The Object of Morality is the title of a book I wrote a good many years ago shortly before I deviated irreversibly into university administration (often an intellectually terminal condition). I do not want to plug that book; nevertheless, it may not be completely irrelevant to say something of what it was about and take a rather rapid trot over its theme.

On 10 July 1973, Laurens, our second son, was born in the same Dutch hospital where I worked as an intensive care physician. Two weeks after we brought him. home from the hospital, my wife heard him crying at about 5:45 A.M. Rather than going to him, she decided to wait until his scheduled feeding time. At about 6:10 when she went to Laurens's room to feed him, she saw him. face down in the corner of his crib. He appeared dead. She screamed for me. I ran from upstairs to Laurens's room on the ground floor. I initiated cardio-pulmonary resuscitation and continued the CPR while my wife called our general practitioner. He arrived in about 10 minutes and the ambulance arrived a minute later.

The development of neonatology and the establishment of neonatal intensive care units has led to a vast array of new medical ethical problems and dilemmas centered around discontinuing treatment or nontreatment decisions. Neonatology has become one of the fields that has made clear that medical success is only rarely nonproblematic. The new technology can be a blessing for some, but it may also become a sad experience to others, with life-long repercussions.

The ethical problems of neonatology transcend national boundaries. Nevertheless, there are differences in approach among various countries. In The Netherlands, the ethical deliberations have been a matter of public debate, but most of the decision making is left to the medical profession; these decisions are considered too harsh for the general public. Recently, two developments have emerged. The Royal Dutch Medical Association (RDMA) and the Dutch Pediatrics Society have published reports with guidelines and ethical reflections. Over the same period of time, cases have been brought to court for legal analysis and the development of case precedence.

The health of newborns has always been subject to the natural lottery. When in the past a severely disabled baby was born, nature provided the “solution,” and the child did not survive. Medical technology has brought about a change; fetuses who would have died during pregnancy or newborns who once would have had little chance to survive are now kept alive. Although these technological advances do benefit many children, the dark side is that more severely handicapped babies are surviving.

When a severely disabled baby is born, all persons concerned are faced with emotional difficulties as well as moral and legal dilemmas. Questions that arise include whether it is acceptable, morally and legally, to allow the severely handicapped newborn to die by forgoing treatment or by direct intervention.

CQ: The Baby Bas Ross case stirred much public debate in The Netherlands since 1988 -a newborn infant with Down's syndrome whose parents refused to consent to a surgery that would have repaired an otherwise fatal congenital anomaly. Can you share your thoughts with us on this case?

HD: I was the first ethicist to comment on this case because I was a friend of Dr. Molenaar, who was the final surgical decision maker for Baby Bas. A physician and I supported his decision throughout the prosecution that followed. We also summarized the case in the N.T.V.G., the Dutch Magazine of Medicine. We argued In the article that parents should have the option to make nontreatment decisions. Moreover, In cases where the physician has to perform aggressive medical interventions, there certainly must be thorough and sound justification to ensure that the decision to Intervene Is in the best interest of the child.

In the 10 years since the birth of “Baby Doe,” the decisions confronted daily by neonatologists and parents of sick or premature infants have been the focus of a great deal of attention. Issues raised by these decisions have been vigorously debated and discussed in the popular media in political and governmental forums, and in the professional literatures of a variety of academic disciplines. These discourses have illuminated a number of moral and ethical principles that may govern these decisions and have contributed to the development of regulatory and procedural constraints upon this process, including requirements for establishment of infant care review committees at all hospitals that provide neonatal intensive care services. However, the philosophical concepts espoused by theoreticians, although often helpful as abstractions, are rarely invoked at the bedside as decisions are sought for individual patients. No clear consensus has emerged on how these ideas should be incorporated into clinical practice or on the role of mandated ethics committees or discretionary ethics consultants. Consequently, there are wide disparities in decision-making processes both within and among institutions. Failures of these systems to protect neonatal patients or their families remain distressingly common and have attracted considerable attention in the lay press. Although there can be no universal decision tree that can dictate the course of this complex process in all cases, a clearly articulated operative paradigm that defines essential features of an effective and equitable decision-making process is essential to identify the causes of failures and conflicts that arise when the process is dysfunctional and to prevent such problems by providing a framework for training practitioners to deal with these issues.

