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ESCAPING THE WILDERNESS: R. v BOLTON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR ERROR OF LAW

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 May 2016

Philip Murray
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Abstract

English administrative law treats almost all errors of law as reviewable. Concerns that this deprives administrators of their autonomy have led to calls for a distinction to be drawn between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of law. This was commonplace for much of administrative law's history. Such calls have fallen on deaf ears as courts and commentators express caution towards retreating to an approach which, it is said, led to a “wilderness of single instances”. This article examines the older law to see whether that was really the case, concentrating on the important decision of the Court of Queen's Bench in R. v Bolton (1841).

Keywords

administrative lawjudicial reviewerror of lawjurisdictionhistory of administrative law
Type
Articles
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The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 75 , Issue 2 , July 2016 , pp. 333 - 365
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Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2016 

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References

1 Anisminic Ltd. v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147.

2 R. v Lord President of the Privy Council, ex parte Page [1993] A.C. 682 (sub. nom. R. v Hull University Visitor, ex parte Page).

3 Broadly speaking, two have been recognised in the case law. First, where a decision-maker is interpreting a body of domestic legal rules, like university or college statutes, certain errors of law will be considered non-jurisdictional: Page, ibid. Second, inferior courts of law might in some cases be able to make non-jurisdictional errors of law: Re Racal Communications Ltd. [1981] A.C. 374, 382–84, per Lord Diplock, obiter. The House of Lords in R. v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 23 also recognised that, in certain circumstances, the evaluative nature of the administrative inquiry required by a given set of laws might mean that it is hard to say that an error of law has been committed at all, even if the reviewing court might have reached a different decision in the case at hand, but this is not really an exception to the principle that all errors of law, once identified as such, are jurisdictional.

4 R. (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2009] EWHC 3052 (Admin); [2010] EWCA Civ 859; [2011] Q.B. 120 (Divisional Court and Court of Appeal); [2011] UKSC 28; [2012] 1 A.C. 663 (Supreme Court).

5 D.J. Feldman, “Error of Law and Flawed Administrative Acts” [2014] C.L.J. 275.

6 Forsyth, C.F., “The Rock and the Sand: Jurisdiction and Remedial Discretion” [2013] J.R. 360Google Scholar, 377; see also P. Murray, “Process, Substance and the History of Error of Law Review”, in J. Bell, M. Elliott, J.N.E. Varuhas, and P. Murray (eds.), Public Law Adjudication in Common Law Systems: Process and Substance (Oxford 2016), 108–11.

7 Beatson, J., “The Scope of Judicial Review for Error of Law” (1984) 4 O.J.L.S. 22Google Scholar; Daly, P., “Deference on Questions of Law” (2011) 74 M.L.R. 694CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I am grateful to Mark Elliott for these references.

8 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] A.C. 997.

9 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40.

10 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374.

11 See Allison, J.W.F., “History to Understand, and History to Reform, English Public Law” [2013] C.L.J. 526CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Murray, “Process, Substance”, note 6 above, pp. 90–92.

13 R. v Bolton (1841) 1 Q.B. 66.

14 Gordon, D.M., “The Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction” (1929) 45 L.Q.R. 459Google Scholar, 459.

15 Cf. Costello, K., “R. (Martin) v Mahony; the History of a Classical Certiorari Authority” (2006) 27 J.L.H. 267, 270–71Google Scholar.

16 Costello, K., “The Writ of Certiorari and Review of Summary Criminal Convictions, 1660–1848” (2012) 128 L.Q.R. 443Google Scholar, 443. See also Costello, K., “‘More Equitable than the Judgment of the Justices of the Peace’: The King's Bench and the Poor Law 1630–1800” (2014) 35 J.L.H. 3Google Scholar and Murray, “Process, Substance”, note 6 above.

17 J.S. Anderson, “Judicial Review”, in W. Cornish, J.S. Anderson, R. Cox, et al. (eds), The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol. 11 (Oxford 2010), 488–89.

18 A. Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality (Oxford 1965), 70–71; Jaffe, L.L., “Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact” (1957) 70 Harvard L.R. 953CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 958. Rubinstein and Jaffe root this development in the late 1750s, citing R. v Wakefield (1758) 1 Burr. 485; 2 Keny. 164 and R. v Inhabitants of Hitcham (1760) 1 Burr. S.C. 589.

