–45: ‘The protection of the right to intellectual property is indeed enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). There is, however, nothing whatsoever in the wording of that provision or in the Court’s case law to suggest that that right is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely protected.’; Laserdisken, C-479/04, EU:C:2006:549, paras 62, 64; Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Budějovický Budvar, C-482/09, EU:C:2011:605, fn 29: ‘The right to property, under which the right to intellectual property falls, is according to the Court’s case-law a fundamental right which is protected in the Community legal order as a general principle of Community law’; L’Oréal and Others, C-324/09, EU:C:2011:474, para 131: ‘effective protection of intellectual property’.
16 See UPC Telekabel Wien, C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192.
17 Scharpf, F, ‘Politische Optionen im vollendeten Binnenmarkt’ in M Jachenfuchs and B Kohler-Koch, Europeische Integration (UTB, 1996), p 109 ff Google Scholar.
18 Art 36 TFEU (goods) and Arts 52, 62 TFEU (services). C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 3rd ed (Oxford University Press, 2010), p 166. The doctrine of mandatory requirements was first developed in the seminal Cassis de Dijon case (Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 120/78, EU:C:1979:42) in the context of free movement of goods, but soon extended also to services (SA Caterpillar Overseas, 111/79, EU:C:1980:78, para 35). The existing case law is best summarized in Gouda, C-288/89, EU:C:1991:323 (services).
19 Ibid.
20 See Coditel, 62/79, EU:C:1980:84; Football Association Premier League and Others, C-403/08, EU:C:2011:631.
21 Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc, 15/74, EU:C:1974:114, para 9 (patents); LC Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission of the European Communities, 258/78, EU:C:1982:211, para 8 (trademarks), para 35 (plant varieties); Keurkoop, 144/81, EU:C:1982:289, para 14 (designs); Deutsche Renault, C-317/91, EU:C:1993:908, para 17 ff (non-registered trademarks); Musik-Vertrieb membrane, 57/80, EU:C:1981:10, para 12 ff (copyright); Kingdom of Belgium v Kingdom of Spain, C-388/95, EU:C:2000:244, para 54 (designations of origin); Exportur, C-3/91, EU:C:1992:420, para 23 ff (geographical indications).
22 Groep v Beele, 6/81, EU:C:1982:72.
23 See ERT, C-260/89, EU:C:1991:254; Schmidberger, C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333; Omega, C-36/02, EU:C:2004:614; Viking, C-438/05, EU:C:2007:772; Laval, C-341/05, EU:C:2007:809.
24 Even an obligation to interpret national laws in line with EU law does not require an interpretation of national law contra legem (Maria Pupino, C-105/03, EU:C:2005:386, para 47; Impact v Minister for Agriculture and Food and Others, C-268/0, EU:C:2008:223, para 100). The outer limits of contra legem are set by the domestic interpretation methods (Dominguez, C-282/10, EU:C:2012:33, para 27). For instance, the German Federal Supreme Court accepts so called teleological reduction which goes contra verbal legis as a mandatory interpretation step in order to give a full effect to EU law (BGH [2008] VIII ZR 200/05; BGH [2011] VIII ZR 70/08).
25 According to Tridimas, the Union measures are traditionally judged less strictly – using the ‘manifestly disproportionate test’ which is difficult to fail – while the national measures are subjected to the ‘least restrictive means test’ – see Tridimas, T, The General Principles of EU law, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2006), p 138 Google Scholar; also de Búrca, G, ‘The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law’ (1993) 13(1) Yearbook of European Law 105 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p 146.
26 Coditel, 62/79, EU:C:1980:84.
27 Ibid, paras 12, 13.
28 Coditel, 262/81, EU:C:1982:334.
29 Warner Brothers, C-158/86, EU:C:1988:242.
30 Ibid, paras 12, 14, 15 (emphasis added).
31 EMI Electrola, C-341/87, EU:C:1989:30; Keurkoop BV v Nancy Kean Gifts, 144/81, EU:C:1982:289.
32 Kur, A and Dreier, T, European Intellectual Property Law (Edward Elgar, 2013), p. 52–53 Google Scholar
33 Peek & Cloppenburg, C-456/06, EU:C:2008:232
34 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Peek & Cloppenburg, C-456/06, EU:C:2008:21, paras 52–54 (accepted a narrow reading of a distribution right due to the principle of free movement).
