This article considers the contentious invocations of history that have become prominent in debates about English public law. It presents them as uses of history not simply to understand English public law but to reform it, through the reconstruction of historic authorities or reappraisal of historical sources. This article addresses the criticism they have attracted by distinguishing different kinds of orthodox and unorthodox reformist history. It advocates their transparent use and thoroughly deliberative history for reformist purposes in public law. It does so in three distinctive ways: first, by suggesting implications of Coke's dictum on causal understanding for whig historical approaches in the common law; secondly, by reassessing Maitland's dichotomy between the lawyer's logic of authority and the historian's logic of evidence; and, thirdly, by arguing that much can be learnt from the methodological caution, deliberation and rigour promoted by comparativists in their developed literature on legal transplants and law reform.

This article reflects on a group of constitutional devices: mechanisms that empower one state institution to defend itself against another. The institution is given a shield to protect against the attentions of another body, or is given a sword it can use to repel an attack. Self-defence mechanisms are interesting for many reasons, but particularly for the light they cast on the separation of powers. These measures seem contrary to the normal prescriptions of that principle, allocating a capacity to a body that it appears ill suited to possess. Understanding why the separation of powers requires these surprising allocations helps explain its operation in ordinary contexts.

Anti-discrimination complaints by religious employees have constructed seemingly intractable conflicts. The United Kingdom courts have resolved these disputes by diluting individual religious liberty, particularly when determining questions of disadvantage and proportionality under indirect discrimination. This article explores an alternative UK anti-discrimination claim route for religious employees, namely an employer duty of reasonable accommodation. A comparative analysis outlines the corresponding Canadian duty. This model is applied to UK employment cases featuring indirect religious discrimination, specifically those claims which formed the recent applications in Eweida and Others v UK. It is suggested that adoption of the Canadian model be considered: its nuanced approach to proportionality is particularly instructive. Whilst such a UK duty could prove controversial, it would cohere with both normative theory in law and religion and conceptual understanding of anti-discrimination law. Moreover, reasonable accommodation's individualised focus should be acclaimed; it need not compromise collective notions of religious liberty.

When the Land Registration Act 2002 first came into force, the prevailing academic view was that it had created a system of “title by registration”, such that, where someone (B) is mistakenly registered as owner of another person's (A's) land, he acquires a good title (notwithstanding the mistake) that can validly be conveyed to someone else (C). The thesis of this article is that, whilst the logic of the “title by registration” principle might be conceptually attractive, it has proven to be unworkable in practice, is questionable as a matter of policy, and – looking to the future – ought to be abandoned in favour of a more subtle legislative scheme for resolving A-B-C disputes.

This article explores the variation of the standard of care in negligence to favour defendants, an issue of considerable practical significance which has not previously been the subject of systematic analysis. By shining a spotlight on this issue I hope to show that varying the standard of care in this way is a useful technique, which is and could be used in a number of types of case to achieve an appropriate balance between liability and non-liability. I also hope to show that if this technique is employed there are some ways of varying the standard of care which are preferable to others. The structure of the analysis is centred around three core questions. First, to what extent has English negligence law already varied the standard of care to favour defendants? Secondly, if the standard of care is to be varied, how should this be done? And thirdly, when and why might the use of a modified standard of care be desirable?

Autonomous self-determination by competent adults is a cornerstone of medical law. We argue that the application of Kantian autonomy as the paramount model for self-determination at end of life is questionable as it fails to capture subtler nuances of decision-making in this context. We propose an alternative model which we term ‘holistic determination for oneself’ and posit this as a potential contender to the traditional Kantian construct. The paradigm of holistic determination is conceptualised on the basis of sub-determinations which coalesce to form the final determination. This paradigm offers a unique perspective that is multi-axial (based on the levels of decision-making) and multi-dimensional (based on an on-going temporal inter-relational and integrative synthesis of decisions at all levels). Holistic determination for oneself offers a paradigm that is tempered, universal and optimal for self-determination at end of life.

This article proposes a new framework for determining the availability of proprietary remedies for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. It examines the alternative and conflicting arguments put forward in the leading cases, and suggests that they fail to justify their conclusions, either under- or over-estimating the incidence of proprietary relief for fiduciary disloyalty. These shortcomings appear to be the result of inappropriate reliance on familiar equitable formulae, in particular the routine equitable duty to account, the seemingly inescapable maxim that “equity treats as done that which ought to be done”, and the potent rules of tracing.