This article argues that the public figure doctrine is doctrinally problematic and conceptually and normatively flawed. Doctrinal uncertainty surrounds who is affected and how rights are affected. Conceptually it raises challenges for universality, the non-hierarchical relationship between Articles 8 and 10 ECHR, the process of resolving rights conflicts, and the relationship between domestic law and the Convention. All of which necessitate a strong normative justification for the distinction. Yet there is no compelling rationale. The values underpinning the right to privacy of public figures are no different from those of other persons and there are other better mechanisms of accounting for freedom of expression. We should therefore reject the idea that public figures have fewer or weaker privacy rights or that the process of dealing with their rights is different and instead focus squarely upon the relative importance of the rights, and the degree of intrusion into those rights.

This article concerns recent challenges to the utility of “accessory liability” as an organising principle or concept in private law and argues that accessory liability is a coherent body of law with common features that is worthy of separate, holistic treatment. We defend a conceptual framework for accessory liability which is dynamic in its operation and which does not dictate the precise legal content of accessory liability in different contexts. Such a conception of accessory liability has come under challenge from recent cases and commentary which either minimise the scope and analytical relevance of accessory liability altogether in equity and tort law or propound a conceptual framework for accessory liability that is fixed in its application and uniform in its content across the whole of private law. Our purpose in this article is to resist both the dismissal, and simplification, of accessory liability in private law.

This article presents the novel view that “inclusion into seclusion” and “public disclosure of embarrassing facts” (“misuse of private information” (“MOPI”) in the UK), which both the academic commentary and US case law treat as two separate legal actions, occupy the same conceptual space. This claim has important practical ramifications. No further development of the law is required to realise an actionable intrusion tort as part of the UK's MOPI tort. The argument is defended in doctrinal and theoretical terms and by reference to both UK and US law. It is presented in three forms: first, in negative terms, that the orthodox distinction between the two claims (informational privacy and intrusion) is unsustainable; second, in positive terms, that both guard against the same wrong (unwarranted privacy invasion) and the same harm (mental distress), in a way that is distinctive from other privacy actions and legal claims based upon the autonomy value; finally, in pragmatic terms, that MOPI's mature jurisprudence is sufficiently flexible and dynamic to recognise intrusion-only claims using its existing legal framework.

This paper explores the effect that conformity to the rule of law has on the ends which might legitimately be pursued within a legal system. The neat distinction between formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law will be challenged: even apparently formal conceptions necessarily affect the content of law and necessarily entail the protection of certain fundamental rights. What remains of the formal/substantive dichotomy is, in fact, a distinction between conceptions of the rule of law which guarantee the substantive justice of each and every law and those which entail some commitment to basic requirements of justice while nevertheless leaving room for unjust laws. Ultimately, the only significant distinction between competing theories of the rule of law concerns the nature of the connection between legality and justice, not whether there is any such connection at all.

Existing definitions of agency are inadequate. In this paper, I offer a new definition of agency: a relationship is one of agency where the agent has a power to exercise at least one of the principal's own powers. I call this a “proxy power” for short. This definition brings with it three advantages. First, focusing on the agent's proxy power highlights the distinctive idea at the core of agency: that people can act through others at law, thereby expanding their legal personality in space. Second, that distinctive idea then helps identify the three reasons justifying when an agent has a proxy power: the principal's unilateral manifestation of will, the necessity of protecting the principal's interests, and where the principal is an artificial person who can only unilaterally manifest his will through an agent. Third, the definition vindicates prevailing intuitions about agency, and gives us a more transparent way to decide whether or one's invocation of “agency” is illegitimate or legitimate.

This article argues that public property rights should be recognised as a separate category of property interest, different and distinct from private and common property interests and conferring distinctive rights and obligations on both “owners” and members of the public. It develops a taxonomy to differentiate private, public and common property rights. The article concludes that it is a mistake to think in terms of “private property”, “common property” or “public property”. The division and allocation of resource entitlements in land can result in private, common and public property rights subsisting over the same land simultaneously, in different combinations and at different times. The categorisation of property interests in land (as private, common or public) may also shift and change from time to time. The article considers the importance of distinguishing between private, common and public property interests for developing new strategies for environmental governance, and for implementing the effective protection of natural resources.

This article argues that it is important for the International Court of Justice to be given an opportunity, for instance through a request for an Advisory Opinion, to explain what exactly it meant when it suggested that the ordinarily applicable international law on immunities need not be an obstacle “before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction”. Two international criminal courts have built a structure of case law on this one obiter comment, which it seems unable to support.

The article focuses on the “legitimate interest in performance” requirement which is now at the heart of the new test on penalty clauses but which has been left undefined by the Supreme Court in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi and ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2016]. It seeks to bring clarity to what is meant by “legitimate interest in performance” by examining other areas of the law of remedies for breach of contract where concepts of legitimate interest have featured in the court’s reasoning. It also makes suggestions as to what considerations are or might be relevant in determining whether a contracting party has a legitimate interest in performance, in particular a legitimate interest that goes beyond compensation.

The author makes two claims in this paper. First, there appears to be an increase in indications of inconsistency (“IoIs”) across the common law world. Second, this increase is a normatively concerning turn in judicial practice. IoIs are judicial statements which, either explicitly or by implication, indicate that primary legislation is incompatible with certain protected human rights or civil liberties. They are related to, but stop short of, the formal remedies known as declarations of inconsistency (“DoIs”).

The value of civility is grounded upon acceptance of the legitimacy of moral disagreement and the need for mutual respect and cooperation in the face of such disagreement. The distinction between rights and goods plays a fundamental role in the form of civility espoused by liberal society. Current models of constitutional rights and proportionality, in a variety of ways, erode that distinction and thereby place the liberal model of civility in jeopardy.

Vicarious liability was, and it remains, curiously unsatisfactory. After a period of stability from the Middle Ages into the early modern period in the late seventeenth into the early eighteenth century, the existing law of vicarious liability began to be challenged. The mid-nineteenth century saw another reappraisal coinciding with the rise of notions of fault. The period that follows, from the late nineteenth century until after the Second World War period has not attracted much comment. One key debate in this period and earlier which provides a useful lens to examine the doctrine was whether vicarious liability should be properly characterised as a master's or servant's tort theory. The history of the doctrine during this period goes some way to explaining why the modern law remains incoherent.