35 Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (1992) OJ L 346, pp 61–66.
36 Some authors also suggest that other variables such as type of a right or a seriousness of an interference also influence the standard of the proportionality review – see Kosta, V, Fundamental Rights in EU Internal Market Legislation (Bloomsbury, 2015), p 63 Google Scholar.
37 Jacobs, F, ‘Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality’ in E Ellis (ed), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing, 1999), p 21 Google Scholar; Weatherill, S, ‘The internal market’ in S Peers et al (eds), The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart Publishing, 2014), p 195 Google Scholar; Weiß, W, ‘The EU Human Rights Regime Post Lisbon: Turning the CJEU into a Human Rights Court?’ in S Morano-Foradi and L Vickers (eds), Fundamental Rights in the EU: A Matter for Two Courts (Hart Publishing, 2015), p 73 Google Scholar.
38 Ibid, Weiß, p 73.
39 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, C-92/09, EU:C:2010:662; Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12, EU:C:2014:238; Maximillian Schrems, C‑362/14, EU:C:2015:650.
40 Metronome Musik v Music Point Hokamp, C-200/96, EU:C:1998:172, paras 9, 12.
41 Ibid, para 23,
42 Ibid, para 24 (emphasis added).
43 Ibid, para 24 et seq. In the law and economics literature, this entitlement distinction is discussed as liability vs property rules: see Calabresi, G and Melamed, D, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
44 See note 10 above, para 25 (citing Rec 6) and para 27: The information given in the order for reference and again in the observations of Music Point, according to which the market in sales of CDs did not register any decline in Germany when renting was still permitted, (16) does not seem significant. First, it relates to the market situation at a time when technological developments had not yet made renting a de facto alternative to sales; second — and this is a more important point — the accuracy of the assessments made by the Community institutions as a basis for the content of harmonising legislation cannot be verified solely in the light of statistics relating to one or more Member States.
45 Ibid, para 25 (emphasis added).
46 Ibid, para 32.
47 Ibid, para 26.
48 Ibid, paras 26, 28.
49 Another attempt of this kind was the case Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-377/98, EU:C:2001:523 (the Court was asked to review compatibility of the Directive 98/44 on the legal protection of biotechnological with the fundamental right to human dignity and integrity. The Court, however, responded by saying that: ‘Reliance on this fundamental right is, however, clearly misplaced as against a directive which concerns only the grant of patents and whose scope does not therefore extend to activities before and after that grant, whether they involve research or the use of the patented products’ (para 79)).
50 Mylly argues that Court accepts all choices by EU legislator, see Mylly, note 8 above, pp 107, 112.
51 Promusicae, C-275/06, EU:C:2008:54.
52 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector [2002] OJ L 201; Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281. The Court came to this conclusion by reading Art 15(1) of the Directive 2002/58/EC together with Art 13(1)(g) of the Directive 95/46/EC. The Advocate General was, however, of a different opinion, rejecting the applicability of Art 13(1)(g); see Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Promusicae, note 51 above, paras 85–89.
53 Ibid, Rec 21.
54 See note 51 above, para 68 (emphasis added).
55 ERT, C-260/89, EU:C:1991:254.
56 Schmidberger, C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333, paras 82, 89: ‘The competent authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion in that regard.’
57 See Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in Tele2 Sverige AB, C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, EU:C:2016:572.
58 Bonnier Audio, C‑461/10, EU:C:2012:219; Scarlet Extended, C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771; UPC Telekabel Wien, C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192.
