A significant and relatively recent academic contribution to the problem of exclusion clauses has been to highlight the relevance of contractual terms to the constructional problems that arise in interpreting individual exclusion clauses. The conventional view, that an exemption clause operates as a shield to a claim for damages or repudiation, has been criticised as a failure to recognise this as simply one device available to the draftsman to enable him to delimit the extent of the obligations undertaken by the agreement: a negative statement of positive obligation. The most persistent advocate of the exclusion clause as a method of modifying primary contractual duties is Professor Coote. Judicial response has, until recently, been disappointing, although there has been more enthusiasm in Australia.

There are but a few days—of who shall say what importance—between the Julian and Gregorian calendars, considered as schemes for the interpretation of recurrent movements in our solar system. And yet, from the point of view of each, the other seems somewhat out in respect of the characterisation of nearly every year, month, week and individual day. The gap between the legal theories of John Austin and Professor Hart—between their models of the legal universe—is somewhat more than this. Its demonstration provides the foundation for Professor Hart's new book. But there may here be some analogy to what divides the concept of law, as elucidated by Professor Hart in terms of rules, from the concept of law as a system of action constructed by the writer in earlier numbers of this Journal. If Professor Hart now reveals himself as conceptual pragmatist as well as linguistic philosopher the writer's gratitude to Professor Hart in the latter capacity is only tinged with regret that he does not display greater boldness in the former.

The case of Re Rose, Rose v. I.R.C. is a well-known authority for the significance of the last act; equity treats a gift as complete where the donor has done all in his power to divest himself of the property, and to vest it in the transferees. The Court of Appeal followed a first instance decision, Re Rose, Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co., Ltd. v. Rose, whose similar name was purely coincidental. In the earlier case, the unusual provisions of a will made it necessary for one Hook to argue that the transfer of preference shares had taken effect prior to the death of the testator. Jenkins J. held that it had, although registration of the transfer by the directors did not occur until later, because the testator had done all he could to transfer the shares before his death. Midland Bank v. Rose was approved, obiter, by Lord Wilberforce in Vandervell v. I.R.C. In Mascall v. Mascall, it was expressly argued that Rose v. I.R.C. was wrongly decided, but the authority of the earlier Court of Appeal decision was upheld, so there is little doubt that what has been called “the Rule in Re Rose” is correct.

Although those sentenced to life imprisonment have no right to release, a life sentence rarely involves imprisonment for the remainder of a convicted offender's natural life. Life prisoners may hope for early release on the so-called “life-licence”, whereby they remain liable to be recalled to prison for the rest of their lives.

Holbeck Hall Hotel stood on the cliffs at Scarborough with views over a lawn and rose garden to the North Sea. The undercliff below the hotel was owned by Scarborough Borough Council. Over the years, natural erosion of the coastline led to relatively minor landslips in the area. The Council engaged engineers to investigate them and remedial works were carried out in 1989, but in 1993 there was a massive landslip. The lawn and rose garden fell into the sea, and the ground under the seaward wing of the hotel collapsed so badly that the whole building had to be demolished. Its owner claimed damages from the Council, and Judge John Hicks Q.C., applying Leakey v. National Trust [1980] Q.B. 485, held the Council liable for breach of a “measured duty of care”. The Court of Appeal agreed that an occupier could be under such a duty to prevent danger to a neighbour’s land from lack of support due to natural causes, but held the Council not liable because it owed no duty in relation to latent defects which could only have been discovered by extensive geological investigation: Holbeck Hall Hotel Ltd. v. Scarborough Borough Council [2000] 2 W.L.R. 1396.