Say an infant is born with high lesion spina bifida. She is paralyzed from the waist down and has severe wasting of all areas below the waist. She will always be doubly incontinent and will have no normal sexual function. She has hydrocephalus and a brain stem, abnormality (Arnold Chiari malformation) that is likely to significantly shorten her life. She will probably be retarded and epileptic. She has severe leg deformities — dislocated hips, dislocated knees, and club feet. Her hips are held in a constant position over her chest and her knees cannot be bent in the right direction. She has an 80% chance of developing kyphoscoliosis (curvature of the spine) which may ultimately prevent her from, sitting in a wheelchair and may restrict her lungs, causing respiratory failure and death. She has little spontaneous movement and little response to simple stimuli. She has shallow breathing and difficulty in swallowing and sucking. Whatever treatment this infant is offered, she may not survive. If she does survive, her quality of life is likely to be so poor that one might question whether she would want to live such a life.

In many ways, Roe v. Wade marked a new chapter in American life. By assuring women of greater reproductive freedom., It gave women greater economic and social freedom, Inflamed a partisan battle between pro-life and pro-choice camps, and provoked a public debate regarding the proper sphere of judicial action. Hence, just as Roe has been critical to the changing politics of gender, it has been the focus of a political debate about the meaning of personhood and morality of abortion, the scope of individual freedom, and the judiciary's role in effecting social change.

In Germany — as probably worldwide — in vitro fertilization (IVF) has provoked disapproval, fears, and dread, but it also raises hope and gives feelings of pride and satisfaction in a new scientific achievement. Critics look for convincing argu- ments that could ban IVF completely or at least restrict it considerably. Some of the most important arguments are outlined below.

The main aspect of IVF that was new to society was that conception could take place outside the female body. Although this fact has made a deep impression on us, no ethical relevance has been attributed to it. One must look further for arguments against IVF.

What should patients know about the degree to which their physicians may be impaired—unable, in the words of the American Medical Association (A.M.A.), “to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of physical or mental illness, including alcoholism and drug dependence”? What patients do in fact find out about such matters as alcohol or other drug abuse by, say, the surgeon or the anesthesiologist in charge of their care is another matter altogether; most patients learn about such impairment the hard way. But what should they know beforehand, if at all possible?

In Abortion and Infanticide, Michael Tooley argues that it is not wrong to destroy potential persons, such as fetuses and newly born infants. His argument presupposes the following: 1)that the destruction of potential persons is not directly wrong because potential persons do not have a right to life; 2)that destroying a potential person—a fetus or an infant—is morally the same as preventing the existence of an (as-yet-unconceived) possible person by, for example, using a contraceptive or refraining from, intercourse during a woman's fertile period; and 3)that it is not wrong to prevent the existence of additional persons who are likely to lead happy or satisfying lives. Here I am concerned with the third presupposition. On this presupposition, the prima facie permissibility of abortion and infanticide hinges on the “moral neutrality” of those of our reproductive decisions on which the existence of additional people depends.

The patient, a 27-month-old girl, presented to Hospital B by ambulance in acute respiratory failure due to bilateral pneumothoraces.

At 41 weeks, the patient had been delivered by Cesarean section for failure to progress at Hospital A in the same city. Three days after birth she suffered a respiratory arrest. Resuscitation and ventilator support were initiated promptly but the child did poorly, and shortly after this first arrest, the parents were told by the child's physician that she had no chance of recovery. Nevertheless, the mother continued to insist that the child be kept on a respirator and aggressive support be maintained.

At first glance, the first informed consent case to be decided by the High Court of Australia appears to be little more than a clear and simple description of the substantive law accepted in most American jurisdictions - although that is no small accomplishment in and of itself. In Rogers v. Whitaker, the highest court in Australia succinctly and persuasively rejected informed consent as a species of battery law, accepted it as a form, of ordinary professional negligence law, and adopted the “American” patient-oriented standard (rather than the British doctor-oriented standard) for measuring the breach of a healthcare professional's duty to her or his patients. On second look, however, the opinion is an even more significant one because it reveals that the law of informed consent is now based on principles broad enough to create a duty on the part of healthcare providers to offer adequate health education to all of their patients. In Implicitly recognizing the physician's duty to educate her or his patients, the High Court's judgment is consistent with a view increasingly held In the medical and ethical communities that teaching patients about how to maintain their health is just as much a part of the doctor's function as diagnosing and treating disease. It may have taken 2,500 years for medicine to progress from, the Hippocratic notion that physicians should apply treatment to patients who are kept in blissful Ignorance of their condition and Its remedy, but there Is little doubt that medicine finally has entered a post-Hippocratic era.