59 Husovec, M, ‘CJEU Allowed Website Blocking Injunctions With Some Reservations’ (2014) 9 (8) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 631 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
60 See also Husovec, M and Peguera, M, ‘Much Ado About Little – Privately Litigated Disconnecting Injunctions’ (2015) 46(1) The International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 10 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
61 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C-201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, paras 27, 34.
62 See Mylly, note 8 above, p 126: ‘far from being champions of freedom of expression’ vs Voorhoof, D, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Right to Information: Implications for Copyright’ in C Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 2015), p 346 Google Scholar: ‘wide and flexible parody concept’.
63 Geiger, C, ‘“Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union’ (2006) 37 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 371 Google Scholar. Art 5 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, 2013/0402 (COD) 26 April 2016 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-76-2015-INIT/en/pdf
64 Opinion of Advocate General Villalón in Coty Germany, C-580/13, EU:C:2015:243, para 32.
65 Painer, C-145/10, EU:C:2013:138.
66 Ibid, paras 109–112 (emphasis added).
67 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C-201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, para 27; Football Association Premier League and Others, C-403/08, EU:C:2011:631, para 163.
68 See Mylly, note 8 above.
69 See to this end the Decision of the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd SR); 30 September 2014 – Case No II, ÚS 647/2014 (reported in IIC 2015, 729): ‘An interference is of a different systematic intensity if it occurs “only” by the situational grant of constitutionally non-conforming remedies than in the case of repeated grant of protection in the subject, which constitutionally unacceptably limits the freedom of expression in every circumstance. A multi-layered construction of copyright law suitably allows balancing of the individual cases of constitutional unreasonableness on its several levels.’
70 Hans Kelsen famously described constitutional courts as ‘negative legislators’ when referring to their power to annul acts of the legislature ( Kelsen, H, General Theory of Law and State (HUP, 1945), pp 268–269 Google Scholar). The notion of the Court as negative legislator, as used in this paper, thus refers to its role of abstract review which allows to pronounce incompatibility of the legal instruments and thus contributes to formation of law by specifying its limits that cannot be overcome without changing the underlying rules – here primary law.
71 An interesting, but unsuccessful attempt to strike down Union laws based on free movement of goods was made in the previously mentioned Metronome case (see note 9 above), but a similar attempt was also made Laserdisken case (see note 15 above).
72 Deutsche Grammophon, 78/70, EU:C:1971:59, para 13 (emphasis added).
73 Ibid; SA CNL-SUCAL NV v HAG GF AG, C-10/89, EU:C:1990:359; Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc, 15/74, EU:C:1974:114; Musik-Vertrieb Membrane, 57/80, EU:C:1981:10; Pharmon BV v Hoechst AG, 19/84, EU:C:1985:304; Merck, 187/80, EU:C:1981:180; Generics BV v Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd, C-316/95, EU:C:1997:347; Parke, Davis and Co v Probel, 24/67, EU:C:1968:11; Sirena Srl v Eda Srl and others, 40/70, EU:C:1971:18; Laserdisken, C-479/04, EU:C:2006:549; Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Centrafarm, 102/77, EU:C:1978:108; Loendersloot v Ballantine & Son and Others, C-349/95, EU:C:1997:530.
74 Also Sauter, W, ‘Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?’ (2013) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 439 CrossRefGoogle Scholar (noting that: ‘An example is where the Member States invoke national public policy exceptions to principles of EU law such as the market freedoms. The degree to which this is possible depends inter alia on the degree of harmonisation that has been achieved.’)
75 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v Clinique Laboratoires, C-315/92, EU:C:1994:34.
76 An old attempt of this was BV Industrie Diensten Groep v JA Beele Handelmaatschappij, 6/81, EU:C:1982:72.
77 Peek & Cloppenburg, C-456/06, EU:C:2008:232, para 38 read together with Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Peek & Cloppenburg, C-456/06, EU:C:2008:21, paras 53, 54.
