“The law as to ‘delivery’ of a deed is of ancient date,” said Lord Denning M.R. in a recent case, “but it is reasonably clear. A deed is very different from a contract. On a contract for the sale of land, the contract is not binding on the parties till they have exchanged their parts. A deed is binding on the maker of it, even though the parts have not been exchanged, as long as it has been signed, sealed and delivered. ‘Delivery’ in this connection does not mean ‘handed over’ to the other side. It means delivered in the old legal sense, namely, an act done so as to evince an intention to be bound. Even though the deed remains in the possession of the maker, or of his solicitor, he is bound by it if he has done some act evincing an intention to be bound, as by saying: ‘I deliver this my act and deed.’ He may, however, make the ‘delivery’ conditional: in which case the deed is called an ‘escrow’ which becomes binding when the condition is fulfilled.”

Jurisprudence should ever be at the service of both legal scholar-ship and practice. If it were to dwell immured within the fastness of theory, this would only make it “stink,” as Dicey said, “in the nostrils of the practising barrister ” —to the mutual detriment of jurist and practitioner. This paper attempts at making a small contribution which, it is hoped, might be of service to both and which will have to be judged in the light of result.