19 For a general overview of this history, see de Smith, S.A., “The Prerogative Writs” [1951] C.L.J. 40, 45–48Google Scholar; and E.G. Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law (Cambridge MA 1963), ch. 3.

20 See R. (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28; [2012] 1 A.C. 663.

21 TNA: K.B. 1/65/3/2, affidavit 91(ii) (affidavit of James Bolton), 7 May 1839, p. 1.

22 Cf. TNA: K.B. 1/65/3/2, affidavit 91(ii) (affidavit of James Bolton), 7 May 1839, p. 8.

23 This picture is presented in the report of the decision of the Queen's Bench, based on the formal information submitted to the justices of the peace at the initial hearing in Bolton's case: see Bolton (1841) 1 Q.B. 66, 67–68. In his affidavits submitted to the Queen's Bench, however, Mr. Bolton made no mention of his going to prison or ceasing to be a tenant: TNA: K.B. 1/65/3/2, affidavit 91(ii) (affidavit of James Bolton), 7 May 1839; TNA: K.B. 1/69, affidavit 56 (affidavit of James Bolton), 17 January 1840.

24 TNA: K.B. 1/65/3/2, affidavit 91(ii) (affidavit of James Bolton), 7 May 1839, pp. 1–2.

25 Ibid., at pp. 3–4.

26 See the rule nisi for the writ of certiorari Mr. Bolton subsequently secured from the Queen's Bench, TNA: K.B. 21/61, 8 May 1839.

27 Stat. 59 Geo. III, c. 12.

28 TNA: K.B. 1/65/3/2, affidavit 91(ii) (affidavit of James Bolton), 7 May 1839, p. 4.

29 Ibid., at pp. 4–5.

30 Ibid., at pp. 5–6.

31 Ibid., at pp. 6–8.

32 The justices of the peace were given notice of the application on 1 March 1839: TNA: K.B. 1/65/3/2, affidavit 91(i) (affidavit of service), 7 May 1839.

33 See Costello, “The Writ of Certiorari”, note 16 above, pp. 459–60.

34 TNA: K.B. 1/65/3/2, affidavit 91(ii) (affidavit of James Bolton), 7 May 1839, p. 11. This was elaborated in a second affidavit submitted by Mr. Bolton at a later stage in the litigation: TNA: K.B. 1/69, affidavit 56 (affidavit of James Bolton), 17 January 1840, pp. 1–2 and 6–19.

35 TNA: K.B. 1/65/3/2, affidavit 91(ii) (affidavit of James Bolton), 7 May 1839, p. 11; TNA: K.B. 1/69, affidavit 56 (affidavit of James Bolton), 17 January 1840, pp. 2–3.

36 TNA: K.B. 1/65/3/2, affidavit 91(ii) (affidavit of James Bolton), 7 May 1839, pp. 9–10; TNA: K.B. 1/69, affidavit 56 (affidavit of James Bolton), 17 January 1840, pp. 5–6.

37 TNA: K.B. 21/61, 8 May 1839.

38 R. v Bolton, sub. nom. R. v Justices of Middlesex (1839) 7 Dowl. 767.

39 Ibid., at p. 767.

40 Ibid., at p. 768.

41 Ibid., at p. 769.

42 Ibid.

43 TNA: K.B. 21/62, 12 November 1839.

44 TNA: K.B. 21/62, 27 January 1840.

45 Bolton (1841) 1 Q.B. 66, 68.

46 Ibid., at pp. 69–70.

47 Ibid., at p. 70.

48 (1802) 2 East 244, cited in Bolton (1841) 1 Q.B. 66, 71.

49 Bolton (1841) 1 Q.B. 66, 70–71.

50 Ibid., at p. 71.

51 TNA: K.B. 21/62, 12 January 1841.

52 Bolton (1841) 1 Q.B. 66, 72.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid, at pp. 73–74 (emphasis original). A similar expression of this principle can be found earlier in Lord Denman's judgment, pp. 72–73.

55 Ibid., at p. 74.

56 Ibid., at p. 75.

57 [1969] 2 A.C. 147.

