Tax legislation is probably the lengthiest and most complex legislation enacted in the United Kingdom. But the sheer volume of the legislation has not brought certainty of meaning or predictability of application. The legislation is seriously wanting in clarity and simplicity. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue are responsible for the “collection and management of the inland revenue”, and “have all necessary powers for carrying into execution every Act of Parliament relating to inland revenue”.

The capacity of the common law to develop and evolve is well recognised within both private and public law. This is indeed one of its enduring qualities. The objective of the present article is not, however, to contribute to the jurisprudential debate concerning the nature of the adjudicative process at common law. My object is more modest. It is to consider and place in perspective some of the recent developments which have occurred at common law in relation to the duty of public authorities to provide reasons. It is a well known and oft repeated proposition that there is no general common law duty to furnish the reasons for a decision. It is equally well known that this proposition has been the target of regular attack by those who argue that such a general duty should exist. A reconsideration of both of these propositions is timely in the light of case law developments culminating in the House of Lords' judgment in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Doody.

Any defendant with a criminal record, who takes the witness-stand, must beware the snares of section 1(f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. The shield this statute confers, once described by Viscount Sankey as “one of the most deeply rooted and jealously guarded principles of our criminal law”, which forbids the prosecution or any co-accused from questioning him on his previous convictions and general bad character, can be forfeited in three ways. An accused may variously adduce evidence of his good character, cast imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the Crown, or give evidence against a co-accused: in each of these circumstances, under sub-provisos (ii) and (iii) of section 1(f), cross-examination of the accused on his bad character then becomes permissible with the leave of the judge. Although there is a frail argument that such evidence may go to issue, the overwhelming preponderance of authority holds

To the annoyance of students and academics alike, the law of tort contains a number of awkward heads of liability which defy classification except under “Miscellaneous” or some similar rubric. This article explores one such: the action on the case for damage to the plaintiffs reversionary interest in a chattel. This oddly obscure head, of liability does not even have a generally-accepted name (in this article it is christened, for brevity, “reversionary damage”). It is traditionally dismissed by the text-books in a paragraph or two; the leading cases on it are rarely cited; and yet in practice it is a highly important aspect of the law of personal property without which the owner's protection would be seriously incomplete.

This article seeks to consider whether it is, or should be, possible for companies to give covenants which amount to fetters on their statutory powers. The companies legislation confers many powers on companies but perhaps the most important are the powers to alter objects and articles by special resolution, and the power to alter share capital provided that there is authority to such effect in articles of association. The question whether it is possible to contract out of these statutory powers has received much recent attention because of the decision of the House of Lords in Russell v. Northern Bank Development Corporation Ltd.

Fuller made a leading contribution to the understanding of the adversary system and the process of adjudication. He did not officially publish his paper, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”, but distributed it widely and discussed it in his correspondence with prominent academics. His analysis of the limits of adjudication has been influential in both England and North America.