Although very different in many respects, the EU and Canada nevertheless confront common problems in certain areas. One such common problem is how to manage inter-state regulatory diversity within a federal (or federal-like), multinational system. This paper compares the different ways in which the EU and Canada have chosen to address the problem of national barriers to trade within their internal markets, and the consequences of these choices. It is somewhat counterintuitive for EU lawyers that a full-fledged state may have an internal market that is less integrated than that of the EU; and yet that is the case in Canada. The comparison is illuminating as to the different possible approaches of federal polities to the problem of state regulatory choices and barriers to trade, the paramount importance of institutional choice, and the significance of historical and political circumstances.

The standing of natural and legal persons to bring annulment proceedings is one of the most difficult and controversial issues in EC law. Article 173(4) EC states that non-addressees of a Community decision can only challenge it if they are directly and individually concerned by it. In Plaumann v. Commission (Case 25/62 [1963] E.C.R. 95) the Court explained that a decision is of individual concern to non-addressees if it “affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed”. But what degree of factual or legal differentiation must an applicant show to be individually concerned? The standard test is that the applicants need to belong to a “closed category”, namely one the membership of which had become fixed and ascertainable when the measure in question was adopted. The mere capacity of an applicant as a trader, importer or exporter does not suffice to render him individually concerned (Case 38/64 Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v. Commission [1965] E.C.R. 203; Case 191/89 Co-Frutta v. Commission [1989] E.C.R 793).

The many critics of the inadequate protection afforded to consumers by the Hire-Purchase Act, 1938, as amended by the Hire-Purchase Act, 1954, have much to be grateful for in the Hire-Purchase Act, 1964, which received the Royal Assent on July 16, 1964, and became operative on January 1, 1965. Those who were cast down by the rejection, in the Final Report of the (Molony) Committee on Consumer Protection, of suggestions for more fundamental reforms which would replace hire-purchase by something less conceptually misleading, such as the chattel mortgage, may still hope; for it is believed that the deeper study promised before the change of Government in October 1964 still continues.

In recent discussion, gifts to the religious have been perceived as exercising a formative influence in the forging of some norms and customs of feudal tenure during the twelfth century. On the one hand, it has been suggested that gifts to the church assisted the clarification in the mind of lay feudal society of the concept of heritability—that is, the future enjoyment of inheritance—since donors could not alienate in perpetuity that which was not already heritable. This suggestion is extremely important in view of the different perceptions of political and legal historians concerning the development of heritability of tenures and tenant right during the twelfth century, which are seen variously to have existed as social or legal norms from varying times and from different causes. A related argument runs that, whilst the warranty clause in charters (but not warranty per se) was initially conceived within the framework of the personal relationship between lord and man, its more widespread diffusion in charters was stimulated largely through the auspices of these religious beneficiaries of gifts in frankalmoign. The introduction of warranty into charters at the instance of religious beneficiaries is thus related to their concern to secure their own perpetual rights in the land at a time of a nascent realisation of hereditary tenant right, and the religious were thus foremost in the insertion of warranty clauses in charters which they, as beneficiaries, wrote or influenced, to secure their own unbridled tenure in perpetuity.

The reign of Richard I offers certain advantages to those who would A study the land law of that time. Glanvill's De Legibus shows the law as it stood immediately before the reign began; and, five years later, the earliest surviving rolls of the Curia Regis show the King's Justices applying it. These rolls have been printed and so are easily available. They carry the story from the summer of thé year 1194 to the end of the century and beyond. Unfortunately, however, they present certain difficulties. In those days, a plea of land before the King's Justices was ordinarily a lengthy matter, extended by essoins and adjournments over several terms or even years. And when one attempts to trace such a plea to its substantial hearing or to judgment one often fails. Perhaps the roll of the crucial term is missing, or the Justices have adjourned the case from Westminster into the Eyre—whereof few records survive. Perhaps the official scribe has so spelled or altered or contracted the names of the parties as to defy recognition; or the case may have ended prematurely by the death of a party or by some compromise not discoverable among the Feet of Fines. Meanwhile, moreover, one is conscious that these records of the law administered by the King's Justices tell us little or nothing of Shire Court and Court Baron, wherein much of the litigation still lay.

