No account of the history of English legal literature can omit the name of Littleton. Sir Thomas Littleton's treatise on tenures made the family name almost synonymous with the common law itself. But it is not generally known that another member of that illustrious family left unfinished a work which, had it been completed and published, would have earned him a position of importance in the history, not only of English, but of universal jurisprudence. In so far as the will ought to be taken for the deed, perhaps some measure of recognition may justifiably be afforded to his work even after three centuries of oblivion. The author was Edward Littleton (1589–1645), Baron Littleton of Munslow, a direct descendant of Sir Thomas. Educated at Christ Church College, Oxford, he entered the Inner Temple in 1608; and there, like his near-contemporary John Selden (1584–1654), he developed a taste for comparative jurisprudence, legal history, and the study of records. His reputation for learning brought him in 1640 to the seat of Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and within a year he was made Lord Keeper. The transition to high office was a personal disaster, since Littleton's nature did not suit him for a position of political delicacy, and his brief tenure of the Seal was scarcely less miserable than that of his predecessor Finch—who had fled to Holland in 1640. Among Littleton's first tasks was to preside over the preliminaries to the proposed impeachments of Finch and the ship-money judges, and the lengthy preparations for the trial of Strafford. Within months he became ill, and from February until August 1641 he absented himself from the House of Lords. The following year, either from fear or high-mindedness, he quit London, following the King to York and thence to Oxford. In his hurried flight he apparently left behind some of his goods and papers in the “Black Lodgings” in the Inner Temple. His health continued to deteriorate, and he died (aged 56) on 27 August 1645.

This paper aims to defend what many academic commentators regard as indefensible—the rule in Foakes v. Beer.

For almost four hundred years (since Pinnel's Case) English law has been clear: the payment of, or promise to pay, a smaller sum than the amount due does not discharge the debt, since the debtor provides no considerationfor the creditor's promise to waive the balance—there is no “accord and satisfaction”. The House of Lords approved this rule, albeit reluctantly on the part of Lord Blackburn, in Foakes v. Beer.

In R. v. Dica [2004] 3 W.L.R. 213, the Court of Appeal decided that a man who knows that he is infected with the HIV virus but who infects his unsuspecting sexual partner through unprotected sexual intercourse should be punishable for inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The Court did in fact quash the conviction of the accused, because the judge at the Old Bailey had not instructed the jury to decide whether or not the two infected partners of the accused had known of his infection and agreed to take the risk of contracting it themselves (this having been in dispute at the trial). Yet the case was sent for retrial, and if the next jury, properly directed, should find that his partners did not agree to take the risk of contracting the potentially fatal virus, then Dica would be properly convicted under OAPA, section 20.

The student who seeks to discover the essential elements of the crime of Assault at Common Law as distinct from Battery does not receive much help from the standard text-books. Most of them in substance follow the description of assault given by Hawkins: ‘An assault is an attempt or offer, with force and violence, to do a corporal hurt to another.’

IN Hämäläinen v Finland (Application no. 37359/09), 16 July 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that Contracting States of the Council of Europe may require the dissolution of an existing marriage before extending the right to legal gender recognition.

Recent decisions relating to commercial transactions have raised issues about the limits of the courts’ jurisdiction to interfere with contractual terms, even where the terms seem to yield unjust results on breach. The author argues for a reconceptualisation of the ancient equitable doctrine of relief against forfeiture, as one which ensures that rights taken by way of security should never allow a secured creditor to recover more than his secured debt. Building on roots in the law of mortgages, this requires the court to characterise the substance of the parties’ bargain. It can, in common with the law of penalties, be understood as implementing a mandatory policy which allows the parties full freedom in crafting their primary obligations, but denies them full freedom in deciding what shall be the consequences of a breach of a primary obligation. The author argues that the restatement fits the contours of the existing law, and the requirements of corrective justice.

On 14 August 1988 the death occurred of Miss Pamela Banyard of Laxenheath. She had been the victim eighteen months previously of a savage and brutal attack for which her assailant was sent to prison for ten years on conviction of attempted murder and robbery. Why was he not convicted of murder? The answer in the words of the Crown Prosecutor: “We cannot prosecute for murder as she died more than a year and a day after the attack.”

RATIONALISING the doctrine of anticipatory breach is notoriously difficult. This may explain the complete lack of attempt by the UK Supreme Court to address its conceptual difficulties in its recent judgment in Bunge SA v Nidera BV [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] 3 All E.R. 1082. It is therefore of interest that the Singapore Court of Appeal in The “STX Mumbai” [2015] SGCA 35; [2015] 5 S.L.R. 1 explained why the doctrine of anticipatory breach can be applied to executed contracts (in the sense of being fully executed by the innocent party). Whilst anticipatory breach applies similarly under English law, the English courts have never considered the underlying justification, save to say in a case with a partially executed contract that “it would be very strange and hardly unworkable” if the innocent party had to wait until the time for performance (Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd. [1973] A.C. 331, 356, per Lord Simon).