78 Svensson and Others, C-466/12, EU:C:2014:76; BestWater, C-348/13 EU:C:2014:2315; GS Media, C-160/15, pending.
79 Svensson and Others, C-466/12, EU:C:2014:76 (emphasis added).
80 See Recs 30, 32 of Directive 2001/29; van Eechoud, M and others, Harmonizing European Copyright Law: The Challenges of Better Lawmaking (Wolters Kluwer, 2009) p 94 Google Scholar: ‘the acquis has left a number of important exclusive rights fully or partly unharmonized.’
81 Svensson and Others, C-466/12, EU:C:2014:76, para 36, 40 (emphasis added).
82 Football Association Premier League and Others, C-403/08, EU:C:2011:631.
83 Ibid, para 102.
84 Ibid, para 105.
85 Ibid, para 106.
86 Ibid, para 108.
87 Ibid, para 109.
88 Football Association Premier League and Others, note 82 above, para 109: ‘remuneration must be reasonable in relation to the economic value of the service provided. In particular, it must be reasonable in relation to the actual or potential number of persons who enjoy or wish to enjoy the service’. The convergence is curious because the goals of two policies are very different. While market integration is a main policy goal of free movement provisions, it is only one of the adjunct goals of EU competition law which tries to curb abusive market behavior. It would be expected that standards of acceptable return on investment are stricter for the former and more permissive in the context of the latter.
89 See note 82 above, para 113
90 Ibid, para 114.
91 Ibid, para 114.
92 Ibid, paras 114–116 (emphasis added).
93 Ibid, paras 118–121.
94 Collins and Patricia Im- und Export v Imtrat and EMI Electrola, C-92/92, EU:C:1993:847; Tod’s and Tod’s France, C-28/04, EU:C:2005:418.
95 Ricordi, C-360/00, EU:C:2002:346.
96 Coty Germany, C-580/13, EU:C:2015:485.
97 Ibid, para 29 and 38 (emphasis added).
98 Opinion of Advocate General Villalon in ACI Adam, C‑435/12, EU:C:2014:254, para 73.
99 See note 51 above, para 60: ‘As to Articles 41, 42 and 47 of the TRIPs Agreement, relied on by Promusicae, in the light of which Community law must as far as possible be interpreted where – as in the case of the provisions relied on in the context of the present reference for a preliminary ruling – it regulates a field to which that agreement applies … while they require the effective protection of intellectual property rights and the institution of judicial remedies for their enforcement, they do not contain provisions which require those directives to be interpreted as compelling the Member States to lay down an obligation to communicate personal data in the context of civil proceedings.’ See eg Rechtbank Amsterdam [2013] Brein v ING C/13/539327, NL:RBAMS:2013:CA0350 (denying the disclosure).
100 Schüth v Germany (Application no 1620/03) (2010), 52 EHRR 32, para 55; Marckx v Belgium (Application no 6833/74) (1979), 2 EHRR 330, para 31; Airey v Ireland (Application no 6290/73) (1979) 2 EHRR 305, para 32.
101 For an overview of the case law of the Court see Akandji-Kombe, J, Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (Directorate General of Human Rights, Council of Europe, 2007)Google Scholar https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168007ff4d
102 See note 100, para 55 (emphasis added).
103 Cherednychenko, O and Reich, N, ‘The Constitutionalization of European Private Law: Gateways, Constraints, and Challenges’ (2015) 5 European Review of Private Law 797 Google Scholar, p 818: ‘No such ‘independent’ positive obligations, however, have been accepted by the Court in relation to EU fundamental rights.’
104 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, C-265/95, EU:C:1997:595.
105 Ibid, para 32 (emphasis added).
106 Cherednychenko and Reich, see note 103 above, p 820: ‘Answering this question in the affirmative would effectively amount to the imposition on the Member States of a positive obligation to respect the EU fundamental rights in question within the scope of the above-mentioned directives.’
107 KU v Finland (Application no 2872/02) (2009) 48 EHRR 52 (recognising a positive obligation of a state to introduce some form of information disclosure against internet access providers).