In its ordinary form, the warranty of land was an obligation, owed to the tenant of certain land, to defend him in his possession of that land against all men. This obligation to warrant was primarily, therefore, an obligation to come into Court, if called upon (‘vouched’) by the tenant, in order to defend some action brought against him for the possession of that land.

In common law jurisdictions, there has been considerable academic and judicial discussion of the duties of company directors generally. In contrast, relatively little ink has been spent on the specific duty, if any, of a company director to disclose his own misconduct (in the civil realm) to the company, even less so on the nature and basis of such a duty. This is unsurprising given the very restrictive approach to disclosure obligations in English law. Thus, while a director may in loose terms be said to be under a “duty” to disclose interests that conflict with the company's, such disclosure only serves the purpose of relieving him from liability, and failure to do so per se has not been regarded as an independent source of liability.

This article is concerned with the availability of “proprietary restitution” in cases of mistaken payments. It is argued that the mistake of the claimant is an insufficient justification for proprietary restitution, but a close analysis of the case law demonstrates that the presence of additional factors can justify the availability of proprietary restitution in specific circumstances. The basis of proprietary restitution is to be found in the breach of a duty which arises separately from the claim for unjust enrichment. The significant contribution of this article is the analysis that knowledge merely creates a duty to maintain the fund until restitution is made, and that knowledge cannot establish the breach of this duty. Importantly, breach of this duty is established by a second condition which is demonstrated by the wilful misconduct of the recipient. It is this conduct which justifies the imposition of the constructive trust. By adopting this analysis, the proprietary claim in the context of mistaken transfers can be classified as forming part of the law of wrongs, rather than the law of unjust enrichment.

What use (if any) may be made of settled practice in statutory interpretation and what are the potential justifications for its use? Debate about the use of settled practice is often framed in terms of a tension between legal certainty, on the one hand, and legal correctness in giving effect to Parliament's will, on the other. That account presents a false choice. This article explores the use of settled practice and argues that it has a legitimate role to play in statutory interpretation and one that is consistent with the prevailing approach of the courts to statutory interpretation.

TWO decisions of the Supreme Court – Benkharbouche v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2017] UKSC 62, [2017] 3 W.L.R. 957, and Reyes v Al-Malki [2017] UKSC 61, [2017] 3 W.L.R. 923 – demonstrate the limitations of state and diplomatic immunity in employment disputes, and raise important questions concerning the interaction between immunity and other rules of international law.

In the criminal justice system’s scheme of unpleasant things, what official part is played by “naming and shaming” the offender?

Toby Milsom was the most original English legal historian of the twentieth century. This paper gives a preliminary assessment of the importance of his work. charting the ways in which it has changed our thinking about the subject.

Section 21 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, provides that a wife deserted by her husband may apply to a metropolitan police magistrate for an order for the protection of her earnings; and the statute further provides that it shall be lawful for the husband and for his creditors to apply to the magistrate who made the order for the discharge thereof. A Mrs. Sharpe obtained such an order, and in 1864 her husband wished to apply for its discharge. He discovered that the magistrate who had made the order was dead; and the question what was now his proper course of action came before a bench composed of Cockburn C.J., Blackburn and Shee JJ., who decided unanimously that this was a casus omissus, and that it was not competent for the husband to apply to some other metropolitan magistrate who might present the advantage of being alive. Forthwith, and in the same year, there was passed the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1864, which consists of one section only, and which provides that ‘if the said magistrate shall have died or been removed or have become incapable of acting, then in every such case the husband... may apply to the magistrate for the time being acting as the successor or in the place of the magistrate who made the order.