Following on from earlier consideration of this issue by the same authors in the 1980s, this article examines the principles governing the negligence liability of public authorities as articulated in recent cases, and in particular the decisions of the House of Lords in X v. Bedfordshire, Stovin v. Wise and Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council. It concludes that the various attempts to establish special principles to govern such liability have been misguided, and that the courts have proved too willing to reject claims on the basis of questionable policy considerations, to the extent that a blanket immunity might appear to have been established in some contexts. Ultimately, this approach has brought the United Kingdom into conflict with its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. It is argued that ordinary private law principles provide a wholly appropriate basis for reconciling the legitimate interests of public authorities with the need to accord justice to individual litigants.

The Human Rights Act enables applicants in judicial review and other legal proceedings to complain that a public authority has violated a Convention right, but only if they are “victims” of that violation. The victim standing test was adopted from the Strasbourg institutions without any consideration being given in Parliament to the appropriateness of such a test in the domestic context. It is argued that the suitability of a particular standing rule for a given jurisdiction cannot properly be evaluated until a theory explaining the juristic function of standing rules has been identified and articulated. Two theoretical aspects of standing rules in public law cases are suggested here, in order to provide a framework in which to assess the appropriateness of the victim test for judicial review cases raising Human Rights Act arguments.

The author considers the potential of the Human Rights Act to influence the future of labour law. First, the development of common law can be based on fundamental human rights principles. Statutory interpretation of employment legislation can also be grounded on this potentially more principled approach. Second, the new legislation may hasten the development of a common law of privacy and provide greater protection for expression of political and religious views in the employment context. Third, it changes the criteria against which the propriety of restrictions in the employment relationship should be judged. It is likely that in judicial review cases the more rigorous proportionality standard rather than the Wednesbury unreasonableness test will be used. Finally, the effective application of human rights in the private sphere is likely since the Convention case-law, the debates in Parliament and the Act itself strongly suggest that the Convention rights will have an indirect effect. The domestic courts must take the opportunity to develop their own human rights standards.