108 Decision of Rechtbank Amsterdam [2015] C/13/583257, NL:RBAMS:2015:9312. See also Caspers, M, ‘The role of Anne Frank’s diary and academic freedom for text & data mining’ (Kluwer Copyright Blog, 20 January 2016)Google Scholar http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2016/01/20/the-role-of-anne-franks-diary-and-academic-freedom-for-text-data-mining/
109 To this end see generally Hugenholtz, B and Senftleben, M, ‘Fair Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities’ (November 14 2011)Google Scholar http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959554; Rosati, E, ‘Copyright in the EU: In Search of (In)Flexibilities’ (2014) 9 (7) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 585 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
110 BVerfG [2016] Metall auf Metall 1 BvR 1585/13, DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513.
111 It has to be noted, however, that quotation exception is mandatory under Art 10 of Berne Convention.
112 See Melloni, C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107.
113 Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C-201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, para 16.
114 Opinion of Advocate General in Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C-201/13, EU:C:2014:458, para 81 (emphasis added)
115 It is generally established that proportionality serves as a tool of market integration; Jans, J, ‘Proportionality revisited’ (2000) 27(3) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 239 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p 243; Tridimas, T, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp 193–194 Google Scholar.
116 Sauter, W and Schepel, H, State and Market in European Union law: The Public and Private Spheres of the Internal Market Before the EU Courts (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp 182–186 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chalmers, D et al, European Union law, 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp 206–207 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
117 Griffiths, J, ‘Constitutionalising or Harmonising? The Court of Justice, the Right to Property and European Copyright Law’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 65 Google Scholar; see Mylly, note 8 above, p 118.
118 See Griffiths, ibid.
119 See Mylly at note 8 above, p 119.
120 See Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document Analysis of the application of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the Member States Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Social Committee on the application of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights’ COM(2010) 779 final, p 13.
121 European Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy, ‘Injunctions in Intellectual Property Right’ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/injunctions_en.pdf ‘Jurisprudence in the Member States illustrates the obstacles to obtaining injunctions against ISPs. In some Member States, national data-protection legislation is a significant obstacle, particularly for the initial evidence collection necessary to bring such litigation in the first place. The permissible scope of injunctions is also potentially affected by data protection and other rules, for example, with respect to the types of technical blocking that may be required under injunction.’ (emphasis added).
122 Schmidberger, C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333, paras 82, 89: ‘The competent authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion in that regard.’
123 Geiger, see note 5 above; Griffiths and McDonagh, see note 5 above, p 76; A Peukert, ‘The fundamental right to (intellectual) property and the discretion of the legislature’ in Geiger (ed), see note 8 above.
124 Marckx v Belgium (Application no 6833/74)(1979) 2 EHRR 330, para 50.
125 Ibid.
126 Harris, D et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2009), p 660 Google Scholar (emphasis added).
127 Geiger, C, ‘Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property’ in PLC Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights (Kluwer Law International, 2015), p 115 Google Scholar.
128 Geiger, see note 12 above, p 679.
129 Griffiths and McDonagh at note 5, p 70.
130 Ibid, p 72.
131 Shaheed, F, ‘Copyright policy and the right to science and culture’, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, A/HRC/28/57 [2015] http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/28/57 Google Scholar
132 Shaheed, F, ‘Patent policy and the right to science and culture’, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, A/70/279 [2015] http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/70/279 Google Scholar (emphasis added).
133 Helfer, L and Austin, G, Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p 513 CrossRefGoogle Scholar (emphasis added).