58 [1993] A.C. 682. Though this acceptance was obiter dictum: the ratio of the case was that the decision-maker in question, the Visitor of the University of Hull, was still able to commit errors of law that were non-jurisdictional.

59 It is difficult to draw a bright line between cases of “misinterpretation” on the one hand and cases of “misapplication” on the other. Furthermore, it might be that the courts are less exacting in reviewing cases of misapplication, showing a greater willingness to depart from the absolute correctness standard favoured in Anisminic, as interpreted by Page: R. v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 23; R. (A.) v Croydon London Borough Council [2009] UKSC 8; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 2557. I am grateful to Mark Elliott for this point.

60 Cf. note 3 above.

61 (1802) 2 East 244.

62 Stat. 17 Geo. II, c. 38.

63 (1802) 2 East 244, 247.

64 Ibid., at pp. 248–49.

65 Ibid., at p. 249.

66 Stat. 13 Geo. III, c. 78.

67 R. v Justices of the North Riding (1827) 6 B. & C. 152.

68 Ibid., at p. 153, per Abbot C.J.

69 R. v Justices of Cheshire (1838) 8 A. & E. 398.

70 Ibid., at p. 403.

71 E.g. R. v Allen (1812) 15 East 333; R. v James (1815) 2 M. & S. 321; R. v Walsall (inhabitants) (1818) 2 B. & Ald. 157; R. v Justices of Somersetshire (1822) 1 Dow. & Ry. 443; R. v Commissioners of Sewers for Tower Hamlets (1829) 9 B. & C. 517; R. v Justices of Denbighshire (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 616; R. v Justices of Cambridgeshire (1835) 4 A. & E. 111; R. v Justices of Lancashire (1839) 11 A. & E. 144.

72 Anderson, “Judicial Review”, note 17 above, pp. 489–90. Anderson, at pp. 490–91, suggests that trespass actions could only be brought where a justice had acted without jurisdiction, and indeed this principle was established in the Case of the Marshalsea (1612) 10 Co. Rep. 68b (see generally Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality, note 18 above, pp. 54–61). This is difficult to reconcile, however, with the judgment of Yates J. in Strickland v Ward (1767) 7 T.R. 633, where it seems to have been envisaged that an action in trespass could be brought in circumstances where justices of the peace were admitted to have acted with jurisdiction. Similarly, as Anderson himself says, at p. 491, in Burn's Justice of the Peace, it was noted that the provisions of the Justices Protection Act 1803 applied “to those cases only where the justice improperly [i.e. with jurisdiction] convicts”, thus implicitly recognising the possibility of an action in such circumstances: R. Burn, The Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer, 21st ed., vol. 3 (London 1810), 40. Perhaps the better view, again suggested by Anderson, is that, despite the Marshalsea case, actions could be brought in trespass for intra-jurisdictional conduct once the record had been quashed in certiorari proceedings, but only because the record could no longer be invoked by the defendant as legal justification for his conduct: see Costello, “More Equitable”, note 16 above, p. 22.

73 (1819) 1 Brod. & Bing. 432.

74 Stat. 2 Geo. III, c. 28.

75 (1819) 1 Brod. & Bing. 432, 433, per Lens Serjt.

76 Ibid., at pp. 433–34.

77 Ibid., at p. 438.

78 (1840) 1 Man. & G. 257.

79 Malicious Injuries to Property (England) Act 1827 (Stat. 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 30), s. 19.

80 (1840) 1 Man. & G. 257, 261.

81 Ibid., at p. 262, per Tindal C.J.

82 It is unclear whether this was required in cases where liability in tort was grounded on the non-jurisdictional status of the defendant's conduct. This is suggested by Costello, “The Writ of Certiorari”, note 16 above, pp. 459–60. See also note 72 above.

83 See W. Paley, The Law and Practice of Summary Convictions, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (London 1827), 303–15; and R. Gude, The Practice of the Crown Side of the Court of King's Bench, vol. 1 (London 1828), 213–14. Under Quarter Sessions Appeal Act 1731 (Stat. 5 Geo. II, c. 19), s. 2, anyone prosecuting a certiorari had to pay a recognisance of £50, their own costs, and promise to pay the costs of the other side if the justices’ order was upheld. Under Laws Continuance Act 1739 (Stat. 13 Geo. II, c. 18), s. 5, certiorari against justices’ orders had a six-month limitation period, and six days' notice had to be given to the justices of the peace before applying for the writ.

