This paper considers the relevance of the concept of “eugenics,”—a term associated with some of the most egregious crimes of the twentieth century—to the possibility of editing human genomes. The author identifies some uses of gene editing as eugenics but proposes that this identification does not suffice to condemn them. He proposes that we should distinguish between “morally wrong” practices, which should be condemned, and “morally problematic” practices that call for solutions, and he suggests that eugenic uses of gene editing fall into this latter category. Although when we choose the characteristics of future people we are engaging in morally dangerous acts, some interventions in human heredity should nevertheless be acknowledged as morally good. These morally good eugenic interventions include some uses of preimplantation genetic diagnosis. The author argues that we should think about eugenic interventions in the same way that we think about morally problematic interventions in public health. When we recognize some uses of gene editing as eugenics, we make the dangers of selecting or modifying human genetic material explicit.

In Finland, as well as all over the globe, great weight is put on the possibilities of large data collections and ‘big data’ for generating economic growth, enhancing medical research, and boosting health and wellbeing in totally new ways. This massive data gathering and usage is justified by the moral principle of improving health. The imperative of health thus legitimizes data collection, new infrastructures and innovation policy. It is also supported by the rhetoric of health promotion. New arrangements in health research and innovations in the health sector are justified, as they produce health, while the moral principle of health also obligates individual persons to pursue healthy lifestyles and become healthy citizens. I examine how, in this context of Finnish data-driven medicine, arguments related to privacy and autonomy become silenced when contrasted with the moral principle of health.

This article aims to do two things. First, it argues that moralization of health occurs not only at the practical level of individual healthcare choices and health states, but also at the conceptual level of health itself. This is most evident in cases where the concept of health is presumed to possess the property of “overridingness” when compared to competing values and norms, that is, when it is treated as taking precedence over other values and norms it may come into conflict with. Second, the article makes a case for being critically skeptical of specific deployments of the concept of health when it has been moralized in this way. In such cases, what typically results is that some other personal value/norm, or set of values/norms, held by the individual is treated as intrinsically at odds with the concept of health, which is presumed, uncritically, to be superior, often because it is taken to be free-standing and self-justifying. Yet, a growing body of evidence-based research suggests that the role played by dimensions of personal meaningfulness in the quality of individuals’ overall health is quite underappreciated. It is useful to think of these dimensions of personal meaning and significance as representing the individual’s values. Thus, taking these data more seriously ought to lead to a reevaluation of the moralization of health at the conceptual level. In the first place, it is not obvious that if the concept of health runs afoul of other values/norms held by an individual, the latter should automatically yield. In the second place, they suggest that other values/norms held by an individual are not necessarily intrinsically opposed to the concept of health, but in fact may go a good distance in support of it.

Empirical work has shown that patients and physicians have markedly divergent understandings of treatability statements (e.g., “This is a treatable condition,” “We have treatments for your loved one”) in the context of serious illness. Patients often understand treatability statements as conveying good news for prognosis and quality of life. In contrast, physicians often do not intend treatability statements to convey improvement in prognosis or quality of life, but merely that a treatment is available. Similarly, patients often understand treatability statements as conveying encouragement to hope and pursue further treatment, though this may not be intended by physicians. This radical divergence in understandings may lead to severe miscommunication. This paper seeks to better understand this divergence through linguistic theory—in particular, H.P. Grice’s notion of conversational implicature. This theoretical approach reveals three levels of meaning of treatability statements: (1) the literal meaning, (2) the physician’s intended meaning, and (3) the patient’s received meaning. The divergence between the physician’s intended meaning and the patient’s received meaning can be understood to arise from the lack of shared experience between physicians and patients, and the differing assumptions that each party makes about conversations. This divergence in meaning raises new and largely unidentified challenges to informed consent and shared decision making in the context of serious illness, which indicates a need for further empirical research in this area.

Gene editors such as CRISPR could be used to create stronger, faster, or more resilient nonhuman animals. This is of keen interest to people who breed, train, race, and profit off the millions of animals used in sport that contribute billions of dollars to legal and illegal economies across the globe. People have tried for millennia to perfect sport animals; CRISPR proposes to do in one generation what might have taken decades previously. Moreover, gene editing may facilitate enhancing animals’ capacities beyond their typical limits. This paper describes the state of animal use and engineering for sport, examines the moral status of animals, and analyzes current and future ethical issues at the intersection of animal use, gene editing, and sports. We argue that animal sport enthusiasts and animal welfarists alike should be concerned about the inevitable use of CRISPR in sport animals. Though in principle CRISPR could be used to improve sport animals’ well-being, we think it is unlikely in practice to do so.

This article examines the moralistic language and arguments used in relation to genetics. The focus is on three practices: (1) the claims that there is a duty to know about one’s own genetic makeup, (2) assertions that genetic information should be used to inform reproductive decisions, and (3) the proposition that there are moral reasons to participate in biobank research. With these three, the author contends that there are equally good, if not better, arguments to challenge them from a Millian perspective. Furthermore, especially in the current political climate, there is a need to respect people’s privacy concerns.