134 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 17 (2005) ‘The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author (article 15, paragraph 1 (c), of the Covenant)’ http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=4slQ6QSmlBEDzFEovLCuW1a0Szab0oXTdImnsJZZVQcMZjyZlUmZS43h49u0CNAuJIjwgfzCL8JQ1SHYTZH6jsZteqZOpBtECZh96hyNh%2F%2FHW6g3fYyiDXsSgaAmIP%2BP
135 See note 51 above, para 60.
136 See Mylly, note 8 above, p 119.
137 Martin Luksan v Petrus van der, C-277/10, EU:C:2012:65.
138 Ibid, para 55.
139 Ibid, paras 65–67 (emphasis added).
140 Ibid, para 69 (emphasis added).
141 Same opinion presented by Ruse-Khan, H Grosse, ‘Overlaps and Conflict Norms in Human Rights Law: Approaches of European Courts To Address Intersections With Intellectual Property Rights’ in Geiger (ed), see note 8 above, p 78; Peukert, see note 123 above, p 134 Google Scholar.
142 Ibid, para 71 (emphasis added).
143 Peek & Cloppenburg, C-456/06, EU:C:2008:232, para 38 (emphasis added).
144 Deutsche Grammophon, 78/70, EU:C:1971:59, para 11
145 See note 82 above, para 108.
146 One could imagine a situation where the consequences of a stricter Art 36 TFEU review could subsequently be questioned on the basis of its compatibility with the overbroad guarantees of Art 17(2) of the EU Charter. For instance, the Member States could try to defend their domestic obstacles to free movement of goods in form of additional exclusive rights on a basis of protection against expropriation offered by Art 17(2). Unless the Court synchronizes the two doctrines, it could be forced to carry out two separate distinct justification reviews.
147 See BVerfG [1971] 1 BvR 765/66; BVerfG [2016] Metall auf Metall 1 BvR 1585/13; Badura, P, ‘Zur Lehre von der verfassugsrechtlichen Institutgarantie des Eigentums, betrachtet am Beispiel des “geistigen Eigentums”, in Festschrift für Theodor Maunz (CH Beck, 1981), p 14 ffGoogle Scholar; Badura, P, ‘Privatnützigkeit und Sozialbindung des geistigen Eigentums’ in A Ohly and D Klippel (eds), Geistiges Eigentum und Gemeinfreiheit (Mohr Siebeck, 2007), p 54 ffGoogle Scholar; Grzeszick, B, ‘Geistiges Eigentum und Art. 14 GG’ (2007) Zeitschrift für Urheber und Medienrecht, p 344 ffGoogle Scholar; Paulus, A, ‘Schutz des geistigen Eigentums’ in J Isensee and P Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Band X (CF Müller, 2013), p 832 Google Scholar; Decision of the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd SR); 30 September 2014, Case No II ÚS 647/2014 (reported in IIC 2015, 729).
148 BVerfGE 31, 229 [1971] Schulbuchprivileg, 1 BvR 765/66, para 35.
149 Eg technological protection measures and the principle of proportionality enshrined in Rec 48 Directive 2001/29; see Nintendo and Others, C-355/12, EU:C:2014:25. In Germany, this principle was also used to give effect to constitutional proportionality exercise in BVerfG (2011) AnyDVD 1 BvR 1248/11.
150 See Portuese, A, ‘The principle of subsidiarity as a principle of economic efficiency’ (2011) 17 Columbia Journal of European Law 231 Google Scholar; Hancher, L and Sauter, W, ‘One step beyond? From Sodemare to Docmorris: The EU’s freedom of establishment case law concerning healthcare’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 117 Google Scholar.
151 See Husovec and Peguera, note 60 above, pp 10, 18, 33.
152 Ibid, p 18.
153 See Mylly, note 8 above, p 127.
154 Similar criticism is also presented by Fornasier, M, ‘The Impact of EU Fundamental Rights on Private Relationships: Direct or Indirect Effect?’ (2015) 23(1) European Review of Private Law 29 Google Scholar.
155 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) OJ L 178.
156 Scarlet Extended, C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771, paras 47, 48 (emphasis added).
157 Savola also speculates about this outcome: Savola, P, ‘Proportionality of Website Blocking: Internet Connectivity Providers as Copyright Enforcers’ (2014) 5 (2) JIPITEC 116 Google Scholar, p 133, fn 59.