84 Costello, “The Writ of Certiorari”, note 16 above, p. 451.

85 (1841) 1 Q.B. 66, 69.

86 Ibid., at p. 75.

87 See Costello, “More Equitable”, note 16 above, pp. 11–14.

88 Anderson, “Judicial Review”, note 17 above, p. 490.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid, at pp. 488 and 491–92.

91 Ibid, at p. 489.

92 Costello, “The Writ of Certiorari”, note 16 above, pp. 459–60.

93 See Anderson, “Judicial Review”, note 17 above, 490–91.

94 Ibid.

95 Costello points out that standard-form convictions started to appear in the 1730s: Costello, “The Writ of Certiorari”, note 16 above, p. 464.

96 Stat. 3 Geo. IV, c. 23.

97 Larceny Act 1827 (Stat. 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 29) ss. 71–73; Malicious Injuries to Property (England) Act 1827 (Stat. 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 30), ss. 37–39; Offences Against the Person Act 1828 (Stat. 9 Geo. IV, c. 31), ss. 35–36.

98 See Anderson, “Judicial Review”, note 17 above, p. 492.

99 J. Stone, The Practice of the Petty Sessions (London 1839), 127; Anderson, ibid., p. 492.

100 See W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1st ed., vol. 4 (Oxford 1769), 277–80.

101 Indictable Offences Act 1848 (Stat. 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42), Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848 (Stat. 11 & 12 Vict., c. 43) and Justices Protection Act 1848 (Stat. 11 & 12 Vict., c. 44). See Anderson, “Judicial Review”, note 17 above, p. 494; see also Freestone, D. and Richardson, J.C., “The Making of English Criminal Law: Sir John Jervis and His Acts” [1980] Crim. L.R. 5Google Scholar. The thrust of these enactments was to provide a “complete code of practice and procedure” for justices acting outside the quarter sessions: Freestone and Richardson, p. 9.

102 On the general features of the Act, see Freestone and Richardson, ibid., at pp. 12–13.

103 Though certiorari review for patent errors of law came to be creatively re-imagined in the middle of the twentieth century in R. v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 K.B. 338. See G. Sawer, “Error of Law on the Face of an Administrative Record” 3 Univ. W.A. Ann. L. Rev. 24, especially at 33–36.

104 Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848 (Stat. 11 & 12 Vict., c. 43), ss. 1, 17, 32, and 35.

105 Stat. 11 & 12 Vict., c. 44. See Freestone and Richardson, “Making of English Criminal Law”, note 101 above, pp. 13–14.

106 Anderson, “Judicial Review”, note 17 above, pp. 494–95.

107 Stat. 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42.

108 Anderson, “Judicial Review”, note 17 above, pp. 495–97; Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality, note 18 above, pp. 73–74.

109 Stat. 12 & 13 Vict., c. 45.

110 Stat. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 43.

111 See H.W. Arthurs, “Without the Law”: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto 1985), 147, and K. Costello, “R. (Martin) v Mahony”, note 15 above, pp. 270–71.

112 Stat. 42 & 43 Vict., c. 49.

113 See Anderson, “Judicial Review”, note 17 above, p. 497; Newark, F.H., “On Appealing to the Lords” (1949) 8 N.I.L.Q. 102Google Scholar, 111.

114 (1843) 3 Q.B. 800. See also R. v St. Olave's Board of Works (1857) 8 E. & B. 529.

115 (1843) 3 Q.B. 800, 807 (emphasis added), per Lord Denman C.J.

116 (1851) 15 J.P. 783.

117 Ibid., per curiam.

118 R. v Justices of Westmoreland (1843) 1 Dow. & L. 178; R. v Justices of Dorsetshire (1844) 2 L.T.O.S. 352; R. v Justices of the North Riding, ex parte Peckham (1844) 8 J.P. 63; R. v Rose (1845) 15 L.J.M.C. 6; R. v Sevenoaks (inhabitants) (1845) 7 Q.B. 136; R. v Arkwright (1848) 12 Q.B. 960; R. v Justices of the West Riding (1849) 13 J.P. 52; R. v Jarvis (1854) 3 E. & B. 640; R. v Saunders (1854) 3 E. & B. 763; Ex parte Smith (1861) 1 B. & S. 412; R. v Bray (1862) 3 B. & S. 255; R. v James (1863) 3 B. & S. 901; Ex parte Pudding Norton Overseers (1864) 33 L.J.M.C. 136; R. v Cousins (1864) 4 B. & S. 849; R. v Ratepayers of Northowram and Clayton (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 110; R. v Justices of Shropshire (1866) 14 L.T. 598; R. v Hardy (1868) L.R. 4 Q.B. 117; R. v Local Government Board (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 227; R. v Lee (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 198; Ex parte Wake (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 291, (1883) 12 Q.B.D. 142; R. v Powell (1884) 51 L.T. 92; R. v Brindley (1885) 54 L.T. 435; R. v Justices of the Central Criminal Court (1886) 17 Q.B.D. 598; R. v Hanley (recorder) (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 481; Ex parte Daisy Hopkins (1891) 61 L.J.Q.B. 240; R. v Bruce [1892] 2 Q.B. 136; R. v Lord Mayor of London, ex parte Boaler [1893] 2 Q.B. 146; R. v London County Court, ex parte Commercial Gas (1895) 11 T.L.R. 337; R. v Board of Agriculture (1899) 15 T.L.R. 176. A similar conclusion, albeit without a rigorous analysis of the case law, was reached by Sawer, “Error of Law”, note 103 above, pp. 31–32.

119 [1922] 2 I.R. 76 (Court of Appeal in Southern Ireland).

120 R. v Justices of Weston-super-Mare, ex parte Barkers (Contractors) Ltd. [1944] 1 All E.R. 747.

121 Ibid., at p. 751, per Atkinson J. See also Shridramappa Pasare v Narhari Bin Schwappa (1900) L.R. 27 I.A. 216; R. (Martin) v Mahony [1910] 2 I.R. 695, especially per Lord O'Brien C.J. at 705–10 and Gibson J. at 738–50 (cf. Palles C.B. at 719–26); R. v Justices of Cheshire, ex parte Heaver (1913) 108 L.T. 374; R. v Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. [1922] 2 A.C. 128; R. v Justices of Lincolnshire, ex parte Brett [1926] 2 K.B. 192; R. v Minister of Health [1939] 1 K.B. 232; R. v Minister of Transport, ex parte WH Beech-Allen Ltd. (1963) 62 L.G.R. 76; Essex County Council v Essex Incorporated Congregational Church Union [1963] A.C. 808, per Lord Devlin at 833–37.

122 G.T.V. Simonds (ed.), Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (London 1953), 62.

123 R. v Bradford [1907] 1 K.B. 365, 372, per Channell J.

124 Ibid.

125 R. v Judge Sir Donald Hurst, ex parte Smith [1960] 2 Q.B. 133.

126 See Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. v Ali [2001] UKHL 8; [2002] 1 A.C. 251, 273, at [52], per Lord Hoffmann.

127 [1922] 2 A.C. 128.

128 Ibid., at p. 154.

129 Ibid., at p. 159. Though Lord Sumner did go on to say, at p. 159, that R. v Bolton “did not change … the general law”. Similar views were expressed by Gibson J. in the Irish case of R. (Martin) v Mahony [1910] 2 I.R. 695, 738. With respect, this seems to ignore the key conceptual change introduced by Bolton, as outlined above; it begs the question of why Bolton, if it did not change the general law in any way, became such an important case.

130 R. (Martin) v Mahony [1910] 2 I.R. 695, 710; see also Gibson J. at 738–40.

131 Gordon, “The Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction”, note 14 above; Gordon, D.M., “Observance of Law as a Condition of Jurisdiction” (1931) 47 L.Q.R. 386Google Scholar and 557; Gordon, D.M., “Excess of Jurisdiction in Sentencing or Awarding Relief” (1939) 55 L.Q.R. 521Google Scholar; Gordon, D.M., “Quashing on Certiorari for Error in Law” (1951) 67 L.Q.R. 452Google Scholar; Gordon, D.M., “Conditional or Contingent Jurisdiction of Tribunals” (1960) 1 U.B.C.L. Rev. 185Google Scholar; Gordon, D.M., “Jurisdictional Fact: an Answer” (1966) 82 L.Q.R. 515Google Scholar; Gordon, D.M., “What did the Anisminic Case Decide?” (1966) 82 L.Q.R. 515Google Scholar.

132 S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 1st ed. (London 1959), 66–67.

133 Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality, note 18 above, p. 212. Though Rubinstein's problem seemed to stem more from the difficulty of distinguishing subject-matters over which a decision-maker might have jurisdiction to decide from those subject-matters which conditioned the decision-maker's jurisdiction; he was less concerned with the limited style of review favoured by Gordon, nor with the idea intrinsic in Bolton that an inquiry into a subject matter over which the decision-maker did have jurisdiction, once properly commenced, could not be lost because of some error arising during the inquiry: pp. 212–14.

134 See W. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 10th ed. (Oxford 2014), 228: “… there was general dissatisfaction with the numerous tribunals set up under the welfare state which often had to interpret very difficult legislation and from which Parliament had provided few rights of appeal.”

135 This is captured by two aspects of Dicey's rule of law, namely “that no man is punishable … except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land” and “that … every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals”: see A.V. Dicey and J.W.F. Allison (ed.), The Law of the Constitution (Oxford 2013), 97–101.

136 de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, note 132 above, p. 68.

137 W. Wade, Administrative Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1967), 83.

138 Namely the Furnished Houses (Rent Control) Act 1946 and the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act 1949. See de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action, note 132 above, pp. 71–72. See also R. v Blackpool Rent Tribunal, ex parte Ashton [1948] 2 K.B. 277; R. v City of London Rent Tribunal, ex parte Honig [1951] 1 K.B. 641; R. v Fulham, Hammersmith and Kensington Rent Tribunal, ex parte Zerek [1951] 2 K.B. 1, per Lord Goddard C.J. at 6; R. v Hackney, Islington and Stoke Newington Rent Tribunal, ex parte Keats [1951] 2 K.B. 15 (note); R. v Judge Pugh, ex parte Graham [1951] 2 K.B. 623; R. v Fulham, Hammersmith and Kensington Rent Tribunal, ex parte Hierowski [1953] 2 Q.B. 147; Heptulla Brothers Ltd. v Thakore [1956] 1 W.L.R. 289 (Privy Council).

139 [1969] 2 A.C. 223 (reproducing the judgment of Browne J. in the Divisional Court from 1966).

140 [1968] 2 Q.B. 862.

141 Ibid., at p. 904.

142 Ibid., at p. 884.

143 [1969] 2 A.C. 147.

144 Indeed, writing just months before the House of Lords handed down its decision in Anisminic, the “materiality of the conceptual distinction between errors within jurisdiction and errors going to jurisdiction” was insisted upon by de Smith – a distinction which English judges were considered, at least in the opinion of de Smith, to be unable to jettison: S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd ed. (London 1968), 100. Given the intellectual pull of Bolton at this time, though, we might question de Smith's cynicism about this dominant approach, which he said led to “manifestly contradictory” cases, the “prolonged reflection” on which “tends to induce feelings of desperation”: ibid. Wade put it more strongly, commenting that the Bolton approach was one with which the courts had only “occasionally flirted with … in the nineteenth century”, which by 1967 had been “long abandoned”: Wade, Administrative Law, note 137 above, p. 83. See also J.A.G. Griffith and H. Street, Principles of Administrative Law, 4th ed. (London 1967), 217.

145 Murray, “Process, Substance”, note 6 above.

146 See notes 3 and 7 above. See also R. (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28; [2012] 1 A.C. 663.

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid.

149 See P. Murray, “Judicial Review of the Upper Tribunal: Appeal, Review, and the Will of Parliament” [2011] C.L.J. 487. Also Forsyth, “The Rock and the Sand”, note 6 above; and Murray, “Process, Substance”, note 6 above.

150 R. (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlements Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 A.C. 48.

151 Murray, “Process, Substance”, note 6 above, pp. 104–07.

152 Ibid., at pp. 107–11.